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SPECIAL NOTICE INSIDE

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USSR REPORT

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No 2, February 1987

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NEED FOR NEW POLITICAL THINKING IN WORLD SECURITY

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[Article by G.A. Trofimenko: "New Realities and a New Way of Thinking";
passages rendered in all capital letters are printed in boldface in source]

[Text] It has been a year since the 27th CPSU Congress. Soviet domestic and foreign policy has been developing all year under the influence of congress decisions and has been aimed at their implementation. In the domestic policy sphere this has meant the acceleration of the country's socioeconomic development by transferring the national economy to the intensive course of development.

In the sphere of foreign policy strategy the main goal stipulated at the congress "consists in securing the Soviet people's ability to work in an atmosphere of lasting peace and freedom." This is why the main area of CPSU activity in the international arena has been struggle against the nuclear danger and the arms race, and struggle for the maintenance and reinforcement of world peace. The congress stressed that "there is no alternative to this policy."¹

The analysis of the dynamic aspects of the international situation by congress speakers, whose conclusions were developed and clarified in the foreign policy initiatives and actions of the Soviet state, made a significant contribution to the theory of international relations.

The Need for a New Way of Thinking in Foreign Policy

The entire discussion of foreign policy issues was permeated by the idea that all of the necessary conditions exist in the world for the development of new approaches and new ways of thinking in the sphere of international relations. The need to renounce outdated doctrines and foreign policy stereotypes which complicate cooperation between nations in the reinforcement of international security was stated unequivocally.

The statement about the need for a new way of thinking in the sphere of foreign policy was motivated precisely by a desire to find radically new but realistic ways of solving the main problem of the present day--the problem of eliminating the danger of nuclear war and of maintaining and strengthening world peace.

New approaches are needed because the stockpiling of nuclear missiles in the world has changed the very nature of war irrevocably. A nuclear world war today would mean the end of all human civilization and the probable disappearance of man as a biological species. Today this statement is not merely an effective rhetorical device. This frightening prospect is corroborated by the research of the competent scientists of the world, who paint a horrifying picture of global ecological catastrophe--nuclear winter--even if the warring sides do not use all of the nuclear explosives at their disposal.

Just recently, one of the most zealous Western opponents of communism said: "After all, we know that the destruction in an atomic war will be terrible. But perhaps it will be worth paying even this high price to rid the world of the evil of communism." The death of 10 percent of the human race in a nuclear war between the United States and the USSR will not mean the end of civilization,² Z. Brzezinski said with morbid optimism when he cited these "absolutely precise" calculations.

We must frankly admit that this devil-may-care attitude toward atomic war can also be found in articles by some of our theorists. This is partly due to the fact that the USSR had to live for some time under the conditions of substantially unequal strategic capabilities, when the nuclear balance was ten to one in favor of the United States. Furthermore, before the ICBM became an important element of strategic forces, U.S. capabilities for the delivery of nuclear projectiles to targets in the USSR were much greater in view of the network of American overseas air force bases along the perimeter of the Soviet Union. This forced optimism was apparently a result of some people's underestimation of all of the possible consequences of nuclear war, it stemmed from the traditional approach to this kind of war as an essentially ordinary war with more powerful explosives, and it was engendered by the centuries-old prevailing notion of war as the "court of last resort."

The Soviet leadership advised the renunciation of these stereotypes. "Whether we like each other or not, we will have to live or die together,"³ M.S. Gorbachev said in reference to USSR-U.S. relations. This is not easy to admit. It would have been much simpler to resort to the cliché that only capitalism will die while socialism survives. The Soviet leadership, however, has faced the facts and has frankly informed its own people and the "potential adversary" of the consequences of war, stating that their prevention will necessitate a change in customary ways of thinking and the renunciation of common stereotypes. This will also entail the revision of some theoretical premises, which were correct at one time but cannot be considered valid in the nuclear age.

For example, everyone knows Clausewitz' definition of war as the continuation of diplomacy by other means (or, more precisely, the continuation of diplomatic relations with the inclusion of other means). This definition was once developed by the founder of the Soviet State, V.I. Lenin, who stipulated the need to discern the specific class interests behind any policy. He wisely predicted, however, that weapons would be improved continuously and that "the time will come when war will become so destructive that it will become completely impossible."³ This is what happened when nuclear missiles were developed and were stockpiled by the nuclear powers. The new way of thinking

demands the renunciation of the view of nuclear war as a continuation of diplomacy by other means. "Global nuclear war," M.S. Gorbachev stressed, "can no longer be the continuation of reasonable diplomacy because it will mean the end of all life, and therefore of all diplomacy."⁵

The other side seems to agree with this belief. During the summit meeting in Geneva in November 1985, President Reagan signed a statement that a nuclear war must never be started and that there can be no winners in this kind of war. Nevertheless, the United States has simply refused to stop the nuclear arms race. Western theorists of militarism have continued seeking justification for nuclear weapons even after political leaders in the Western countries acknowledged the catastrophic nature and impermissibility of nuclear war.

"Nuclear weapons are useful only if they are never used," wrote C. Krauthammer, one of the Republicans' current favorite analysts of the nuclear balance. To ensure that they will not be used, the author goes on to say, "you must convince your enemy that you will use them in response to an attack. This willingness to use them is what the moralists find unacceptable."⁶ Other theorists and politicians say that nuclear weapons are necessary to the West for the prevention of nuclear and non-nuclear wars. The same Brzezinski, applauding Reagan's refusal to agree to sweeping nuclear arms reductions in Reykjavik, said that "making the world safe for conventional (non-nuclear--G.T.) war cannot be an American goal."⁷ And this kind of war, he implies, will certainly become a reality if the United States and USSR give up not all of their nuclear weapons, but just their ICBM's. Brzezinski is not the only one to express this opinion. It is being energetically expounded by M. Thatcher, H. Kohl, J. Chirac and several other conservative leaders in Western Europe, who are trying to convince the public in their own countries that nuclear disarmament is impossible.

This has created a vicious circle: Yes, nuclear war is unthinkable, cannot be won, and must not be fought, but its avoidance will necessitate the possession and continuous improvement (even without a quantitative buildup) of nuclear weapons to secure a "position of strength," because nuclear war can be deterred only from a position of strength.

We should recall, however, that this was precisely the line of reasoning used in past centuries by apologists for the buildup of conventional arms--offensive and defensive: "If you want peace, prepare for war." Preparations of this kind, however, have never eliminated war. On the contrary, they have made war almost a natural institution of human society.

In fact, how did a large state solve the problem of security? By attempts to create so-called absolute security--that is, a situation of inaccessible superiority or invulnerability to potential enemies. This was accomplished either by designing better offensive weapons--the crossbow, followed by the musket, the rifle, the machine-gun, and so forth--or by organizing "impenetrable" defenses: the armor of a knight and the medieval castles--the most vivid proof that the means of warfare were often created on the pretext of its prevention. The traditional--to avoid the term militarist--way of thinking wants to perpetuate war today on the same pretext: Nuclear weapons are

needed for the prevention of war. Secretary of State G. Shultz published a special reference article, "New Realities and New Ways of Thinking," in the influential American magazine FOREIGN AFFAIRS.⁸ But what does the article advise, what new approaches does it recommend?

Negotiations should be accompanied by the buildup of strength; the "new creative way of thinking" in Europe is a signal of "stronger West European cooperation in the defensive sphere." Strength and diplomacy must be combined. I am not referring to Shultz' belief that the "weakening of the Soviet system" would be the best thing for the United States.⁹ This is an extremely familiar refrain. After all, it can be found in the American documents of the 1950's on the cold war strategy, with the aid of which the United States planned to use military force to attain its hegemonic goals in the postwar world.¹⁰

The U.S. leaders' intense efforts to prove that their current way of thinking is supposedly new because the emphasis in military organization is now placed on defense rather than on offense, do not change anything. Even in the Middle Ages offense and defense were, in addition to other things, a search for "absolute security"--in other words, absolute military superiority. In this century of instantaneous military decisions, the global scales of fighting, and the kind of means of destruction in which a single missile warhead can be as powerful as all of the explosives used in all of the wars of the past, defense and offense are interconnected more than ever before. It is no coincidence that one of the fundamental postulates of the U.S. nuclear doctrine aimed at winning a nuclear war (in spite of the statements of U.S. civilian leaders about the impossibility of victory) is the concept of "limited losses." The essential message is that if you can limit the losses of your own side to an acceptable level, you will win the war.

This is why the arguments about whether the United States is creating the space shield in order to parry a Soviet first strike (and thereby deprive the USSR of any hope of victory a priori, as Washington spokesmen assert) or whether it is being done for the purpose of a first strike against the USSR and victory, proceeding from the assumption that the space shield will intercept retaliatory Soviet warheads weakened by the first strike (as the U.S. intentions are seen in the USSR), do little to clarify the matter.

The insistence on defense in space is just another, perhaps technologically new but absolutely stereotypical and predictable, move in the old "attack-defense" contest. And because the United States has made this latest move in this contest, just as it has throughout the more than 40 years since the creation of the nuclear weapon, this is just another attempt, undertaken within the framework of traditional approaches, to become absolutely superior to the other side--that is, it is another case of the illusion of absolute security.

The Soviet way of thinking, however, is new because it questions the very possibility of guaranteeing security in our age with the aid of competition in the buildup of weapons.

This is the question: Can either side--the United States or the Soviet Union--achieve guaranteed security through its own efforts within the sphere

of arms construction in the presence of huge stockpiles of operable nuclear weapons and in a situation in which the other side will not respond passively to its rival's undertakings? In short, can this problem be solved with military equipment?

The reply of Soviet leaders and Soviet experts is unequivocal and categorical: Security cannot be guaranteed in this age by new rounds of the arms race! And this is not a matter of social systems, but of the characteristics of the most modern weapons, which can be delivered quickly and precisely over colossal--global--distances and which have colossal destructive force.

The Soviet Union has never prepared to attack the United States. It, in contrast to the American side, has never made plans for this. If we disregard political considerations, however, we can admit that the "balance of terror," in which each side has the ability to deliver a crushing retaliatory strike even after it has been attacked, has been the main factor of mutual deterrence to date.

Despite the seeming stability of this balance, which the Western "optimists" are so eager to discuss, it is, in the final analysis, unreliable, fragile, and abnormal. It is not surprising that J. Kennedy compared it to the sword of Damocles, hanging by a hair. The built-in features of this imaginary stability are an escalating race for more technically complex weapons, a race acquiring colossal dimensions, and the transfer of the functions of controlling and commanding systems of incredible destructive force from the man to the machine. "The continuation of the nuclear arms race," M.S. Gorbachev stressed at the 27th CPSU Congress, "will inevitably increase this common danger and could take it to such extremes that even parity will cease to be a factor of politico-military deterrence."¹¹

If the nuclear arms race should continue at its present speed, effectively undermining the spirit of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, within 20 or 30 years of scientific and technical progress the current USSR-U.S. nuclear balance will be replaced by a much more complex configuration of multipolar nuclear confrontation, in which even the "smartest" computer will be unable to calculate the fundamentals of a "stable balance." For this reason, the Western theorists who argue the need to retain nuclear weapons on the grounds that their elimination will not lead simultaneously to the elimination of the institution of war, and will even supposedly increase the danger of non-nuclear war, are actually asserting that the human race is powerless to do anything to prevent its self-destruction. Pinning the label of "moralist" on anyone who disagrees with them, they take an inhumane and fatalistic stance that is incompatible with any moral code, including Christian morality.

President Reagan likes to say that people do not distrust one another because they are armed; they arm themselves because they do not trust one another. It is possible that this was true in some specific situation in the past. As a generalization, however, this is hardly valid, especially now that trust cannot be established between the people of the USSR and the United States unless the most radical measures are taken to eliminate the fear engendered by confrontations between countries over-armed with systems of mass destruction,

ready for use at a moment's notice. This tense and highly charged atmosphere is engendered by the increasingly widespread and increasingly agonizing realization of what will happen to the Americans, the Soviets, and all other people in the event of a nuclear conflict between the "superpowers," and it is certainly not engendered by propaganda and rhetoric. The latter are an expression--and an aggravation--of the main suspicions created by the escalation of military preparations.

Everyone was upset by the accident in Chernobyl. But after all, the explosion in the Chernobyl plant was microscopic in comparison to the explosion of even a thousandth of the nuclear explosives possessed by the United States and the USSR; however tragic the results of this accident were, they are incomparable to the potential results of the destruction, even with the aid of non-nuclear weapons, of all of the nuclear power plants in Europe. No space shield or any other exotic form of defense in the foreseeable future will prevent a retaliatory strike. Even a strongly diluted strike will mean destruction. Even in the event of a so-called local non-nuclear war in Europe, the radiation from the destroyed nuclear power plants alone will mean the death of Europe, including the United States' allies--that is, those for the sake of whose "defense" the current American military doctrine stipulates the possibility of the United States and NATO starting a nuclear war. Therefore, an arms race to guarantee absolute security is out of the question in the nuclear age. Nevertheless, the U.S. leaders appear to have been bewitched by the idea of superiority and are still seeking technical skeleton-keys for the lock of absolute security. The SDI is being portrayed as the latest of these keys.

The motives lying at the basis of Washington's persistent efforts to achieve absolute security include not only the desire for unrestricted freedom of action in the world arena, but also the 150-year habit of living in an atmosphere of reliable security guaranteed by two oceans. But an analysis of the reasons why the United States could feel more secure throughout the 19th century and the first half of the 20th explains why the same level of security cannot be maintained today.

The paradox is that nuclear weapons, the monopoly on which was supposed to perpetuate the "absolute security" of the United States and make the second half of the 20th century the "American age," completely eliminated the possibility that any state could achieve absolute security through its own efforts and its own military organization.

When the Soviet Union eliminated the American monopoly on the atom bomb and when Soviet-American parity was subsequently achieved, the world entered a qualitatively new stage: Security, in the case of USSR-U.S. relations, can only be mutual, and in the case of international relations in general, it can only be common. This is why the 27th CPSU Congress statement that "the nature of today's weapons leaves no state able to defend itself only with the aid of military equipment" and that "the guarantee of security is becoming an increasingly political matter"¹² is a valid and impartial judgment stemming from a thorough and objective analysis of the problem of nuclear weapons in the present era.

Therefore, in the approach to security today we find two lines of logic--the military-technocratic logic defended by the American leaders, and the humanitarian political line of reasoning proposed by the Soviet leadership. According to the American logic, which was set forth in great detail by the U.S. Secretary of State in the previously mentioned article, the best way of guaranteeing security is "the adaptation of strategic thinking to constant technological progress,"¹³ actually signifying the automatic effort to keep up with military technology. This naturally gives rise to a question: If military equipment and its capabilities are dictating Washington's strategy and, in the broader context, its foreign policy today, where is the guarantee that the same progressing equipment will not dictate the decision to "push the button" to those who blindly follow in its wake tomorrow?

Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger adds the expansion of competition with the USSR in the arms race to this "constructive idea." "In the future," he has said, "we must energetically expand the spheres of our competition. We must have carefully planned strategies based on natural and easily maintained American advantages. Wherever possible, we must adopt strategies which will make past Soviet investments in defense obsolete. We must acquire programs which will cost much less than an effective Soviet response to them."¹⁴

There is no question that the secretary of defense's policy statement explains a great deal: the "logic" of the SDI, American military preparations, and the negotiating tactics of U.S. representatives in disarmament talks. The principles Weinberger declares have been set forth even more clearly in occasional conversations with American experts on strategy and military organization. The object is to conduct nuclear arms limitation talks with the USSR on levels and sublevels of the greatest advantage to the American side, to force the USSR to undertake the restructuring of its strategic triad in order to tip the balance in the U.S. favor, and to simultaneously "burden" the Soviet side with a search for ways of counteracting SDI weapons systems. The Pentagon is essentially unwilling to maintain the existing Soviet-American balance on lower and lower levels and is striving to tip the balance radically in the U.S. favor even during the negotiating process. But who would consent to this?

This way of thinking can only bring global catastrophe closer and certainly cannot prevent it. Washington's use of these recipes in the last 40 years has only undermined the military security of the United States itself, as any thinking strategist or politician will admit, and in recent years has even undermined its economic security. During its constant efforts to strain the economy of the potential adversary with a high-speed arms race, the United States itself has gone so far as to add over a trillion dollars in the 6 years of the Reagan Administration to the previous national debt of a trillion dollars, accumulated over the more than 200 years of the American republic's existence.

Soviet experts also begin with an analysis of the present state of weapons of mass destruction, but they see a contradiction in their development, because the world's endeavors to achieve security by over-arming have brought it to the brink of death. Any further competition in the improvement of weapons,

given the present capabilities of military equipment and the scales of the contest, can only hasten global catastrophe, and not prevent it--this is the conclusion drawn in Moscow.

"Winning the arms race is already as impossible as winning a nuclear war," the political report of the CPSU Central Committee to the congress stressed. "The continuation of this race on earth, not to mention its extension to space, will escalate the already critically rapid accumulation and improvement of nuclear weapons. The situation in the world could reach the point at which it will no longer depend on the reason or will of politicians. It will be at the mercy of technology and the military-technocratic line of logic."¹⁵ In other words, all civilization will be held hostage by military equipment.

The Soviet Concept of Common Security

Now that self-defense by means of unilateral military-technical solutions and larger and larger investments in military organization is impossible, ways of guaranteeing common security must be negotiated. This has been proposed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries, which have put forth an entire series of constructive initiatives in recent months on nuclear and conventional weapons and on broader principles of the organization of international security.

Above all, these include the statement of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev of 15 January 1986, in which he set forth a specific program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world by the end of this century, the fundamentals of an all-encompassing international security system, formulated by the 27th CPSU Congress, and the proposal of the Warsaw Pact states, which could result, given the presence of the willingness of NATO countries to reciprocate, in the reduction of the ground troops and tactical nuclear aviation of both alliances in Europe in the beginning of the 1990's by approximately 25 percent in comparison to the present level.

The Soviet concept of international security envisages the preliminary accomplishment of several fundamental undertakings in the military sphere:

The renunciation by nuclear powers of wars against one another or against third countries--both nuclear and conventional;

The prevention of an arms race in space, the cessation of all tests of nuclear weapons and their complete elimination, the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, and the refusal to create other weapons of mass annihilation;

The dissolution of military groupings and, as a step in this direction, the refusal to enlarge them or to form new ones;

The proportional and equivalent reduction of military budgets;

The strictly monitored reduction of the military potential of states to reasonably adequate levels. This will entail not only the minimization of

the existing "security equation," but also radical changes in the content of this equation. Such suicidal elements as nuclear, space, and chemical weapons are to be removed from it.

The main element of the proposed security system should consist of non-military means of keeping the peace--measures in the political, economic, and humanitarian spheres, which should increase the mutual understanding and accord between states, strengthen their trust in one another, and create additional powerful incentives for the maintenance of stable friendly relations.

The Soviet Union's aim of nuclear disarmament was demonstrated in the most concrete terms at the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik last October. The Soviet delegation arrived at the meeting with constructive arms reduction proposals, the most radical proposals in the entire history of Soviet-American talks. These proposals, which were submitted as a package, were based on the Soviet program for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. They envisage:

First: The reduction of all strategic arms without exception by half.

Second: The complete elimination of Soviet and American intermediate-range missiles in Europe and the retention of 100 warheads each on Soviet intermediate-range missiles in the eastern USSR and on similar American missiles in the United States; a moratorium on nuclear missiles with a range of less than 1,000 kilometers and the commencement of talks on these missiles without delay. If Soviet and American intermediate-range missiles in Europe had been eliminated, there would be no need to base Soviet increased-range operational and tactical missiles in the GDR and CSSR.

Third: The reinforcement of ABM regulations by the assumption of commitments by the sides not to use their right to withdraw from the treaty for at least 10 years, with the mutual understanding that, in complete accordance with the letter of the treaty, research and tests of new ABM systems will not transcend the confines of laboratories.

The Soviet Union also proposed the commencement of full-scale talks on a complete nuclear test ban.

President Reagan is known to have accepted the Soviet proposals regarding the radical reduction of nuclear arms and even agreed that all USSR and U.S. strategic nuclear arms should be completely eliminated by 1996. After this, however, the President impeded agreement on these matters by refusing to reach a compromise on the SDI. In this way, a historic chance was lost, although people in Moscow believe that the proposals discussed in Reykjavik could still be instrumental in the resolution of problems. The Soviet package of proposals has not been withdrawn, and the USSR is prepared to move ahead and finish what was started in Reykjavik.

As far as the U.S. administration is concerned, it has used various excuses to revise the mutual understanding reached in Reykjavik and has effectively retreated from the negotiated position. The American side's behavior after

Reykjavik proved once again how difficult it is to conclude agreements with the United States on anything whatsoever, because it changes its position and principles as easily as a person changes his gloves.

Ever since President Reagan arrived in the White House in January 1981, he has been arguing that the "fatal flaw"¹⁶ of the SALT II treaty was that, instead of curbing the nuclear arms race, it supposedly "legalized the race" by allowing the sides to develop one new type of light ICBM and modernize existing weapons. It was largely on this basis that the United States announced in May 1986 that it would not observe the unratified SALT II treaty (and then effectively violated it in December by surpassing the treaty limit of 1,320 units on multiple warhead delivery vehicles of nuclear weapons). When the President announced the refusal to adhere to the terms of the treaty, he said: "The main problem with the SALT II treaty was that it codified the massive buildup of arms instead of their reduction."¹⁶ We will not argue the relative accuracy of the President's assessment of the SALT II treaty here. It is important that he believed (and repeatedly said so) that the treaty's "fatal flaw" was its failure to close off all of the channels for the buildup of strategic arms. But the same Reagan suggested to M.S. Gorbachev in Reykjavik that this precise fatal flaw be inserted in a new agreement: that the possibility of continuing an unbridled arms race in several areas of strategic construction be retained. Can there be any talk of principles after this? And this divergence of words and actions, of rhetoric and actual behavior, as experience has shown, is the rule rather than the exception.

In its approach to mutual arms reductions, the Soviet side is guided by the main criterion the two governments agreed upon in the 1970's at the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT)--the principle of equality and equivalent security. The Soviet leadership amplified this principle by making the well-known statement that weaker U.S. security in comparison to our own would not benefit us, because it would lead to mistrust and engender instability. This clearly expressed point of view is also a sign of the new way of thinking. After the USSR took this position, it was justified in expecting the same from the United States. Unfortunately, however, Washington is not happy with strategic parity and equal security. Using the mechanism of the arms race, including the SDI, and the mechanism of Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons, the United States wants to achieve military superiority through space. It is obvious that the USSR cannot accept this prospect. M.S. Gorbachev clearly announced from the rostrum of the 27th CPSU Congress: "THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT STRIVING FOR GREATER SECURITY AND WILL NOT AGREE TO LESSER SECURITY."¹⁷

In view of the fact that the Reagan Administration has blamed its reluctance to negotiate the cessation of nuclear tests and the reduction of nuclear arms constructively with the USSR on the "unsatisfactory" Soviet proposals regarding verification, the Soviet Union reaffirmed its interest in the strictest verification. To demonstrate the sincerity of our intentions, the USSR Academy of Sciences concluded an agreement with the U.S. Natural Resource Defense Council, on the basis of which American seismic monitoring equipment was installed near a testing ground in east Kazakhstan in the USSR, and Soviet stations were installed near Yucca Flat, Nevada, where American nuclear

tests are conducted. TIME magazine called this an "unprecedented agreement."¹⁸ When the Soviet scientists arrived in the United States in accordance with the agreement, however, the American authorities did not allow them to visit the test site. This is extremely indicative in view of Washington's adherence to the idea of "on-site inspections."

The USSR always takes the situation in Europe into account in all of its proposals on arms reduction and the consolidation of peace. Its improvement is the specific aim of the proposal of the Warsaw Pact states on the substantial reduction of armed forces in Europe, totaling half a million people on each side. The clear proposal of the socialist countries should dispel all fears, both hypocritical and genuine, that the elimination of nuclear weapons on the continent will tip the balance in favor of the socialist countries, with their alleged superiority in conventional arms.

During French President F. Mitterand's visit to Moscow in July 1986, M.S. Gorbachev told him: "Let us look at all of this in a new way: Let the West make the appropriate reductions in all of the types of weapons in which it is superior, and we will unhesitatingly get rid of our 'surplus.'"¹⁹ Proposing the kind of reductions in armed forces and arms in which the "disparities" in certain types of weapons that create imbalances will be eliminated, in which the tactical forces of the attack aviation of both politico-military alliances in Europe will be reduced substantially from the very beginning, and in which the concentration of troops along the line of contact will be diminished, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact partners are actually suggesting specific ways of creating so-called impenetrable defenses on both sides, which could reduce the danger of surprise attacks dramatically.

The initiatives of the USSR and its allies were supplemented by the constructive work of the delegations from the socialist countries at the Stockholm conference, which was a continuation and confirmation of the viability of the all-Europe process begun in Helsinki in 1975. Delegates in Stockholm agreed on a broad range of political and military-technical measures to reduce the risk of war in Europe, strengthen security, and reinforce trust between states.

The Soviet Union believes that Europe--not its western or eastern portions, but all of Europe, with its common prospects, historical traditions, and culture--can and must contribute to the development of the new way of political thinking and the improvement of the overall situation.

In the search for effective ways of consolidating world peace, we must rise above national egotism, tactical considerations, and disputes and disagreements of negligible importance in comparison to the preservation of the main value--peace on the planet, a reliable peace unclouded by the fear of nuclear catastrophe. In essence, if the existing balance of power between the USSR and United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO could be maintained but established at the lowest possible levels of troops and arms, if reliable verification could be secured and supplemented with a group of bilateral and multilateral agreements on arms limitation and reduction, the prohibition of

the spread of the arms race to new areas, and confidence-building measures, and if these could be reinforced by agreements on the creation of a system of international economic security and various types of cooperation between states, this would be a major contribution to international detente and to the creation of a comprehensive and reliable security system.

The Development of the Doctrine of Peaceful Coexistence

The Soviet concept of comprehensive security is based on the terms of the new way of political thinking, making trust and peaceful coexistence the fundamental principles of international relations.

"The Soviet Union has stated repeatedly that it will adhere firmly to the Leninist policy line of peace and peaceful coexistence stipulated by our social order, our code of morals, and our view of the world," said General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev at the April (1985) party central committee plenum. "We believe in equal and proper--and civilized, if you will--intergovernmental relations, based on genuine respect for the standards of international law."

As speakers stressed at the 27th CPSU Congress, there is no alternative today to cooperation and interaction by all states. Given the current objective situation, "confrontation between capitalism and socialism can take place ONLY AND SOLELY IN THE FORMS OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND PEACEFUL COMPETITION."²⁰

Therefore, the Soviet concept of contemporary world development acknowledges the present and future existence of confrontation between the two social systems in addition to cooperation. This social confrontation, however, cannot take military forms. It must take the form of peaceful competition for the sake of the preservation of the unique human civilization. The terms and methods of this competition stem from the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social structures.

The policy of peaceful coexistence, as it is interpreted in the USSR, presupposes the renunciation of war and of the use of force or threats of force as a means of settling disputes, and their settlement through negotiation; non-intervention in internal affairs and consideration for one another's legitimate interests; the right of people to independently control their own destiny; strict respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and the inviolability of their borders; cooperation based on complete equality and mutual advantage; the conscientious fulfillment of obligations stemming from the general principles and standards of international law and from negotiated international treaties. These premises are recorded in the Constitution of the USSR.

The doctrine of peaceful coexistence was amplified in the Delhi declaration, signed by M.S. Gorbachev and R. Gandhi on 27 November 1986. "LIFE IN THE HUMAN COMMUNITY MUST BE BASED ON NON-VIOLENCE," it stresses. "We must...give up stereotypical ways of thinking in which other countries and peoples are seen as the enemy."

It is significant that this declaration was virtually ignored by the U.S. mass media.

Since the time of its establishment in 1917, the Soviet State has adhered unconditionally to the principle of peaceful coexistence, first formulated by V.I. Lenin. It took several decades, however, for the capitalist states to officially acknowledge this principle. In 1975 the abovementioned bases of peaceful coexistence were officially recorded in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Three years earlier, in May 1972, for the first time in the history of Soviet-American relations the President of the United States signed a joint document, the first point of which said that the USSR and United States "will proceed from their common belief that there is no other basis than peaceful coexistence for the maintenance of their relations in the nuclear age."²¹

The principle of peaceful coexistence was recorded, reinforced, and amplified in Soviet-American treaties and documents of the 1970's, including the SALT I and SALT II accords, and in several treaties and agreements between the socialist and capitalist countries of Europe. In this way, it became a widely acknowledged standard of intergovernmental relations. Unfortunately, however, this is a standard that is still not observed by all.

The ruling class segment currently in power in the United States actually questioned the standards of peaceful coexistence that had become part of international law. Theorists expressing the views of this segment have frankly stated that "the Reagan Administration's initiatives represented an effective attempt to reassess the rules of the game the superpowers observed in the 1970's. Both the SDI and the American assistance of 'freedom fighters' are intended to revise the rules, which were too unilaterally pro-Soviet."²²

But were there any such "unilateral" rules? Or is it just that the United States refuses to play according to generally accepted rules and demands special standards for itself? And if these privileged conditions are not established for it, it then tries to impose them on its partners, opponents, and the world community at large, from a position of strength or even by threatening to create this kind of position (this is precisely the aim of Washington's current speculation on the "Star Wars" idea).

Anyone who knows anything about the reversals of American policy is convinced that the segment of the U.S. ruling class which advanced to the front of the political stage in the beginning of the 1980's was upset not by the "unilaterally pro-Soviet" nature of the new standards of international relations, but by the fact that the standards were the same for the United States, the USSR, and all other members of the international community. One of the first principles of the policy of peaceful coexistence and detente to be attacked by this group was the principle of equality and equivalent security. The ratification of the SALT II treaty, which was based on this principle, was blocked by the political forces that have set the tone in American politics in recent years. The new U.S. burst of energy in the nuclear arms race, including the SDI, and the "Reagan doctrine," with its promise of assistance

and support to all antisocialist forces in today's world, have the aim of, in addition to other things, imposing new rules of international play on the socialist community, rules unilaterally beneficial to the United States. And this is not all. As S. Rosenfeld, one of the editors of THE WASHINGTON POST, remarked, "the Reagan doctrine looks familiar at first; it fits into the 40 years of U.S. efforts to contain the Soviet Union. In fact, it is quite different.... The Reagan doctrine takes an offensive stance. It advocates liberation and sets the goal of recapturing communist-controlled territory."²³ In short, this doctrine is the antithesis of the policy and concepts of peaceful coexistence.

The balance of USSR and U.S. power today, however, gives Washington no hope of imposing any kind of rules benefiting only the United States on the USSR. The opposite is also true, but the Soviet Union is not even trying to do this. The situation of strategic parity gives neither side a chance to impose anything undesirable on the other, whether it is the rules of arms limitation or the principles of detente. Furthermore, imposition is counterproductive, because any kind of pressure will be opposed by the other side, and sometimes the other side might even overreact, which can only exacerbate the "action-counteraction" struggle. In view of this, the Soviet leadership wants compromises based on mutual concessions for the purpose of mutually acceptable agreements and civilized and equally binding standards of behavior in world affairs.

While Washington is striving to direct the competition between the two systems into exclusively military channels, Moscow is seeking and suggesting ways and means of putting relations between states on a more solid and safer foundation than weapons. Soviet foreign policy seeks mutual understanding, dialogue, and the establishment of peaceful coexistence as the universal standard of relations between states.

Developing the Soviet doctrine of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet leadership advanced the concept of the interdependent world--interdependence not within the capitalist or socialist framework, but throughout the world. The Soviet Union has made sweeping proposals regarding the organization of worldwide cooperation in the peaceful study and use of space and in the resolution of ecological problems and other problems concerning the entire human race. Acknowledging the existence of each country's vitally important national interests, Soviet diplomacy advocates their mutual consideration and the creation of the kind of international mechanisms that would produce the best balance of national and state interests with the interests of the entire human race.

At a meeting in Moscow with a group of world cultural figures last October, M.S. Gorbachev said that V.I. Lenin had once expressed a tremendously profound belief--regarding the priority of the interests of societal development and of general human values over the interests of any particular class. "Today," M.S. Gorbachev said, "this statement is particularly relevant. We can only hope that people in the other part of the world will also realize and accept the fact that the general human values of the world must take precedence over any other values."²⁴

FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXVII syezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Materials of the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1986, p 110.
2. "A Talk with Brzezinski: 'Concerned Optimism' on World Affairs," INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 10 October 1977.
3. M.S. Gorbachev, "Izbrannyye rechi i statii" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1985, p 207.
4. N.K. Krupskaya, "O Lenine" [About Lenin], Moscow, 1960, pp 40-41.
5. PRAVDA, 2 July 1986.
6. C. Krauthammer, "On Nuclear Morality. Nuclear Arms: Ethics, Strategy, Politics," San Francisco, 1984, p 21.
7. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 3 November 1986, p 32.
8. G. Shultz, "New Realities and New Ways of Thinking," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Spring 1985, pp 705-721.
9. Ibid., p 706.
10. For example, in Memorandum NSC-68, which defined the U.S. politico-military strategy in the first postwar decades ("Foreign Relations of the United States 1950," vol 1, "National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy," 1977, p 291).
11. "Materialy XXVII syezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza," p 65.
12. Ibid., p 64.
13. G. Shultz, Op. cit., p 708.
14. C. Weinberger, "U.S. Defense Strategy," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Spring 1986, p 695.
15. "Materialy XXVII syezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza," p 65.
16. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, 2 June 1986, p 708.
17. "Materialy XXVII syezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza," p 67.
18. TIME, 14 July 1986, p 16.
19. PRAVDA, 8 July 1986.
20. "Materialy XXVII syezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza," pp 65-66.

21. "The Fundamentals of Interrelations Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America," PRAVDA, 30 May 1972.
22. J. Azrael and S. Sestanovich, "Superpower Balancing Acts," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "America and the World 1985," p 480.
23. S. Rosenfeld, "The Guns of July," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Spring 1986, pp 698-699.
24. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 5 November 1986.

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ROLE OF POLITICAL APPOINTEES IN WASHINGTON BUREAUCRACY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 87
(signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 16-25

[Article by S.B. Chetverikov: "Political Appointees and the Washington Bureaucracy"]

[Text] The organization of government activity in the United States, just as in other developed capitalist countries, is ultimately determined by the merger of the staffs of government and monopolies. Although this also applies to representative bodies and the judicial system, the core of the process is the merger of the executive branch staff, headed by the administration and defending the interests of big capital, with the monopolies.

The capitalist state, the new edition of the CPSU Program adopted at the 27th congress says, "redistributes, partially through the budget, a significant portion of national income to the benefit of big capital and strives to put the latest scientific and technical achievements at its service. The machinery of exploitation has become more complex and more sophisticated."¹

A vivid example of this role of the administration and of the government in general is the current administration's efforts to concentrate on the maximum satisfaction of the needs of big business, especially the military business. Contrary to official Washington rhetoric, this is precisely the purpose of its socioeconomic policies.

The merger of government with the monopolies is a complex, multifaceted, and contradictory process, especially at a time of increasingly severe crisis in the bourgeois state. Without discussing all of its aspects, we will note that this process is distinguished by certain differences, however conditional they might seem, at various levels of public administration. The most intense merging is seen at the highest administrative level, where governmental decisions are made. The traditional personal ties between government and monopolies, which have recently been further developed, are supplemented here with consulting ties. Special bodies made up of representatives of monopolies are formed to secure constant contact with the government, and high-level government officials are asked to serve on them (one example is the President's Council of Economic Advisers or the Pentagon's Defense Management Committee).

The middle level of administration in the federal government is distinguished by the less intense merger of government with the monopolies. Personal contacts are secondary, giving way to close and constant working contacts between administrative agencies and monopolies. The influence of the monopolist bourgeoisie is stronger on this level, partially as a result of its stronger social affiliation with the middle strata of the bureaucracy.

It is on this middle level that administrative decisions are planned and carried out. Political decisions taking the form of laws or directives are clarified in decisions on administrative actions. This is the reason for the so-called tripartite alliance of the bureaucracy, the congressional staff, and the interest groups representing the monopolies on this level. It is controlled by the latter and has a great deal of influence in government.

The contradictory process of the government's merger with the monopolies on various administrative levels is one of the main reasons for the clearly diverging interests of the changing political elite of the government power structure and the permanent, career bureaucracy. The intensification of these differences, which has been extremely characteristic of the United States in recent decades, not only intensifies the contradictory aspects of government development but also has a direct effect on government activity. This has been clearly demonstrated by the performance of the Reagan Administration.

The report of the rightwing conservative Heritage Foundation, which serves the present administration as something like a "think tank" and prepared detailed programs of action for Reagan's first and second terms, is of interest in this context.² The document published by the foundation at the end of 1984 sums up the results of administration performance during the first 4 years, analyzing the reasons for the nonfulfillment of many (40 percent, according to foundation calculations) of the plans and programs, and offering advice and recommendations to political appointees in government about what they should do in the future to carry out the President's "conservative program." Furthermore, it frankly admits that if they are unable to change their attitudes and behavior, the "conservative revolution" Reagan announced might be unattainable.

With the aim of simultaneously "educating" inexperienced political appointees, the authors of the report list the modification of policy in accordance with conservative aims, and not merely the "good leadership" of subordinate agencies and subdivisions, as the main objective. This objective, the report explains, is not simply a matter of pushing new laws through Congress, but includes the much more important task of regulation and other administrative actions. "Policy in the sphere of public administration," the report says, "is not simply a matter of bills approved by Congress and enacted after being signed by the President; policy is what the bureaucracy actually does...and policy exists only in the actions undertaken by agencies; furthermore, it is largely determined in advance by what was done by previous administrations and the career bureaucracy."³

According to the authors of this report, the main reason for the administration's failure to carry out its program was the inability of many political appointees to understand the nature of the machinery of government and the bureaucracy and to direct their actions into the channels necessary for the administration.

Despite all of the importance of these admissions, which reflect with some degree of validity the situation encountered by federal administrations, including the current one, the report lists only some of the reasons for the tendency toward the increasingly divergent views of the political elite and the career bureaucracy, particularly the executive link. This seemingly paradoxical tendency has a complex group of factors lying at its basis. They include, particularly in the United States, factors connected with the social stratification of officialdom and the evolution of the bureaucracy's political role.

The intensification of social stratification within the machinery of government, which is of a class nature, is creating a wider social gap between the elite and the group of government employees at large, most of whom, according to V.I. Lenin's definition, "are of proletarian or semiproletarian status."⁴ The polarization of interests within the bureaucracy and the realization of their administrative role by minor employees are creating obstacles for political appointees "from outside," who must concentrate on attaining the objectives of the political group winning the election.

The process of social stratification also affects the politocracy. There are social differences between the changing political elite and the executive link of the permanent bureaucracy. The former are mainly the executives of monopolies, the personnel of their administrative systems ("capitalist managers"), and jurists and academics with close ties to large corporations who are occupying temporary government positions, while the latter are permanent government functionaries.

The politocracy consists of three main groups with significant differences in status and influence: the elite of the politocracy, part of the financial oligarchy, consists of several dozen people in top-level government positions; another 450-500 people occupy less important political positions; around 8,000 others occupy top-level career positions and represent the administrative segment of the permanent bureaucracy. These three groups, numbering around 8,500 top-level functionaries in all, differ in terms of their place and role in government affairs, legal status, length of government service, forms and methods of employment, etc. Factors like these, among which the social differences between the groups of the politocracy occupy the most prominent place, engender conflicting interests and contradictions.

As experience has shown, the changing politocracy takes shape largely as a result of the so-called research centers with close ties to the financial oligarchy and with a political outlook consistent with the aims of the new administration. One example is the Trilateral Commission, financed by the Rockefellers. Its members occupied almost all of the top foreign policy positions in the administration of J. Carter in 1976 (J. Carter himself, W. Mondale, C. Vance, H. Brown, Z. Brzezinski, M. Blumenthal, and others).

An equally indicative example can be seen in the influential positions occupied in the leadership of the current Republican administration by representatives of such ultra-rightwing and rightwing conservative organizations as the Committee on the Present Danger, the Georgetown University Center for

Strategic and International Studies, the Hoover Institute of War, Revolution and Peace, and the American Enterprise Institute (W. Casey, R. Perle, F. Ikle, K. Adelman, P. Nitze, M. Kampelman, and others).⁵

Furthermore, since these personnel are taken primarily from monopolist or near-monopolist sources, the top positions in the administration are occupied in many cases by people with a great deal of administrative experience in business.

As American researchers have pointed out, however, this experience is often of little use to political appointees in the government, whose main function is the implementation of the new administration's policy line. They encounter extraordinary conditions and a political environment impeding their activity. One of the studies dealing with this subject matter, written at the time of the Eisenhower Administration, said that "most of the administrators from the business sphere feel out of place and are not successful in top-level positions in the federal government connected with policymaking--as secretaries and their deputies. They are also unfamiliar and dissatisfied with the interest legislators have in administrative affairs. They are irritated by the need for agreement and coordination with numerous other agencies, and by public scrutiny of their actions and the strict control of purchasing operations."⁶

These facts are the main reasons for the high rate of turnover in this part of the politocracy (according to various calculations, these people do not occupy government positions for more than 2 or 3 years on the average).⁷ Besides this, the high rate of turnover is due primarily to the government elite's personal accountability to the President and the rapidly changing administration, a result of the tendency of recent decades (after the time of D. Eisenhower, 1952-1960) for presidents to serve only one or one and a half terms. As far as Reagan is concerned, his re-election for a second term in 1984 was accompanied by substantial changes in the composition of the administration, the most significant of which were the departure of the "big four"--E. Meese, J. Baker, M. Deaver, and J. Clark, the President's most influential advisers--from the White House and the replacement of half of the members of the cabinet. Several new appointments and transfers were made on the level of the "subcabinet"--deputy secretaries, including in the State Department.

Another group of factors giving rise to differences of opinion and even some conflicts between political appointees and the career bureaucracy is connected with general problems in the interrelations and interaction of successive administrations and the permanent staff. The main reasons for these problems can be found in the top level of public administration. Of course, the presidency's relations with the bureaucracy cannot be assessed only from the standpoint of conflicting interests. In the broader context, the increasing strength of the presidency as the nucleus of the machinery of government provided the legal political basis for the development, rapid reinforcement, and expansion of bureaucratic authority. In turn, the bureaucracy is one of the main pillars supporting the presidency, including the support of presidential onslaughts on congressional and judicial prerogatives.

At the same time, the concentration in the President's hands of the extensive powers connected with the leadership of the state and the ruling party necessarily fills the presidential agenda with problems of a political nature, leaving little room for other issues, including those connected with the direct supervision of government officials. The success or failure of the President's domestic and foreign policy programs will depend, however, on what these officials do and on the degree to which they accept presidential directives and strive for their implementation.

Realizing the contradictory aspects of this situation, recent American presidents have tried to escape it with the aid of their own distinctive leadership methods. For example, Presidents G. Ford and J. Carter tried to become as involved as possible in administrative matters by means of, for instance, detailed analyses of the budget requests of the main executive departments. President Nixon and President Reagan, on the other hand, have tried to relegate administrative matters to their assistants and the main secretaries. These considerations were the main reasons for Nixon's futile attempts to reorganize the upper echelon of government by concentrating administrative functions within the hands of four "supersecretaries"--the President's assistants (for domestic, economic, foreign policy, and administrative affairs). Reagan is taking approximately the same route. In the beginning of 1985 he announced the creation of two councils, on economics and domestic policy, which would be headed by J. Baker and E. Meese, who had recently become heads of departments (secretary of the treasury and attorney general, respectively).

There is, however, another reason that the President and the administration, which is responsible for the daily supervision of government personnel, are unable to resolve administrative issues as they should. This is the present system--or, more precisely, the unsystematic procedure--for the establishment of the administration. Above all, there is no institutionalized procedure for the selection and recruitment of new individuals to oversee government personnel. Each administration seems to be clearing the road to government of all opponents from the other party and starts its work virtually from go, relying only on its own contacts and methods of selecting and evaluating administrative personnel. Continuity in these matters is complicated even within the framework of the same party, because each president relies on the people he trusts, a small circle which essentially takes shape during his campaign. These are the ones who then become responsible for the creation of the new administration.

This quite important work, which includes not only the selection of candidates, but also their thorough investigation, primarily through FBI channels, is also complicated by the time factor: The administration has less than 3 months (between the election at the beginning of November and the inauguration of the president at the end of January), and as far as the main appointments are concerned, experience has shown that it has only 4 or 5 weeks, although the candidates for key government positions are naturally decided in advance. This applies not only to the 450-500 appointments made by the president, but also the approximately 2,000 appointments and transfers made by secretaries and heads of agencies in the upper echelon of government. According to

F. Malek, a former assistant to President Nixon, under these conditions cabinet members and heads of agencies, many of whom were themselves appointed in haste, act mainly according to the principle of "hire your friends and the friends of your friends."⁸

Furthermore, the selection and placement of administrative personnel depend less on objective factors than on political and party considerations. Many administrative positions are awards for services rendered to the president during the campaign. In addition to the heads of the campaign staff, the people in line for these positions include wealthy donors who have made sizeable contributions to party campaign funds--that is, another case of big businessmen, "capitalist managers," or people connected with big private enterprise. The Reagan Administration's approach to the creation of the upper echelon of the State Department and the diplomatic service is an example of this: 60 percent of the people appointed to the 150 leading diplomatic posts had no experience working in the federal executive branch. Political appointees occupied two-fifths of the offices of ambassadors and assistant secretaries of state (as compared to 26 percent under the Carter Administration).⁹

It comes as something of an unpleasant surprise to the majority of political appointees (with the exception of the small circle of top-level administrators) that they are so far removed from the president, with whom they could communicate so freely during the campaign. They quickly learn that the road to the presidential cabinet is blocked by a hierarchy of White House and cabinet officials, and that they themselves are no longer regarded as members of the former candidate's "campaign team," but as emissaries from the agencies they head: It is assumed that they should solve their own problems, including those connected with the implementation of presidential programs, independently or at least in such a way that they do not reach the presidential level. Political appointees soon learn that contacts with the White House are limited.

Explaining this phenomenon, the authors of the abovementioned Heritage Foundation report say that it is connected with the bureaucratization of the "presidential mechanism," including the White House staff--that is, the institutions responsible for the general supervision of government officials and the coordination of their activities.¹⁰ As a result, the report says, inadequate supervision by the White House makes the appointees extra-cautious. "Their attempts to receive answers from the White House to their questions take too much time. The internal White House bureaucracy subjects political problems to coordination and examination almost to the point of their disappearance. The White House's cautious approach to questions requiring definite answers is a signal to the appointees that the White House is not seriously interested in any dramatic changes in policy."¹¹

When we assess these remarks, we must certainly provide allowances for the fact that the authors are members of the extreme rightwing conservative groups that have repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with the Reagan Administration's "excessive pragmatism." Nevertheless, the remarks in general reflect the essence of the problems encountered by the temporary heads of government agencies in their interrelations with the White House.

Substantial problems also arise in relations with the bureaucrats of their own agencies. As American sociologists and political scientists have pointed out, professional differences are one of the main sources of disagreements between political appointees and the career bureaucracy. The main advantage of the latter is its special knowledge and experience, which become increasingly necessary as scientific and technical progress complicate administrative problems. Whatever attempts the political appointees make to fill the gaps in their knowledge, they cannot get along without the conclusions and recommendations of permanent staff experts, many of whom specialize in narrow fields of public administration. "Expertise," particularly in its narrow form, aids considerably in the regulation of administration information and in the determination of the quality, quantity, intensity, and general direction of the upward (that is, to the political leadership) flow of information on the given administrative problem. This gives experts a chance to exert considerable influence, with a view to their own interests, on administrative decisions on specific matters and even on the more general policy line, although its exact determination naturally remains the prerogative of the administration. "The ability to control information," American research B. Peters points out, "is an important instrument of the bureaucrat's influence on policy."¹²

The professionalism of the career bureaucracy is the result of many years of training and specialization inside and outside the government. Sociological studies indicate that individuals with professional training and work experience usually maintain fairly close contact with one another on a purely professional basis (within the appropriate academic institutions, associations, societies, etc.). This suggests to American sociologists that professionalism promotes the creation of "professional elites."

For example, according to F. Mosher, professional schools and associations (which he regards as something outside the government) form the professional outlook of specialists and influence their behavior by setting standards and ethics and thereby influence their approach to problems, the selection and analysis of information, and the formulation of judgments and recommendations. As an example of these "professional elites," he cites the group of forestry experts controlling the forestry service of the U.S. Department of the Interior (in charge of natural resources), the National Association of Social Workers, and such large organizations of government employees as the American Society for Public Administration and the National Academy of Public Administration. The latter unite many administrators of the U.S. civil service.

The "professional elites" take an active part in personnel affairs, striving, as F. Mosher points out, to create something like "self-government in matters concerning general personnel policy, hiring criteria and standards, appointments, promotions, the resolution of individual personnel problems, the evaluation of personnel training, etc."¹³ One of the most strictly controlled subdivisions of government is the diplomatic service, where the personnel are virtually completely subordinate to career diplomats in the State Department leadership and the diplomatic corps.

The control of information and the ability to affect the decisionmaking process and personnel policy are important elements of the influence of the "professional elites" and of the permanent politocracy in general in policymaking and particularly in the implementation of policy. In other words, these are important elements of the influence distinguishing the role of the American career bureaucracy, especially its executive link, at the basis of which the merger of government with the monopolies lies.

The augmentation of the bureaucracy's political role and its power is essentially a phenomenon of the last 50 years and is directly connected with the dramatic expansion of government intervention in various spheres of public life since the time of F. Roosevelt's New Deal. President L. Johnson's "Great Society" program, formulated in laws worded in deliberately general and vague terms and providing a great deal of scope for administrative discretion, gave this phenomenon considerable momentum.¹⁴ The career bureaucracy is seriously interested in the passage and retention of such laws, the enactment of which is connected with numerous permanent programs and substantial allocations. Incidentally, it was here that the Reagan Administration encountered difficulties when it tried to eliminate several social programs.

The career bureaucracy's definite independence of the political upper echelon is also a result of the role it plays in securing continuity in public administration, although it goes without saying that the continuity of the general policy line of ruling circles is secured by the entire machinery of state and other political institutions. It is the career bureaucracy that serves as the representative of precedents, the "reservoir of administrative decisions," on which a new administration has to rely to a considerable extent. The importance of this aspect of the bureaucracy's activity stems from the 4-year cycle of the complete or partial variability of the administration under the conditions of the virtually continuous contest between the two main parties in connection with presidential and midterm elections, requiring considerable time and effort from the president and the administration.

Analyzing the significance of this factor in government foreign policy activity, American specialist L. Bloomfield concludes that contemporary political institutions and the decisionmaking procedure "drive all administrations into the trap of the extravagant cycle of politics, which undermines the attainment of even the most sensible foreign policy goals." Bloomfield calls this cycle "presidential bureaurhythms" and remarks that each successive administration, whatever extravagant promises it may have made during the campaign, loses momentum soon after the election, when it encounters criticism within the nation and abroad and discovers the value of past policy and the difficulty of achieving dramatic results. The first, relatively successful year is followed by 2 years of retreat. Presidents "change their image" and start leaning toward the political center. By the end of the third year the policy line is fairly stable, but by this time it is already necessary to consider the coming presidential campaign, with its inevitable foreign policy debates, "dismantling the hard-won progress."¹⁵

The disagreements between political appointees and the bureaucracy are well illustrated by the example of the Reagan Administration, which wanted the

executive branch to carry out a political program reflecting primarily the views of rightwing conservative groups in the Republican Party. For obvious reasons, the program, envisaging the dramatic escalation of the arms race and an unprecedented increase in military spending, was supported by the particular links of government and the segment of the career bureaucracy affiliated with the military-industrial complex.

At the same time, some of the administration's aims, such as the curtailment of government regulation and the reduction of the federal staff, were understandably opposed by bureaucrats in several agencies. To some extent, this also applies to the administration's attempted cuts in social programs.

We must say that the last example reveals the restrictions and limitations on opposition to administration priorities. The funds for these programs are known to have been cut by more than 100 billion dollars in the first 3 years of the current administration. Later, however, the rate of reduction slowed down somewhat. Although the profound dissatisfaction of large segments of the population played the main role here, the bureaucratic factor also had some influence. Obviously, we would not exaggerate its importance, but closer scrutiny can reveal the mediating connection between these two factors, if we consider the gradual social stratification of officialdom. It is bringing civil servants closer to other segments of the laboring public and is promoting their acceptance of general public feelings, including objections to many aspects of Reagan's conservatism. In turn, these feelings are having some effect on the views of the permanent politocracy.

This is corroborated to some extent by the fact that the Reagan Administration had to deal with the conflicting political views of its appointees and much of the politocracy (with the exception of Pentagon personnel). A survey of 200 senior-ranking administrators in the civil service in 13 agencies in 1983 revealed a clear predominance of liberals--from 48 to 63 percent--whereas only 23-29 percent called themselves conservatives.¹⁶ Furthermore, most of the liberals (63 percent) were administrators in such agencies as the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission; that is, agencies concerned more with the implementation of social programs. In other agencies (the departments of agriculture, commerce, and the treasury), the number of liberals was perceptibly lower (48 percent).

Analyzing the significance of this factor for Reagan's second term, the representatives of the Heritage Foundation warned in the abovementioned report that Reagan's political appointees should proceed from the assumption that most of the permanent politocracy would be "ideologically" opposed to the conservative White House. Besides this, the report says, the Democratic Party administrations created "many subdivisions for the implementation of liberal policy" in the federal government, including legislatively secured agencies, which are striving to justify their existence. These elements in the bureaucracy are backed up by likeminded members of Congress and liberal interest groups (something like a "liberal tripartite alliance"), and also by the "liberal mass media."¹⁷

In this context, the report "complains" about several specific federal agencies. In particular, it criticizes the State Department and the diplomatic corps, where the "total control" of the personnel system by professionals could be, in the opinion of the report's authors, "the main reason for the complaints of all recent presidents about the difficulty of controlling and changing national foreign policy."¹⁸ It also cites an interesting example of "bureaucratic disobedience" by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. In spite of the decision of the White House and the Office of Management and Budget to cut the funds for the program of weather satellites launched into polar orbit, this agency tried for 3 years to reinstate the allocations cut by the administration in Congress. Furthermore, to save one of the satellites, the agency conducted negotiations with several countries without the administration's consent and then concluded an agreement stipulating that the United States would use the satellites in search and rescue operations following ship and aircraft accidents.

It is indicative that when the authors of the report advise political appointees on how they should act in order to carry out the President's program during his second term, they essentially proceed from the presumed impossibility of reorganizing the work of government in any substantial manner in order to surmount its "bureaucratic defects." In essence, they advise the political upper echelon to seek ways and means of neutralizing and circumventing the "natural and unavoidable" opposition of the career bureaucracy, and in some cases to use the bureaucratic shortcomings in its own interest and thereby actually perpetuate them.

In general, the Reagan Administration and other administrations of recent decades clearly reveal the conflicting interests of the changing government elite and the permanent bureaucracy, especially its administrative link. These conflicts, stemming from the increasing important political role of the permanent bureaucracy, constitute an important aspect of the contradictory development of government. This has been accompanied by the stronger dependence on the bureaucracy of the political upper echelon, including the president and his closest advisers, under the influence of such factors as the permanence of the bureaucracy, its professionalism, its special authority, and its ability to secure the continuity of government policy in spite of changes in the political leadership.

The bureaucracy is displaying a strong tendency toward exclusivity, isolation, the protection of its special interests as a separate group, alienation from society, and a thirst for absolute power. This is the reason for the increasing tendency of the bureaucracy to escape the control of the political leadership of government, including presidential control, to transcend constitutional boundaries, and to act in accordance with its own narrow group interests, which can differ perceptibly from the interests of the political upper echelon.

This tendency also attests to a qualitatively new feature in the development of the U.S. Government. Of course, the bureaucracy displayed some desire to escape the control of the political elite and to pursue its own interests in the past, but now, under the conditions of its much more important political

role and the exacerbation of conflicts within government, including conflicts between the bureaucracy and the changing political upper echelon, the desire has turned into a significant factor in the development of government. At the basis of this phenomenon, which is largely a result of the general bureaucratization of U.S. public affairs and the widespread bureaucratism in this country, lies the process by which government and monopolist forces are united, with the merger of the government and monopoly bureaucracies representing one facet of this process.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXVII syezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Materials of the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1986, p 130.
2. "Mandate for Leadership. Policy Management in a Conservative Administration," Wash., 1981; "Mandate for Leadership II, Continuing the Conservative Revolution," Wash., 1984.
3. "Mandate for Leadership II," p 461.
4. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 34, p 308.
5. For a more detailed discussion, see R.S. Ovinnikov, "Zigzagi vneshney politiki SSHA. Ot Niksona do Reygana" [U.S. Foreign Policy Reversals. From Nixon to Reagan], Moscow, 1986, pp 141, 240-247.
6. Quoted in FORTUNE, July 1954, p 69.
7. HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, September-October 1972, p 65.
8. F. Malek, "Washington's Hidden Tragedy. The Failure To Make Government Work," N.Y., 1978, p 65.
9. L. Bloomfield, "What's Wrong with Transition," FOREIGN POLICY, Summer 1984, p 31.
10. As American researchers T. Dye and L. Zeigler remark, by the time of President Nixon, "the White House office itself had become a powerful bureaucracy," which often came into conflict with departments and duplicated many of their functions (T. Dye and L. Zeigler, "Democracy for the Elite. An Introduction to American Politics," Moscow, 1984, p 224).
11. "Mandate for Leadership II," p 511.
12. B. Peters, "The Politics of Bureaucracy," N.Y., 1984, p 182.
13. F. Mosher, "Democracy and the Public Service," N.Y., 1968, pp 105, 124.
14. T. Lowi, "The End of Liberalism," N.Y., 1979, pp 212-216.
15. L. Bloomfield, Op. cit., p 23.

16. REGULATION, November-December 1983, pp 16-22.

17. It is noteworthy that the authors' fear of liberals in the government was so great that they categorized 14 percent of the executive officials as people "leaning toward socialism" ("Mandate for Leadership II," pp 520, 530).

18. Ibid., p 483.

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POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURES TO SDI

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[Article by A.A. Vasilyev, M.I. Gerashev and A.A. Kokoshin: "An Asymmetrical Answer (Possible SDI Countermeasures)"]

[Text] The speeches by Soviet political and military leaders and the numerous works of Soviet and foreign scientists and specialists convincingly show that contrary to the assurances of the current Washington administration, the large-scale ABM system being created [sozdavayemaya] according to the "Strategic Defense Initiative" program is by no means a defensive system. With full justification, it can and must be viewed by the other side as a system of ensuring an unpunished first strike and as a system designed to reduce the losses from a retaliatory strike of retribution by the side subjected to a nuclear attack. Moreover, space ABM weapons will also have capabilities for a direct hit on various types of targets on the ground, in the air, and at sea.¹

The current administration's persistent action to implement the SDI program, despite the growing resistance from the public and from a significant portion of the U.S. Congress, compels the Soviet Union to consider possible variants of countermeasures in case this program is implemented.

One of the main expectations of rightwing and militarist forces in launching an arms race in space is reliance on the "economic exhaustion" of the USSR. Therefore, the choice of countermeasures that would ensure a reliable defense in a way that is not too burdensome on the state assumes particular importance under the conditions of the Soviet people's struggle to boost the national economy on the basis of the latest achievements of the scientific-technological revolution.²

M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has noted in a number of his speeches that if the American side refuses to avert an arms race in space, the USSR's response would be "effective, less expensive, and could be carried out in a shorter time frame. Moreover, it would not be symmetrical, but it would be a response that would nullify the 'Star Wars' program."³

Speaking about potential countermeasures, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov, USSR minister of defense, explained that "the USSR would select methods of action that respond best to the interests of its defense capability, and not those to which Washington's personages would like it to agree."⁴

It should be noted that this approach by the Soviet Union, together with a firm policy of averting the militarization of space, of nuclear disarmament, and of armed forces and conventional arms reduction, is perceived in many countries as a striking demonstration of new thinking and as a cogent debunking of the thesis of the supposed equal responsibility of the superpowers for the arms race.

On the whole, the cardinally different course proclaimed by the Soviet leadership if the United States launches an arms race in space is of fundamentally defensive, economic, and international political significance. This course makes it possible to optimally provide resources to all areas of the development of the armed forces in accordance with the most important interests of the national security of the Soviet Union and its allies.

The broad package of possible measures and countermeasures against space weapons is presented in the research of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat. This work was carried out by a group of the committee's members and experts in 1983-86 and was given concrete expression in a series of reports, papers, and articles.⁵

The main task of these countermeasures against a potential U.S. ABM system⁶ is to retain, under any variant of nuclear attack, the capability for a retaliatory strike, which is unacceptable to the aggressor and which is approximately identical to the one that the attacked side could inflict if the aggressor did not have an ABM defense.

According to the nature of their impact, these countermeasures could be active or passive. They could include both the development of special systems to neutralize and kill various elements of a multilayered ABM system and the proliferation, modification, and diversification of strategic nuclear arms.

According to the activation time of the countermeasures, they can be divided into rapid reaction measures, whose implementation is directly connected to the moment of a retaliatory strike, and long-term measures that encompass the preliminary preparation of a capability for a retaliatory strike, including structural changes (quantitative and qualitative) in it.

It is obvious that a full picture of potentially possible countermeasures will be identified when the concept of this or that variant of the deployment [razvertyvaniye] of a large-scale ABM defense finally takes shape. But already today they can include certain measures that could be used to kill its vitally important and very vulnerable elements, such as, in particular:

Space communications, which could be disrupted or put out of action by electronic warfare systems and other similar systems;

The command and control subsystem, in which the most vulnerable component is the central command and control computers and which even with standby systems would be deployed [razvertyvat] in limited numbers in view of their increased complexity and high cost;

Various energy carriers and power systems (nuclear power plants, explosives, fuels, and so on).⁷

Within the framework of the SDI program, about 50 percent of all appropriations are channeled into the creation [sozdaniye] of various information systems: reconnaissance, target designation, navigation, communications, and command and control, including the use of artificial intelligence systems. These information systems, according to the Pentagon's plans, may be used before the end of this century to accomplish a broad category of other military missions besides the interception of ballistic missiles, including in low-intensity conflicts, even if subsequent administrations do abandon the SDI program in its original form. Thereby, the Star Wars program, besides the creation [sozdaniye] of space-strike weapons, gives a new dimension to the land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear and conventional arms race. Therefore, systems to kill and neutralize these elements merit particular attention.

Special Kill and Neutralization Systems

Various land-, sea-, air-, and space-based systems that use kinetic energy (missiles, projectiles) and laser and other kinds of high-energy emissions for kill action can be included among active measures of this kind. Active countermeasures are particularly effective against elements of ABM defense echelons that are for a long time in orbits having known parameters, which significantly simplifies the task of their neutralization, suppression, and even total elimination.

Thus, it appears that the system of space battle stations (space platforms on which, according to the SDI program, it is proposed to station various kinds of laser, kinetic, and particle-beam weapons) is very vulnerable as regards the broad package of countermeasures.⁸ Insofar as space stations, in accordance with their main mission, will be oriented toward killing strategic ballistic missiles, specially created and variously based small missiles, whose use could be combined with various concealment measures, could be an effective system for their destruction. Such properties are possessed by, for instance, the American "Sprint" ABM interceptors, which can withstand high aerodynamic and heat stress while moving through the dense layers of the atmosphere.⁹

So-called space mines--satellites put into orbits that are close to the orbits of the other side's battle stations and armed with a sufficiently powerful weapon exploded on a command from earth--could be very effective active countermeasures. Such "mines" could be armed with various kinds of fuses, in particular those that react to heat or mechanical action.

High-powered land-based lasers could be used as active countermeasures. The creation [sozdaniye] of these lasers is substantially simpler than that of those that are designed for space battle stations for the purpose of using

them to destroy ballistic missiles in flight. In comparing confrontations of "laser versus missile" and "laser versus space platform," the latter variant would obviously be more effective. First, space battle stations are bigger targets than ICBM's, which facilitates the targeting of laser beams on them. Second, the number of these stations will be fewer than the number of targets--ICBM's or their warheads--subject to destruction during their mass launch and flight. This practically removes the very complicated problem of the super-fast retargeting of laser beams. Third, space battle stations are within a land-based laser installation's field of vision for a long time, which makes it possible to significantly increase the exposure time (up to 1,000 seconds) and thereby to decrease the requirements on its capacity. Moreover, the rigid restrictions on mass, size, energy consumption, and so on that are inherent in space systems are much less substantial for land-based installations.

A highly effective active countermeasure against space battle stations could be obstacles along their orbits created by a cloud of small objects (shrapnel). For instance, if the oncoming relative velocity of a "shrapnel" cloud is about 15 km per second, a particle weighing 30 grams is capable of piercing a steel shield (or the wall of a station) up to 15 cm thick.¹⁰

Vulnerable elements of laser battle stations such as fuel tanks, power systems, and relay mirrors could become a particularly attractive target in this plan of counteraction. The dispersal in orbit of a small cloud of even microscopic particles could create defects on the surface of a relay mirror that would impede the focusing of a laser beam.

During the operation of weapons created on the basis of land-based excimer lasers or free-electron lasers with mirrors in geostationary and low orbit, another effective countermeasure--besides putting the land-based laser out of commission--could be the dispersal of light materials with a large laser-beam absorption coefficient directly in the zone in which the mirror or laser is based.

As regards the selection of a possible countermeasure against the deployment in space of nuclear-pumped x-ray lasers, it is necessary to note the following: In accordance with one SDI concept ("pop-up defense"), it is proposed to put them in orbit at the very last moment with the help of missiles stationed on nuclear-powered ballistic submarines, which it is proposed to keep in the waters of the world oceans that are close to the USSR's borders (the putting into orbit of lasers from U.S. territory in accordance with the aforesaid concept is excluded due to the long time needed for them to reach heights that are optimal from the viewpoint of a laser beam's kill effectiveness against in-flight ICBM's). Calculations show that even delivery vehicles with the highest thrust-to-weight ratio cannot, if launched from U.S. territory, provide a time frame to put the laser at the necessary height (up to 3,000 km) before the point at which the active flight trajectory of launched ICBM's has ended. Therefore, in particular, plans are being considered within the SDI framework to station x-ray lasers on the missiles of submarines whose patrol areas are the northern part of the Indian Ocean or the waters of the Norwegian Sea. Such a plan, obviously, could be vulnerable to anti-submarine warfare systems and to the appropriate missile interceptors with x-ray lasers, which the other side would be capable of developing as warranted.

As already noted, in space arms the entire package of information systems--reconnaissance, target designation, and communications--is very vulnerable. The tasks of "blinding" them could be accomplished by carrying out a nuclear explosion in the upper layers of the atmosphere. Finally, the traditional measures of electronic warfare used against the space echelons of a large-scale ABM system are capable of making a substantial impact on its effectiveness.

A brief review of possible measures to neutralize and suppress a large-scale ABM system with strike-weapon echelons deployed in space shows that it is by no means mandatory to set missions for its total destruction. It is enough to weaken and disintegrate it by affecting the most vulnerable elements and to breach it so as to retain the power for a retaliatory strike that would be unacceptable to an aggressor.

The Development of Strategic Nuclear Arms as a Measure To Retain the Capability for an Adequate Retaliatory Strike

Among hypothetical measures one can single out the development of the retaliatory capability of strategic nuclear arms, primarily the number of ICBM's and so-called decoy missiles.

U.S. deployment of an ABM defense for the country's territory or of individual combat subsystems would be a direct violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty. In the prevailing situation it is quite obvious that the Soviet Union could be faced with the necessity, in the interests of its security, to consider itself free from having to observe both Article XII of this treaty, which prohibits deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means, and the SALT II Treaty, which is unratified through the fault of the United States and which limits the number of ICBM's and the building of additional launchers for them. The quantitative proliferation of ICBM's and, therefore, the appearance of wider opportunities for the other side's mass use of its ICBM's for a retaliatory strike would create a number of additional difficulties for the detection systems of a space-based ABM and would produce a sharp decline in the effectiveness of its strike weapons' interception and targeting systems.

The further "saturation" of an ABM system could be achieved through the additional deployment of relatively inexpensive decoy missiles equipped with a simplified command and control system and without warheads. The deployment of such missiles, which cannot be reliably identified by technical means, would be a simple and effective measure, from the economic standpoint (if one compares their cost with expenses for the creation [sozdaniye] of an ABM system, particularly its space echelons), which would hamper the work of an ABM system and would force it to exhaust itself largely without results.

As a measure to retain the capability for an adequate retaliatory strike it is necessary to note the possible increase of the capability of arms for which, for the time being, appropriate interception systems have not been proposed. These are, for example, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) launched at low-angle trajectories. The greater part of these missiles' flight trajectories lies within the stratosphere, where the effectiveness of a number of

the most important components of a multilayered ABM system is sharply reduced. The mass deployment of variously based cruise missiles could be another measure. None of the variants of space arms proposed today is capable of carrying out reliable detection and interception of low-flying and small-size cruise missiles with an extremely low radar profile. The organization of the interception of thousands of variously based long-range cruise missiles constitutes a complicated and expensive task.¹¹

An effective measure for passive counteraction of an adversary's ABM system, a measure which increases the ICBM's viability in the process of overcoming this system, is reduced duration of the boost phase of its trajectory. The parameters of the boost phase of a ballistic missile's flight are mainly defined by considerations of reducing the overload on the missile body and by the desire to utilize a flight trajectory which is optimal from the energy point of view. The specialists who appeared before the Fletcher Commission noted that it would be possible to cut the duration of the boost phase down to 40 seconds and to conclude it at a height of no more than 80 km. According to their evaluations, such characteristics could be achieved at relatively little cost, incurring a weight increase of about 15 percent while maintaining the original useful payload and range. A reduction in boost phase duration would create additional difficulties for detection, tracking, and targeting, which in turn would reduce the effectiveness of ABM weapons.

All other measures for counteraction during the boost phase of the trajectory can be divided into two basic groups: measures which make it difficult to aim ABM weapons and measures to strengthen the missile body. The former group includes the brightness and configuration of the rocker motor's torch. The target is not the torch itself, but the missile, which is some distance away from it, and any infrared targeting system must use an algorithm to calculate the position of the missile in relation to the torch. In addition, the laser beam must be fixed on a definite section of the missile body for several seconds. These circumstances make it possible to change the brightness and configuration of the flame, thus complicating the problem of aiming and holding the beam, since the torch changes picked up by the infrared sensors will cause the laser beam to be displaced in accordance with the standard algorithms being used. The means of achieving such unstable combustion in the torch come down to various additives in the rocket propellant.

This group of countermeasures also includes camouflaging missile launches by placing a smokescreen over the launch area or by using various means of disguising the missile in flight, for instance, by equipping missiles with camouflage screens.

There is also a diversity of methods of shielding missiles from the effects of laser radiation. These include shielding the missile body with reflective and absorbent coatings and making it rotate about on its own axis, thus making it impossible to fix the laser beam on a particular area of the body. Effective measures could include equipping missile bodies with an additional cooling system or fitting them with mobile absorbent screens which would be placed over zones of heat buildup. For example, a screen of this kind with a graphite coating a centimeter thick would be enough to absorb 200 megajoules/m² of heat energy.¹² Another promising countermeasure is the atomization of

various substances in the atmosphere in order to create vapors or aerosols--that is, a screen to absorb laser radiation. It may prove expedient to recall the construction of the first missiles. For instance, the German V-2 ballistic missile had its propellant and oxidant tanks inside the propulsion casing of its body. Abandoning the use of tanks as supporting structures and returning to a two-layer construction, with additional heat-isolating interlayers inserted between these layers, may substantially increase the resistance of ICBM's.

The application of various combinations of the above measures, as well as of a number of others, will make it possible to significantly reduce the vulnerability of ballistic missiles in the boost phase, and an increase in their survivability in this phase will in turn greatly complicate the task of intercepting them at all subsequent stages of their flight. The complex of passive measures is also applicable to both the intermediate and the midcourse phases of an ICBM's flight. The intermediate sector of the trajectory--that is, the flight along a ballistic curve from the cutoff of the final stage motor and the detachment of the re-entry vehicle until the entry of the warheads into the atmosphere--is usually divided into two stages. The first stage is the flight of the re-entry vehicle as a whole until the separation of the warheads and the release of decoys. The second stage is the independent flight of warheads and decoys until they enter the atmosphere.

The first stage is naturally more suited to interception, due to the smaller number of targets and the absence of decoys which complicate the identification of re-entry vehicles. However, missiles can end their boost phase within the atmosphere, with earlier detachment of the re-entry vehicles and division of these into warheads. For this reason the majority of researchers are concentrating their attention on examining the intermediate phase as that of the flight of the separated warheads.

The long duration of this phase (20 minutes for ICBM's and about 10 minutes for SLBM's) widens the possibilities for interception. During this phase the greater durability of the warheads as compared with the missile body is compensated for, as it were, by the length of impact which weapons, both individually and in various combinations, can have on them.

During this phase of their trajectory, ABM weapons must deal with a significantly greater number of targets, which must be identified and intercepted, and this number could reach several tens of thousands in a massive strike. All the targets, both warheads and decoys, move at a virtually identical velocity along analogous trajectories. As a result, the main difficulty of interception at this stage lies in the rigorous conditions imposed on the detection and targetting systems, which become even more rigorous if the massive strike has not been sufficiently weakened in the preceding phases of the missile's flight.

The above two fundamental circumstances make it possible to come to the conclusion that from the point of view of breaking through an ABM system, it is necessary to rely on passive countermeasures operating against the ABM system's means of tracking and targetting. The detection and tracking of targets--that

is, warheads--is made extremely complicated by the fact that it is necessary to deal with a large number of moving objects which have no rocket torch and which are relatively small in size. In the schemes now being discussed in the United States for space-based layers of a wide-scale ABM system, detection, identification, and targeting are to be carried out using an extensive range of active and passive means (optical, infrared, radar, and so on) based on earth, in the atmosphere, and in space. Apart from the fact that all of these means will be vulnerable to the countermeasures mentioned above, an additional arsenal of countermeasures could be developed.

One of the most effective measures would be decoys of various kinds. At the same time as the warheads separate, a cloud of small lightweight metal objects would be spread around the warheads, not only absorbing and deflecting radio waves, but also causing the radar waves reflected from the warheads to be dispersed. A method of counteracting infrared means of detection and targeting is to release an aerosol cloud around the warheads. It would be possible to camouflage the warheads' own infrared radiation against this background. All these measures could be quite effective, and--what is most important--available for mass application.

The operational efficiency of the sensors of a space-based ABM system would be significantly reduced if the other side made use of various means of setting up electronic interference, suppression, or distortion of signals, and if it fitted its decoys with means of imitating the reflection of laser, radar, or optical signals from warheads. A number of studies have already noted the method of concealing warheads inside lightweight hollow canisters made of a reflective metallic film. For every warhead inside such a canister, there could be dozens, even hundreds of empty canisters. What is important here is that apart from making charged or empty canisters indistinguishable in terms of the signature of signals reflected from them, it would also be possible to make them identical in their ballistic rates.

In the terminal phase of the trajectory (as they enter the atmosphere) the warheads and decoys can be selected by ABM detection sensors due to differences in their weight and aerodynamics. However, the duration of this trajectory phase does not exceed 60 seconds, and this requires that interceptor weapons be used with great rapidity. Maneuverable and high-speed warheads could be used to counter these weapons. Other ways are possible here, such as those of increasing the power of warheads and of fitting them with detonators which pre-empt their destruction on contact with an interceptor. Calculations have shown that if this were done, even the explosion of a warhead more than 10 km above the earth's surface could have a considerable destructive effect. It stands to reason that the application of these countermeasures would create several additional problems for the counterstrike forces, such as weight increases and useful payload reductions for missiles. However, a quantitative buildup of ICBM's could compensate for these losses to a certain extent.

To conclude this examination of the possible countermeasures available to the other side if the United States deploys [razvertyvaniye] space weapons created by the SDI program, it should be noted that some supporters of SDI consider that the multilayered structure of an ABM system in outer space would be adequately resistant to any reduction in the efficiency of its separate layers.

In order to prove this they usually resort to the simplest calculations of the probability of penetrating the entire system; these are based on the false premise that the layers function independently, and they do not take into account the full diversity of the complex of possible countermeasures. The lightweight nature of this approach is illustrated most simply by the example of destruction of the battle management link in this system (detection, tracking, selection, and targeting). Since the different layers of an ABM system are dependent because they rely on the general subsystem of battle management, it is clear that counteracting this most important structural link in the entire ABM system may lead to a sharp fall in the system's effectiveness as a whole.

Thus, to assess as a whole the effectiveness of possible countermeasures against a wide-scale ABM system with space-based elements, it is possible to predict with a fair degree of conviction that it will be very far from the ideal of impenetrability. There is a whole range of effective, available, and much less expensive means which could be used by the side against which this system is directed, in order to ensure the possibility of an effective counterstrike. What is really involved, however, is the fact that in any case SDI is not a defensive but an offensive system designed for the infliction of a first strike.

A number of studies which the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat has conducted, using general and specialized methods of systems analysis and operational research, provide grounds for concluding that certain combinations of counteraction systems virtually fend off the danger of an upset in favor of the United States which the deployment of a wide-scale ABM system might cause in the military-strategic balance. This could be ensured by a relatively cheaper method than that presupposed by a retaliatory increase in the ABM potential of strike weapons in outer space. In one of the combinations which was analyzed in the course of these studies, the estimated value of the complex of counteraction means would amount to only a few percent of the cost of a wide-scale ABM system.¹³

Certain other variants and combinations of means of neutralizing, breaking through, and suppressing this system look more expensive, particularly when one takes into account the measures to increase these variants' resistance to a first strike by the other side. However, in any combination, countermeasures will invariably prove at least several times less expensive than the variants being examined within the SDI framework for the deployment of a wide-scale ABM system. In addition, such an aggregate of countermeasures is overall significantly less vulnerable and considerable more stable as a system than a wide-scale ABM system with space weapons (with at least some space-based elements).¹⁴

One often comes up against attempts to place the SDI program on a par with the Manhattan project (the creation of the atomic bomb) or the Apollo program (landing a man on the moon). As Army General V. Shabanov, USSR deputy minister of defense, correctly notes, the fundamental difference with SDI is that the struggle here is not only with the laws of nature, which can be understood and which do not change, but also against an intelligent adversary, who may use

these same laws in an unforeseen manner against the creators of a defensive system. This idea is confirmed most graphically by the broad range of countermeasures available for use against one or another variant of an ABM system.

The increased degree of vulnerability of the space-based echelons of a wide-scale ABM system is noted by many eminent foreign scientists and specialists, including some working within the SDI program. Considerable forces have been directed into solving this problem in the corresponding U.S. Defense Department section, which is headed by General J. Abrahamson. In speeches published in the press and broadcast on television, his representatives at various international forums have recently been trying to convince the public that the problems of combating countermeasures is being "successfully solved." In this connection, however, they regularly evade scientific discussion of these problems.

By order of a group of American senators headed by W. Proxmire (who is hardly to be counted among the political figures who have a soft attitude toward the Russians), a special investigation of the course of implementation of the SDI program was conducted (about 40 specialists working on this program were questioned). As a result it became apparent that the problem of combating countermeasures has virtually not progressed an inch and is, in the opinion of many scientists and specialists, insoluble in principle. The results of initial work on SDI itself have been considerably overstated, as the report states.¹⁵

Studies which the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat have conducted on possible measures to counteract a U.S. wide-scale ABM system have shown once again that military-strategic superiority over the Soviet Union, a superiority designed to make an unpunished nuclear first strike possible through the creation of an ABM defense of U.S. territory, is impossible to achieve. The USSR has a wide range of measures and resources with which even an attempt to acquire superiority would be effectively neutralized; that is, if there were any U.S. attempts to upset the established military-strategic balance, that balance would inevitably be restored by Soviet countermeasures. These countermeasures would be of a different nature from U.S. actions, but they would be adequate from the point of view of ensuring the security of the USSR and its allies. However, it should not be forgotten in this connection that the military-strategic balance would become even less stable. There would be an increased danger of a sudden outbreak of nuclear war, including as a result of technical breakdowns and of the spontaneous activation of space echelons of the ABM system.

It is clear that in breaking the Soviet-American ABM treaty, the creation of such a system would also mean the destruction of the existing strategic arms limitation regime. Under these conditions it would be impossible to reach any kind of serious agreements on strategic nuclear weapons reductions. Neither can it be forgotten that as a result of many elements in the SDI program being made a reality, additional impetus would be given to the arms race in a number of other areas. As M.S. Gorbachev noted at a press conference on 12 October in Reykjavik, it is possible to advance through SDI to new types of weapons, to a completely new stage in the arms race with very serious consequences.

Assessing as a whole the question of creating a wide-scale ABM system and possible countermeasures, it is possible to say that strategic stability will inevitably decrease, the danger for both sides will increase, and a situation will arise in which, as the Political Report by the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Congress stated, parity will cease to be a factor of military-political deterrence.¹⁶

It is necessary to make persistent efforts to preserve the Soviet-American ABM Treaty of unlimited duration, to consolidate its regime, and to prevent an arms race in space. It is precisely this that the USSR and its allies are striving to achieve. Many realistically thinking political and public figures and scientists in the West are also acting in this direction. This policy is meeting with understanding and support among the broadest social circles in various countries of the world.

FOOTNOTES

1. This issue is analyzed most thoroughly in the book "Kosmicheskoye oruzhiye: dilemma bezopasnosti" [Space Weapons: A Security Dilemma], edited by Ye.P. Velikhov, R.Z. Sagdeyev, and A.A. Kokoshin, Moscow, 1986, pp 81-91--Editor's note.
2. M.A. Gareyev, "M.V. Frunze--voyennyy teoretik" [M.V. Frunze--Military Theorist], Moscow, 1985, p 425.
3. "The Soviet-American Summit Meeting. Geneva, 19-21 November 1985. Documents and Materials," Moscow, 1985, p 40; PRAVDA, 9 April, 19 August, and 14 October 1986.
4. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 5 May 1985.
5. One of the versions of the report by the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat, with a foreword by its chairman, Academician Ye.P. Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, was published in SSHA: EPI, 1985, No 11, pp 112-127--Editor's note.
6. As follows from an analysis of materials published on the SDI program, this ABM system could comprise kill components using various kinds of lasers (chemical, x-ray, excimer, and free-electron), neutral particle accelerators (so-called particle-beam weapons), electrodynamic mass accelerators, small missiles with a high thrust-to-weight ratio, and systems that create a powerful electromagnetic pulse. For the most part, it is proposed to deploy them fully or in individual components in low or medium near-earth orbit (see R.Z. Sagdeyev and S.N. Rodionov, "Otsenka vozmozhnostey kosmicheskoy protivoraketnoy oborony" [An Assessment of the Possibilities of Space ABM Defense], Moscow, 1986, pp 12-65).
7. "A Large-Scale ABM System and International Security. Report by the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat," Moscow, 1986, p 57.

8. See SSHA: EPI, 1985, No 11, pp 119-120--Editor's note.
9. "Prospects for the Creation of a U.S. Space-Based ABM System and Its Probable Impact on the World Military-Political Situation. Report by the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat," Moscow, 1983, p 20.
10. "A Large-Scale ABM System and International Security," p 59.
11. "Space-Strike Arms and International Security. Report by the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat," Moscow, 1986, p 47.
12. In order to transmit this amount of energy to a target 1,000 km from an ABM battle station, it would be necessary to increase the intensity of the laser source by five orders of magnitude (100,000 times).
13. "Space-Strike Arms and International Security," p 52.
14. "Kosmicheskoye oruzhiye: dilemma bezopasnosti," p 179.
15. "SDI: Progress and Challenges. Staff Report, Submitted to Senator W. Proxmire, Senator B. Johnston and Senator L. Chiles," Wash., 1986.
16. "Materialy XXVII syezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Materials of the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1986, p 65.

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PARADOXES OF THE AMERICAN-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 87
(signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 55-62

[Article by A.O. Anichkin]

[Text] "For the United States and Japan, if they are together, nothing is impossible," President R. Reagan proclaimed from the rostrum of the Japanese parliament. "The United States and Japan are united by a common destiny," Prime Minister Y. Nakasone said when he visited the United States.

It is probable that never in the entire postwar period have so many commentaries, long and short articles, in both countries extolled Japanese-American cooperation. "There is no bilateral alliance in the world as important as the Japanese-American one!" This statement by U.S. Ambassador to Japan M. Mansfield has become something like a catchword in official descriptions of the present state of Japanese-American relations.

It is true that whereas in Western Europe the United States has to deal with a powerful politico-economic grouping, the Common Market, and an entire galaxy of NATO allies which are far from always or unanimously willing to follow Washington's recipes without question, it appears on the surface that Japan has long been a politically stable and economically powerful "strategic partner" of the Americans.

Something odd has been happening in Japanese-American relations, however, and especially in recent years. It is probable that never in the postwar period has mutual hostility been so pronounced, have so many loud demands for an end to Japanese "economic aggression" been voiced in the United States, and have people in Japan spoken with such resentment about the Americans' arrogance and their reluctance to consider the interests of their Far Eastern partner. Just before the 40th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a member of the Reagan Administration who was angry about the growing U.S. deficit in trade with Japan tactlessly said, as a Japanese newspaper reported, that "it is time to send a squadron of B-52's with nuclear bombs to Tokyo." In response, Chairman I. Inayama of the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations, furious about the endless demands for economic concessions from Japan, said: "Japan has absolutely no need to import anything from the West, with the possible exception of Italian neckties."

American-Japanese cooperation in the military sphere, on the other hand, is constantly growing stronger. The United States has military bases on Japanese territory that are located close to the Soviet border. In addition to its 32 large military bases, it has 50,000 soldiers stationed in Japan. The Pentagon has command, communication, intelligence, and control centers in Japan, and these are part of its global strategy. American naval ships, including aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, sail into Japanese ports. These visits have been more frequent in the last few years than at the time of the aggression in Vietnam, when the Japanese islands served as one of the service areas of the U.S. Army. Since the end of 1985, F-16 fighter planes have been deployed in Misawa (northern Honshu), and their number is expected to reach 50 by spring 1987.

The scales and intensity of joint American-Japanese military maneuvers involving all kinds of troops increase with each year. Combined arms maneuvers were conducted by the United States and Japan on Hokkaido and northern Honshu in fall 1986. All of the branches of the armed forces of the two countries took part in these maneuvers for the first time in the history of the Japanese-American alliance. The transfer of air units from South Korea and armed forces subunits from the Philippines and Hawaii was another first for maneuvers in Japan. Military observers described the maneuvers as "a new phase of Japanese-American military cooperation, the commencement of direct preparations for the creation of a NATO east wing."

The buildup of Japanese military strength has been relatively rapid: In the last few years Japan has ranked first among the leading capitalist countries in terms of military budget growth (6-7 percent a year). Its naval forces rank fourth among the forces of these countries in tonnage, and fifth in the number of submarines.

The past year was marked by the Nakasone cabinet's concerted attack on the military expenditure ceiling. Although the resistance of the opposition and of the premier's rivals in the ruling party itself kept him from eliminating the restrictions, the government approved a new program of armed forces construction. More than 18 trillion yen (76 billion dollars) will be allocated for military purposes in the 5 years from 1986 to 1990. Most of the sum will be used for the acquisition of new weapons systems, primarily American. When K. Kato, head of the Japan Defense Agency, visited Washington in June 1986 he informed the U.S. defense secretary, according to reports in the press, of the intention to purchase new long-range weapons systems, including radar equipment for the detection of targets within a range of 4,000 kilometers, AWACS planes with a range of 7,000 kilometers, and Aegis naval missile systems. Restrictions on deliveries of "dual-purpose" (civilian and military) technology and even on purely military items were cancelled after the "memorandum on mutual understanding" regarding shipments of Japanese military technology to the United States was signed in November 1983.

All of these moves demonstrated that "Japan's armed forces are intended less for national defense than for actions within the framework of American strategy in relations with the Soviet Union." This is what Tokyo's ASAHI newspaper had to say about them.

Nevertheless, the development of the ally relationship between Japan and the United States has not been as smooth, and certainly not as quick, as it has been portrayed in the press. It was not until the end of the 1970's that then Prime Minister M. Ohira was the first of the Japanese heads of government to dare to call the United States an "ally" of Japan, thereby giving rise to a political storm in the country. The agreement on the exchange of military technology was concluded long ago, but it was not until September 1986, according to reports in the press, that the first two military-technical developments from Japan reached the Pentagon. And it was not until December 1985, after lengthy altercations, that an agreement was signed on experimental tests of Japanese missile homing technology in the United States. This procrastination was not a coincidence. Apparently, most of the Japanese political leaders are in no hurry to expand military cooperation with the United States.

The same can be said of Japan's position on Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative." Nakasone was one of the first heads of government to announce his "understanding" of the motives for the announcement of the SDI program. In Japan and in other countries, this statement was interpreted as "support" for the Star Wars program. Evidently, it was this at first, but as the SDI began to be debated more extensively, Tokyo delayed making an official decision on the matter. This change of stance was the result of an entire group of factors, including the objections of the opposition, which pointed out the fact that Japan's participation in the program would be a violation of the parliamentary resolution on the use of space research exclusively for peaceful purposes. On 10 December 1985 the Japanese minister of foreign affairs announced that "it is not the right time" for a final decision.

The question of support for the SDI eventually became a question of political faith in the ally. "The United States is now insisting precisely on a governmental decision, and not on Japan's involvement on the SDI without official approval, because it was seriously taken aback by Tokyo's delays," wrote Ayako Doi, an American journalist of Japanese origin with an excellent knowledge of the workings of Japanese-American relations. Tokyo's official inclusion in the SDI occurred in September 1986, after Nakasone won the battle for the retention of his position as leader of the Liberal Democratic Party and thereby--automatically--kept the office of chief of state.

Examples of more fierce confrontations between Washington and Tokyo over questions of military cooperation could also be cited. For example, during Japan Defense Agency Director K. Kato's U.S. visit, a resolution accusing Japan of failing to fulfill its obligations and calling its level of defense spending extremely inadequate, was passed in the American Senate by an overwhelming majority. This flagrant intervention in Japanese affairs by the American legislators was seen by many politicians in Tokyo as a slap in the face. In most cases these skirmishes resemble, as MAINICHI newspaper aptly termed them, disagreements between the rider and the horse, with the United States representing the former and Japan representing the latter.

The idea that Japan's economic success would allow it to take a more active part in the arms race serves as a constant excuse for Washington complaints

about Japan. The logic in this is devastatingly simple and appealing to U.S. politicians. There is the underlying implication that Japanese firms are using the money saved on weapons to compete with American companies.

In the opinion of many American politicians, the imbalance in the military efforts of the two countries is obviously unfair: The American GNP is only twice the size of the Japanese GNP, they remark, but its military budget is almost 15 times as great. The inescapable conclusion, the supporters of this line of reasoning assert, is that Japan must be forced to pay a higher price for the "security guarantees" the United States supposedly gives it. What they have in mind is the expansion of Japanese imports of American goods and the augmentation of Japan's own military efforts, primarily through purchases of the latest expensive American weapons and the licenses for their production. Resolutions requesting the President to periodically verify Japan's level of combat readiness and the intensity of its efforts to augment its defensive potential were passed in the U.S. Senate in June 1986 and in the House of Representatives in July; all dealings with this country should depend on these inspections.

Some officials in Japan saw a way of turning this to Japan's advantage: Even minor, but vigorously advertised, moves in the sphere of defense, they believed, could alleviate trade and economic friction. Many observers interpreted Nakasone's loud political support of Reagan Administration foreign policy primarily as a method of letting steam escape from the boiling pot of Japanese-American trade. Reagan's casual comment that "it is hard to be tough with a close friend like Nakasone" was widely cited in local newspapers. Japanese correspondents noted that Tokyo's efforts to comply with American wishes in the military sphere were strengthening White House opposition to Congress' protectionist moves.

Members of the American administration realized, however, that the practice of linking trade and economic problems with military issues could have undesirable effects on bilateral relations. They apparently do not want acute trade conflicts to spill over into the generally satisfactory sphere of military relations. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs R. Armitage said on 17 July 1985 that "the large U.S. deficit in trade with Japan is the cause of serious worries, but this is not a reason to demand greater defensive potential from Japan. The U.S. desire for equal access to Japanese markets is legitimate, but our military relations must not be used as leverage to accomplish this."

Of course, the continuous and catastrophically growing U.S. trade deficit is a source of Japanese-American trade and economic conflicts. In 1984 the imbalance was 37 billion dollars in Japan's favor, in 1985 it was 50 billion dollars, and most economists estimate that in 1986 it will reach a new record high of 70 billion dollars. Japan accounts for almost a third of the entire U.S. foreign trade deficit. Japanese firms sell twice as many products in the United States as American firms sell in Japan. As a result, as American advertising and public relations expert S. Saunders remarked, "Japan has virtually become a metaphor for U.S. foreign trade deficits."

The crisis in this sphere has not abated. In fact, the two countries are moving from one such crisis to another, equally acute one. In the past they could be resolved in some way, or they resolved themselves, as a result of changes in market conditions, a move to new spheres of trade expansion by Japan, etc. The year of 1985 was marked by acute conflicts over exports of American agricultural products to Japan and of Japanese steel to the United States. In 1986 exports of integrated circuits to the United States, telecommunications equipment, leather goods, medical equipment and medicine, and large computers were the reasons for disagreements.

In 1986 the intensity of protectionist demands in Congress was unprecedented. Legislators passed several resolutions asking the President to take measures against Japan's "unfair" foreign trade practices. The U.S. Department of Commerce decided to investigate complaints about the dumping of Japanese semiconductor items.

Judging by all indications, the latest anti-Japanese campaign in the United States took official circles in Tokyo by surprise. The uneasiness of the government was expressed by Minister of Foreign Affairs T. Kuranari, who said that "trade friction is having a destructive effect on the entire system of bilateral relations." Chairman S. Okita of the prime minister's advisory committee on foreign economic affairs, a former minister of foreign affairs and one of the most respected Japanese economists, said that "the present criticism of Japan is of an absolutely new nature. It is exceptionally emotional and is colored by the Americans' shaken belief in their country as 'world power number one.'"

The two sides began to seek compromises. Dozens of bilateral advisory bodies are now conducting an active search for acceptable solutions. Just as there is no shortage of defenders of the U.S. point of view in Japan, there are many influential American officials who are well aware of the colossal political and economic interdependence of the two countries, which is the foundation of their postwar alliance.

In 1984 deliveries to the United States represented a third of Japan's total exports, and 20 percent of its imports came from the United States. At that same time, 25 percent of all American exports were being sent to Japan, and it was the source of 50 percent of American imports. Japan is the largest overseas market for American farmers: 18 percent of all U.S. agricultural exports go to this country (including 30 percent of its exported grain, 70 percent of its beef, and 85 percent of its citrus fruit). Exports to the United States account for 80 percent of the profits of Japanese automobile companies.

This international economic complex, the largest in the world, has been reinforced by the recent increase in Japanese investments in the American economy. According to the Japan Economics Institute's data for 1984, Japanese firms controlled 50 percent or more of the stock of 342 leading American companies. Japanese investments are largest in the U.S. automobile, electronics and steel industries. Toyota, Nissan, Honda and Isuzu have built their own plants in the United States or have opened plants jointly with one

of the companies of the American "big three" automobile corporations. More than 100,000 people work in Japanese firms in the United States. Nippon Kokan owns half of the American National Steel Company.

The political cooperation between the United States and Japan can be seen as an extension of this strong economic interdependence. "Japan has linked its future with the West, and this fundamental strategic decision cannot be shaken by indignation, however strong it might be, over trade or over Japan's rightful place in the alliance with the United States," stressed T. Oka, an American authority on Japanese affairs.

The statement that the Japanese-American alliance is the "cornerstone" of the country's foreign policy has become an obligatory rhetorical formula in the policy statements of all Japanese prime ministers and foreign ministers. Y. Nakasone is no exception. On the contrary, as ASAHI correspondent K. Akiyama remarked when he summed up the results of the current government's performance in the last 3 years, "the policy of the Nakasone cabinet has become a declaration of Japan's willingness to take part in U.S. global strategy." He also commented that the prime minister sees "the attainment of the trust of the United States, Japan's closest ally, as the best evidence of his success as the head of the government. It is not surprising that half a year after Nakasone was elected premier, he took an important step by signing the Williamsburg political declaration in 1983, connecting Japan with the NATO decision on the deployment of new nuclear missiles in Western Europe. Even now this is regarded as the most important move in the development of the political alliance with the United States and what might be called Japan's official membership in the "Western club."

Japan usually sides with the United States during votes on important UN resolutions. According to the "Kirkpatrick index"--a report prepared by the staff of the former permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations on the percentage of agreement in the votes of different countries with the American position, the figure for Japan was 69 percent. This is slightly higher than the average for the NATO countries, and it is approximately three times as high as the average for the Asian Pacific countries (footnote 1) (The "indices" of Japan's UN votes are nevertheless surpassed, however, by the indicators of some other U.S. partners and allies. For example, the indicator is 93 percent for Israel, 84 percent for England, and 82 percent for the FRG).

A comparatively new feature of the cooperation between the two countries is the agreement on the coordination of policy in rendering overseas economic assistance on the basis of Western strategic interests, concluded at the beginning of 1985 by Secretary of State G. Shultz and then Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Abe. The concept of "strategic aid" is supposed to supplement U.S.-Japanese military cooperation and represent an extension of it. It has also become a new phase of the unique "division of labor" between the two countries. In effect, Japan agreed to use economic means to attain some of the common political objectives of ruling circles in both countries.

Japanese-American political cooperation recently acquired something like a long-range program--the concept of establishing a "Pacific community." This

concept is the subject of many discussions and many articles, and its possibilities are being investigated by several bilateral Japanese-American committees, by national committees in both countries, and by a number of multilateral forums. The creation of a politico-military organization in the Pacific region has not been discussed yet, but the very fact of the idea of the "Pacific community" testifies to the desire of the United States and Japan to assume a position of leadership in the region.

After announcing the start of an "age of equal partnership," Tokyo is now willing to adhere to Washington's political points of reference much more eagerly than in the past. And people in Washington are more confident in their view of Japan as a major "strategic partner," a partner capable of being entrusted with a somewhat independent role within the framework of general Western strategy.

The reinforcement of the Japanese-American alliance during Nakasone's term as premier seems just as paradoxical as the postwar alliance itself. "For many years before Nakasone became prime minister," ASAHI commented, "many in America viewed him with poorly concealed suspicion. He was thought to be an anti-American nationalist." It is true that in domestic policy, Nakasone led a vigorous assault on political realities and traditions that had taken shape over decades, declaring the aim of a "final accounting of postwar developments" and returning Japan to the status of a "first-class world power." But the paradox in contemporary Japanese nationalism consists in the fact that the Japanese officials who are striving to make their country a world leader see a stronger alliance with America as the best way of achieving this. "By cementing the alliance with the United States, Nakasone grabbed at a chance to make Japan a leading political force in the world," ASAHI pointed out. "In addition, he can easily use this to instill national pride in the Japanese."

In spite of all this, far from all of the long-range goals of Japanese policy coincide with American goals. "A common approach to the attainment of our objectives over the long range is much easier to formulate in words than to implement in actions," remarked Y. Kobayashi, the president of the Japanese Fuji Xerox corporation, an influential businessman and a member of the Japanese-American Advisory Commission and the Japanese Committee of the Trilateral Commission.

The two countries have already expressed quite seriously diverging opinions in some areas of world politics. For example, in connection with the American raid on Libya in spring 1986, Tokyo's response to Washington's appeals for support of its anti-Libyan sanctions was "extremely passive," according to YOMIURI newspaper, and the minister of foreign affairs said that he "knew nothing about this country's involvement in terrorist activity." In general, in the Middle East, Japan has continued to pursue a line which might not be contrary to the American position but certainly does not coincide with it. It maintains extensive contacts with the PLO, and its relations with Israel are quite cool. Even Japan's position on the "Pacific community" clearly indicates less support for the "new globalism" of the United States than the determination to attain its own national goals in this region, whereas the

American side's hurry to settle the matter indicates worries about Japan's "new leadership" in the region and the hope of confining Japanese policy within the framework of the United States' own strategic goals.

Judging by all indications, people in Washington and in Tokyo now realize that definite and perhaps quite serious political disagreements between the two countries are unavoidable. For this reason, people in the United States will probably begin an intense search for additional opportunities to exert pressure on Japan, and people in Tokyo will seek ways of counteracting this pressure, but certainly within the overall framework of the alliance. Disagreements are still of a fairly limited nature: Economic problems usually lie at their basis. Japan's Middle East policy, for example, is dictated largely by its dependence on oil imported from this region.

But Japanese-American relations are constantly complicated by obvious signs of inequality in the bilateral alliance. They reflect not only inequalities in political potential, but also some features of the relationship that have existed since the time when Japan was defeated in World War II. Many people in Japan saw Nakasone's "new nationalism" as evidence of an intention to take some kind of revenge for the defeat 40 years earlier, and his statements about the need for a "final accounting of World War II" as the expression of a wish to settle long-standing accounts with the United States. Economic success is now fueling these feelings in the Japanese, although politicians of the older generation are striving to tone them down.

The local press quoted a remark by M. Esaki, an influential member of the LDP who had served as the head of the Management and Coordination Agency in Nakasone's previous cabinet: The alliance with the United States and concessions to the partner are "a matter of honor for Japan," which is indebted to America for its postwar restoration and development. "However," the above-mentioned A. Doi wrote in this context, "the fact is that people like Esaki will soon be replaced by young and arrogant Japanese who do not care about the old debts their country owes to America, and we can only hope that they will not lead Japan down the dangerous road of confrontation.... For these people, who were born after the war, nothing seems impossible or unattainable, and the U.S. demands for concessions make them resentful."

It is therefore no coincidence that many Americans are now so alarmed by the "lack of understanding" between the United States and Japan. Besides this, the anti-Japanese campaign in the United States is acquiring increasingly distinct racist nuances, as Japanese-American Senator S. Matsunaga admitted when he was interviewed by a KYODO NEWS AGENCY correspondent.

It must be said that the young people about whom A. Doi writes in such perturbed tones were taught for decades to view America as the main ally, and this is now as firmly entrenched in their consciousness as McDonald's hamburgers and rock and roll music. In the responses to a questionnaire compiled by the office of the prime minister, 75 percent of the respondents expressed the most friendly feelings for the United States. In a survey conducted jointly by YOMIURI newspaper and the Gallup Institute, the United States was chosen by the Japanese as the country warranting the greatest trust: It was

chosen by 56 percent of the respondents. It is true that Japan ranked only eighth among the countries chosen by Americans who responded to a similar question (23 percent).

The recently published autobiography of renowned American statesman H. Stimson tells how he received the Japanese ambassador in Washington in fall 1931 when he was secretary of state. At this meeting the two men concluded that relations between their countries had never been so good. Less than 48 hours later, the secretary of state was informed of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the event marking the beginning of the rapid collapse of bilateral relations. This was the first link in the chain which stretched to Pearl Harbor and ended in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. "No one thinks that relations between the United States and Japan are as fragile today as they were then," the JAPAN TIMES remarked, "but the speed with which they disintegrated in the 1930's is nevertheless disturbing."

Obviously, Japanese-American relations today are not the same as they were half a century ago, and the situation in the world is not the same, but it is indicative that these passages in Stimson's memoirs aroused so much interest in Tokyo.

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EXPORT OF AMERICAN CULTURE VIA MASS MEDIA

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 87
(signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 62-65

[Article by L. Todorova (Sofia): "The Latest Technology and the Export of American Culture"]

[Text] The development of the technological revolution in general and of modern means of communication in particular marked the beginning of a new stage in the dissemination of culture. The major scientific and technical achievements of the 1940's and 1950's and the increasing popularity of television were, even then, important preconditions for accelerated U.S. cultural and informational expansion.

Problems in the mastery of modern technology are connected to a considerable extent with the present and future of communications, with their high impact, and with profits, which depend largely on the speed of the transmission of information, audiovisual clarity and, consequently, the possibilities for the ideological and aesthetic influence of information.

By the middle of the 1980's more than 126 countries were broadcasting television programs, and around 2.5 billion people were watching programs on more than 600 million TV sets. There are 1.3 billion radios in the world. The United States makes extensive use of electronic mail, cable television, and satellite communications, which gave rise to the need for an international information store and computer system with its center in the United States.

There has also been a revolution in the newspaper industry. Many technical difficulties have been surmounted, and now news reports are transmitted through satellite communications or cable television and reach Paris, London, Zurich, The Hague, and Hong Kong within a few minutes each morning, after which they are computer processed, edited, collated, and printed. Telecopying devices can transmit facsimiles from, for instance, Paris to Singapore within 5 minutes. And every morning the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, an American newspaper, is on the desks of its readers, giving them the American opinion and point of view on any issue.

Two American news agencies of world significance, UPI and AP, make extensive use of the latest achievements of scientific and technical progress and are

expanding their operations. Computer-controlled and satellite-aided information channels can transmit 30 million words a day. The AP agency has more than 220 news bureaus in the United States and abroad, supplying over 1,300 newspapers and 56,000 radio and television stations with information. More than 10,000 clients in almost 100 countries other than the United States subscribe to AP news reports and photographs. The AP reports are carried to a billion people each day.

The second largest agency in the United States and the world, UPI, supplies more than 1,040 newspapers, 38,000 radio and TV stations, and 7,000 subscribers in 80 countries with reports and pictures. This agency transmits 11 million words a day in 48 languages.

The spread of videototechnology has been rapid. Portable mini-cameras combined with microwave transmitters are already being used for reports from the scene of the event. Television sets with stereophonic sound are being introduced. Space technology is being used. The next decisive step in the development of world communications will be 24-hour satellite TV broadcasting.

"Video-clips"--that is, 2- or 3-minute video films of performances by the most popular singers--appeared in the United States in the 1980's. These mini-films are being offered to European television for free as advertisements to arouse interest.

The overseas method of selling cultural goods is very much like the method of selling narcotics: After some initial free doses, habit engenders a craving. The European public will have to pay for this new narcotic--American-produced musical videocassettes.

The use of electronic audiovisual equipment allows the mass media to engage in the mass production of cultural values. Television, which constantly updates and creates various programs--scientific, entertainment, sports, and documentary--is becoming an information and culture factory with its own natural tendencies and rules.

New technological principles are being introduced quickly into the publishing business in the United States. Books are no longer offered only in printed form, but are photographed for reproduction on the TV screen and are recorded on videocassettes.

The revolutionary breakthroughs in the development of communication systems created a qualitatively new situation in the world. On the strength of the virtually unlimited opportunities to transmit information, one country with a strong technical base is capable of manipulating world public opinion. This poses a threat primarily to countries with underdeveloped communications. The process is compounded by informational aggression, which has an indisputable negative effect on international relations. The prospect of a total U.S. informational presence, giving the United States the ability to influence more than 3 billion people with the aid of direct satellite TV broadcasts by the end of the decade, will create an unprecedented situation, in which it could establish ideological and propaganda control over many countries in the world.

It publicizes its own way of life and disseminates its own system of values for the sake of imperious domination.

An important step was taken in the middle of the 1960's, when the multinational INTELSAT corporation was founded for the transmission of TV programs through space satellites. Around 100 capitalist and developing countries are participating members. The largest stockholder, however, is the American COMSAT company, which makes decisions on the development of this exceptionally powerful communication network with its great political impact. It makes the decisions on the content of programs, and the equipment receiving American television broadcasts is being modernized at its initiative and with its active participation. This is an example of the policy of "compulsory Americanization" in action.

As the organizer of the launching of international space communication satellites, INTELSAT has a monopoly in the capitalist world on the use of space for radio and TV broadcasting. This company with its modern electronic systems was founded with the aid of the largest electronics firms--General Electric, IBM, IT&T, Western Electric, Westinghouse, and others. It is controlled by the largest American banks and other corporations in close contact with the State Department and the Pentagon. Americans own 61 percent of the stock in the consortium. In addition to the perceptible commercial advantage, there are also invisible benefits for the United States--political, ideological, and cultural.

The second half of the 1970's marked the beginning of the process of the concentration of computer potential and the creation of a global network. It handles all necessary operations--administrative, advertising, and informational--and maintains constant contacts with other companies, countries, and many government organizations and institutions. Back in 1967 American congressmen organized a special discussion of "The Contemporary Communication Medium and Foreign Policy." The final report said: "To a considerable extent, other countries will follow our example and become party to the institutions and systems we establish."

Satellite television now broadcasts programs, reports, and movies with a tendentious political thrust. In this respect, satellite communications can serve as an instrument for the establishment of monopoly power over the culture of other nations, an instrument to turn them into subordinate, dependent subsystems devoid of the necessary autonomy.

At the end of the 1970's American satellite TV broadcasts were watched daily by 55-80 million people abroad. According to estimates, the audience exceeded 600 million in the middle of the 1980's.

It is no secret that the U.S. space program was wholly subordinate to national foreign policy objectives from the time of its inception. But whereas in the beginning, back in President Eisenhower's time, it was supposed to solve military-strategic problems of importance to the United States, the Kennedy Administration later supplemented and expanded it with plans for the use of space technology in the ideological struggle between the two social systems.

After conducting research and experiments in outer space for more than a quarter of a century, the United States occupies a leading position among the capitalist countries in this area. Space satellite technology will give the United States new opportunities to attain its globalist goals.

The use of satellites for direct radio and television broadcasting was discussed in detail at a meeting of a congressional subcommittee (in October 1981). An expert of that time on satellite communications, G. Rogers, a member of the space office of the National Science Board, said that the United States was faced by the task of creating a single satellite system in the 1980's for overseas broadcasts, "meeting national security requirements and creating significant advantages for the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty."

On 1 January 1985 cable Television SAT-1 began a "new era" in West European broadcasting and now reaches the homes of a million citizens of the FRG. An important role in this first private television network in the FRG was assigned to the Springer concern (it contributed 35 percent of the initial capital). Political news programs alternate with entertainment programs and sex and variety shows. Most of the "food for the spirit" comes from the United States in the form of products purchased or received through the INTELSAT-5 medium.

The executives of the English BBC company announced two new channels for satellite television broadcasting in 1986, and one is specifically designated only for American programs.

The foreign policy and ideological expansion of the United States, encompassing all spheres of spiritual life in the bourgeois society, is deforming the essence of the internationalization process. The United States is trying to direct the integration in the world capitalist system. Gigantic multinational conglomerates are being created with American capital. This is the reason for the leading role of the United States, which determines whose national, political, military, and cultural interests will be declared the majority interests in an attempt to turn them into common, international, and universal interests.

Everyone knows, however, that internationalization presupposes considerable multilateral participation, reciprocal influence in various spheres of international life, and broader integration in research and the use of research findings. This process of interaction and mutual enrichment affirms the highest achievements of various nations in all spheres of life. The internationalization of culture is primarily interaction by the spiritual values of different nations.

In the present situation, on the other hand, Washington is trying to substitute Americanization for this process. In this way, American models and standards in politics, economics, ideology, and culture are being imposed on other countries, and American systems of values and the way of life are being cultivated.

The United States is still investing billions of dollars in the retention of its leadership in the sphere of modern communication technology. In addition to everything else, it hopes that this leadership will secure its ability to conduct ideological subversion and to diversify the forms and means of "psychological warfare" against socialism and the national liberation and revolutionary movements in developing countries. These hopes, however, are built on sand: Dollars alone cannot decide the issue of culture.

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CANADIAN DOMESTIC, FOREIGN POLICIES REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 87
(signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 65-72

[Article by B.P. Sitnikov: "Mulroney's 'New Beginning'"; passages rendered in all capital letters are printed in boldface in source]

[Text] The popularity of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, judging by all indications, has declined perceptibly after just over 2 years of rule. Public opinion polls indicate that only around 30 percent of the voters supported it at the end of 1986, in comparison to 52 percent in 1984. In Toronto--the political barometer of the country--only 21 percent of all respondents expressed faith in B. Mulroney.

The erosion of the Tories' position testifies that the Canadians are not greatly impressed by the Conservative government's attempts to eliminate such negative phenomena as the favoritism and extravagance of ministers, the approval of industrial and construction projects in the hope of earning political dividends, etc. The well-publicized scandals in which cabinet members were implicated (four ministers resigned for this reason) did not enhance the government's prestige either. More than anything else, however, the Conservatives' position has been undermined, according to voters, by their inability to keep their promises and to adhere firmly to their chosen policy line. The prime minister is constantly reminded, for example, of his promise to create "thousands and thousands of new jobs."

Mulroney made the political atmosphere in the country even more tense with his unexpected decision to begin negotiating free trade with the United States. These negotiations, which began in May 1986, could have far-reaching effects on the entire Canadian society and on the prime minister's own political career. Judging by all indications, the question of trade with the United States will be a prominent issue in the next parliamentary elections. In summer 1986, for example, the country's largest labor association, the Canadian Labor Congress, announced an extensive campaign against free trade with the United States.

These alarming developments did not escape the notice of the Conservatives. At the beginning of the second half of his term, the Canadian prime minister took resolute steps to restore the waning popularity of the Tories: His

political strategy is aimed at winning the affection of the particular segments of the population where support for the Conservatives has usually been weak. Above all, these are the French-speaking Canadians, women, and national and ethnic minorities. It was to this end that B. Mulroney conducted the major reorganization of his cabinet in June 1986, strengthening the position of Quebec Conservatives and women.¹ The summer parliamentary recess was used for the drafting of a new Tory platform for the coming parliamentary elections in 1988. Expert campaign organizer N. Atkins took charge of the entire Conservative election machine. Experienced party official D. Camp was asked to plan a new strategy and tactics for the Conservatives. By taking these actions, the Mulroney cabinet seemed to be informing the Canadians: We are starting over, with new priorities.

The Conservative cabinet's program for the next 2 years was set forth on 1 October 1986, at the start of the Canadian Parliament's fall session. The government's primary objectives in the remainder of its term were declared to be "national conciliation, economic restructuring, social justice, and constructive internationalism."

NATIONAL CONCILIATION. It has been more than 5 years since Canada acquired its constitution, but several serious constitutional issues are still unresolved. Above all, these include the problems of Quebec and the native peoples.

After a "constitutional deadlock" lasting a century, the Canadian Parliament approved the Constitution Act, including a Bill of Rights, in December 1981, despite the objections of Quebec. British parliamentary approval in March 1982 was followed by the ceremonial transfer of the Constitution Act to the Canadian Parliament by the queen of England on 17 April that same year. Quebec, however, refused to sign it and did not take part in the ceremony. The premier of Quebec at that time, R. Levesque, believed that the national constitution weakened the province's authority by depriving it of the right to veto constitutional amendments, did not recognize the equality of French- and Anglo-Canadians, and also "did not secure the sovereignty of Quebec"--that is, did not grant it the right of self-determination. At that time the provincial government was headed by the Parti Quebecois, a petty bourgeois separatist party with social-democratic leanings which advocated the declaration of Quebec a sovereign state with the retention of an economic alliance with the rest of Canada (resembling the Common Market). The economic crisis and the intense disagreements in the PQ over ways of achieving Quebec's independence, however, led to the decline of voter support for the party. There was a split in the party in 1984-1985, and the slogan of independence for Quebec was withdrawn. In summer 1985 the party's founder, R. Levesque, resigned from his position as party leader and premier of the province. The Liberal Party, headed by the former premier of the province (1970-1976), R. Bourassa, won the National Assembly elections in December 1985.

The Canadian Tory program published in October 1986 envisages the resumption of talks with provincial governments for the negotiation of conditions allowing Quebec to sign the constitution of Canada and become its "equal partner."

The unresolved problems of national conciliation also include the issue of the rights of Canada's native inhabitants--Indians and Eskimos.² Before P. Trudeau resigned, he suggested that articles acknowledging the natives' right to political autonomy be added to the basic law. The conference on the native peoples in April 1985, however, was also unproductive. The Canadian press described this failure as "Mulroney's first major political defeat since the start of his term."

The new Conservative program envisages the conclusion of the negotiations for the purpose of securing the special rights of the Canadian native peoples in the constitution.

ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING. After 2 years of economic boom, Canada is entering a more trying period. Judging by all indications, the period of prosperity is "fizzling out." Capital investments in the private sector, which were expected to serve as the main generator of economic growth, increased, according to preliminary estimates, by only 3 percent in 1986, in comparison to 8.5 percent in 1985. The GNP growth rate decreased accordingly from an average of 5.6 percent in the second half of 1985 to around 3 percent in the same period of 1986. According to experts, the huge federal budget deficit is one of the main reasons for this.

The national debt has increased. At the end of fiscal year 1985 it exceeded 220 billion Canadian dollars, and interest payments on it exceeded 20 billion. Ottawa has had to maintain high interest rates on loans--1 or 2 points above American rates--to finance the debt. At the beginning of 1986 the difference was even increased to 5 points for the purpose of stopping the decline of the exchange rate of the Canadian dollar. Under these conditions, President Leo de Bevera of Chase Econometrics remarked, "many industries are too scared to take risks."

Canadian economists blame cyclical factors for approximately half of the increase in the budget deficit in the beginning of the 1980's. At the start of the period of economic prosperity, the Tories apparently expected the current national debt to decrease without any special government intervention. Nevertheless, the budget deficit became the focus of attention again at the end of 1985, after the U.S. Congress passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, requiring a balanced American budget by 1991. Canadian Minister of Finance M. Wilson alleviated the problem to some extent by envisaging the first cuts in federal expenditures in the last 20 years in the budget for FY 1986 and reducing the current budget deficit from 34.3 billion dollars to 29.5 billion. The government's intention to reduce the deficit to 22 billion dollars, or 6.5 percent of the GNP, by 1990 was also announced.

It soon became clear, however, that the economic cycle had ceased to work to the Conservatives' advantage. Besides this, budget income estimates, based on the assumption that the average price of a barrel of oil would be 22.5 American dollars, turned out to be too optimistic. According to preliminary estimates, the deficit in the balance of payments for current operations more than doubled just in 1986, totaling 6.8 billion Canadian dollars. The declining prices of oil and grain reduced treasury receipts by 2.5 billion dollars

in 1986. As a result, the federal budget deficit was estimated at 32 billion dollars at the beginning of FY 1987. This complicated the continued pursuit of the policy of budget austerity and jeopardized the attainment of projected economic goals.

The Canadian Tory program published on 1 October states the goal of nothing other than "the creation of a national economy capable of competing successfully in world markets." "Economic restructuring," the program says, "will be accomplished through the improvement of state finances with the aid of trade initiatives and tax reform."

Tax levers are now expected to occupy a prominent place among the instruments of government regulation, in the encouragement of the economic restructuring so necessary after the boom. A draft tax reform has been submitted to the Canadian Parliament for discussion. According to the government, it should aid in the resolution of difficult long-range problems by securing economic growth and employment, progressive changes in the economic and regional structure, the heightened efficiency of enterprises, and greater scientific and technical potential. A preliminary analysis indicates that the projected economic restructuring will consist essentially in changes in the structure of government revenues: The population will pay more taxes, and corporations will pay less. For example, the gradual reduction of corporate taxes is to begin in July 1987, and the basic rate should decline from 36 to 33 percent by 1989.

In addition to offering tax incentives to the private sector for the reinforcement of its competitive potential, the Tory program envisages "effective restraint in spending" for the further reduction of the budget deficit. The government's refusal to increase aid to developing countries and to freeze it at 0.5 percent of the Canadian GNP was announced earlier. The rate of real increase in military spending is to be decreased from 2.75 to 2 percent in FY 1987.

In addition to the budget, foreign trade expansion is regarded as another important lever of economic restructuring by the Mulroney cabinet. "If Canada wants to achieve stable economic growth," its new program says, "the government must strive to secure the country's interests in the international sphere. Almost a third of our economy depends on international markets. Trade is our future. The government intends to improve Canada's status as a trading nation among its main partners. Priority will be assigned to trade with Japan and other Pacific countries."

May 1986, when the Canadian-American talks on a free trade agreement began, and when Prime Minister Mulroney took a long trip to Japan and China to strengthen relations with Canada's main Pacific partners, can be regarded as the point of departure in the pursuit of this policy line.

With the aid of an American-Canadian agreement on free trade, the Conservative government, supported by big capital, hopes to neutralize the threat posed to Canadian interests by increasing U.S. protectionism (in October 1986, for example, the United States imposed additional duties on imported goods made

of Canadian wood). In the last few years the Canadian business community's support for this agreement has grown stronger due to the fear of being left out of all of the large trade blocs. "It would be difficult to overestimate the danger Canada faces from the risk of not having free access to at least one of the large sales markets, especially at a time of intense international competition and mounting protectionist feelings," remarked, for example, Bank of Nova Scotia chief economist W. MacNess. The supporters of free trade assert that Canada's competitive potential was undermined in many sales markets in the last 25 years as a result of the creation and growth of the European Economic Community and European Free Trade Association, the system of privileges for developing countries, and the cancellation of Commonwealth privileges. Feelings in favor of free trade were reinforced by the period of prosperity in the American economy and the declining exchange rate of the Canadian dollar, which caused more strained trade relations with the United States. Its share of Canadian exports, for example, rose from 60 to 78 percent between 1980 and 1985. The United States and Canada are the largest trade partners in the world, and their reciprocal trade amounted to 165 billion dollars in 1985.

This policy, however, is encountering increasing resistance in broad segments of the Canadian public, who are afraid that free trade will mean the Americanization of Canada, the ruin of several traditional industries, the growth of unemployment, and the eventual loss of economic independence. The campaign against free trade has been joined by the Liberal, New Democratic and Communist parties, prominent scientists and public spokesmen, the main labor organizations, farmer organizations, and small businessmen. Publisher M. Hurtig, the founder of the Canadian Council, the public organization which launched the campaign against free trade with the United States, believes that this will put an end to Canada's existence as an independent country. "Coalitions against free trade" have been formed in the provinces of Ontario and Manitoba. Many Canadians see free trade as a new attempted takeover of Canada by the United States.

SOCIAL JUSTICE. The Conservative government today, in contrast to the last 2 years, is not emphasizing the need to reduce the colossal budget deficit, but is making more statements of concern about existing social problems. In the new program, the Mulroney cabinet promises to review government measures in this sphere to meet today's requirements.

B. Mulroney frequently remarks that around 600,000 new jobs have been created in the country in the last 2 years, and that the rate of unemployment fell from 11.3 percent in 1984 to 9.5 percent in September 1986 (almost 1.2 million people). It is true that the increase in employment is less a result of special efforts by the government to create new jobs than of the economic boom in the country. The low exchange rate of the Canadian dollar also promoted the expansion of Canadian exports and, consequently, the heightened activity of export industries. Nevertheless, at least half of the people who have found new jobs are employed in the service sphere and are working part-time. The unemployment problem is compounded by the fact that a third of the unemployed are young people between the ages of 15 and 24, most of whom have no special training and are therefore experiencing serious difficulties finding jobs. Government vocational and technical programs are not effective in the capitalist economy.³

There has also been an increase in the number of people who cannot find jobs before their unemployment compensation runs out and who must then join the ranks of the poor. And the increasing number of people receiving aid to the poor compounds the financial difficulties of provinces and cities. This is particularly hard on the economically underdeveloped Atlantic provinces (Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia). The economy of the western and prairie regions is experiencing serious difficulties as a result of declining world oil and grain prices.

In their program, the Conservatives are still promising to pay more attention to the economic development of the Atlantic provinces, "to diversify the economic base of Western Canada," and to assist agriculture for the alleviation of the Canadian farmers' difficulties. The possible resumption of the debates on the institution of a national social security system has also been announced. We should recall that in 1965 the Tories' proposed cancellation of automatic cost-of-living increases in pensions led to an outburst of indignation in the country, forcing the government to retreat from its original plan to make the amount of compensation dependent on the income of the recipient.

The primary objectives of the Mulroney government in the remainder of its term include the passage of laws against pornography, wife-beating, child labor, and drug addiction.

The Canadian press has had an extremely skeptical response in general to all of the Tories' lavish promises of "social justice." It sees these declarations as obvious campaign tactics. There are sufficient grounds for this conclusion. For example, Mulroney intends to turn most of his work in the Parliament, where arguments usually concern socioeconomic policy, over to his deputy, to minimize the incidents in which he is the target of opposition criticism or has to give precise answers to questions. He will spend most of his time traveling around the country.

CONSTRUCTIVE INTERNATIONALISM. In the foreign policy section of the program, entitled "Constructive Internationalism," the Mulroney cabinet declares the following priorities: the preservation of international peace and security, arms control and disarmament, the modernization and reinforcement of armed forces, and the augmentation of the Canadian contingent of NATO troops in Western Europe.

In general, Ottawa has confirmed its support of the Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems of 1977 and the SALT II treaty. It is significant, however, that the Mulroney cabinet was criticized for its ambiguous interpretation of the ABM treaty during debates in the House of Commons on the meeting in Reykjavik. The 28 October 1980 issue of the TORONTO STAR said: "At one time Canada insisted on the precise interpretation of the treaty to mean that research must be confined to laboratories. Statements by Clark and Beatty (the foreign minister and defense minister--B.S.), however, have given rise to some doubts. If we support the Americans now, this might aid in eliminating some of our other difficulties in relations with the United States, especially in trade, but it will disappoint many Canadians who want

the arms race to stop and are hoping that their government will firmly and directly inform Washington and Moscow of this."

As far as the Star Wars issue is concerned, Ottawa is known to have officially refused Washington's invitation to take part in the SDI. The Canadian "no," however, does not erase the statements made in the memorandum on the modernization of North American Air Defense, signed by Mulroney in March 1985, in accordance with which the United States and Canada pledged to cooperate in the research, development, and incorporation of advanced military equipment, including space equipment.⁴ The appeals of advocates of more active participation in the preparations for Star Wars have recently been countered in Canada by a growing campaign for the use of Canadian space potential exclusively for peaceful purposes. In response to public opinion, the government promised to submit a bill to Parliament on the creation of a Canadian space agency.

The issue of the sovereignty of the Canadian Arctic has become an acute foreign policy problem again. The United States does not recognize Canada's jurisdiction over the straits of the Canadian Arctic archipelago. Canada regards them as its territorial waters, and the United States regards them as international waters. This led to a serious diplomatic conflict between the two countries in August 1985, when the Americans sent their ice-breaker "Polar Sea" there without the consent of the Canadian Government. The U.S. actions caused an outburst of indignation in the country. For example, Chairman S. Carr of the Canadian Labor Congress declared: "Why does the United States want to have political influence in our country? Because it wants to control the Arctic and the Northwest Waterway."

With a view to this mood in the country and in an effort to enhance their prestige, the Conservatives gave this problem special attention and planned several measures for its resolution. "The government reaffirms the complete sovereignty of the Canadian Arctic and recognizes that it requires an active national presence. The government has strictly delineated the perimeter of the Arctic archipelago to retain Canadian sovereignty over the land, sea, and ice of the Canadian Arctic. Canada will build one of the world's largest ice-breakers to consolidate its sovereign rights and to contribute to the development of the north. Other measures have already been taken and will be taken in support of this important national objective, including more extensive studies of polar conditions, military exercises in the Arctic, and the establishment of a national park on Ellesmere Island."

The Conservatives are striving to play up to the prevailing opinion in the country with regard to international problems. By taking a central position in advance, the Tories hope to deprive the Liberals of the chance to use any serious foreign policy issue in their own interest. In general, they have been able to do this to date. Foreign policy issues, with the exception of the Conservatives' proposal on the institution of free trade with the United States, have not given rise to any serious disagreements between the main Canadian political parties yet. In fact, Tory and Liberal differences of opinion are disappearing even in this matter.

The erosion of the Mulroney government's position, according to public opinion polls, is due to the historical status of the Progressive Conservative Party, which is considered to be the minority party. As a rule, it has won 30-35 percent of the vote, while the Liberal and New Democratic parties have shared the support of almost all other voters. The Conservatives' victory in September 1984, when they won 51.8 percent of the vote, is now seen as an exception. Until recently the Tories took some comfort in the fact that the Liberals were experiencing discord in the federal political arena. Their leader J. Turner, who had served as prime minister during the 2 months between P. Trudeau's resignation and the elections in September 1984, was having difficulty in his efforts to win loyal supporters within the ranks of the Liberal Party. For a long time, for example, the party could not take a consistent stand on free trade with the United States. After the Conservative government announced its new program, the Liberals, who had been regarded as the "natural ruling party" of Canada for most of this century, had to quickly demonstrate the consolidation of their ranks and put together a political basis for a future campaign platform. These objectives were set forth at a national convention of the Liberal Party in November 1986. Canadian observers saw its results as evidence of a "leftward shift" by this largest opposition party in socioeconomic and foreign policy issues. For example, delegates advocated equal pay for equal work by men and women, the institution of a guaranteed income as a means of combating the increasing poverty, the guarantee of full employment, the expansion of the network of accessible pre-school establishments, the development of higher education, and the revision of the unjust tax structure. A resolution was also passed to acknowledge the distinctive status of Quebec and its right to veto constitutional amendments. The Liberals advocated an independent policy line for Canada in international relations, repudiated Reagan's Star Wars program, and supported the conclusion of a universal and total nuclear test ban treaty, the cessation of the testing of American cruise missiles in the country, and the declaration of Canada a nuclear-free zone. Therefore, the political bases of two campaign platforms were submitted to the Canadian voters for their consideration by the end of 1986. The election race is on in Canada.

FOOTNOTES

1. See SSHA: EPI, 1986, No 10, pp 74-77--Ed.
2. For more detail, see SSHA: EPI, 1985, No 9, pp 108-116--Ed.
3. See SSHA: EPI, 1986, No 8, pp 67-74--Ed.
4. See SSHA: EPI, 1986, No 9, pp 55-61--Ed.

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U.S. ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 87
(signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 73-79

[Article by E.A. Gluskin and K.O. Tuchapskiy]

[Text] Commercial sea lanes connect the United States with all continents and most of the countries in the world. Sea transport accounts for around 90 percent of all U.S. foreign trade deliveries, representing approximately 10 percent of all world foreign trade shipments by sea.¹ Shipments between ports in the United States and other countries are made up of a great variety of goods, and the main ones are oil--27 percent, agricultural products--18 percent, and coal--13 percent (1982).² Most of American foreign trade shipments are sent to the Far East and Southeast Asia or to continental Europe and the Mediterranean ports.

The position occupied by the United States in international shipping is largely dependent on the state of its merchant fleet. In 1985 the total deadweight of the fleet flying the American flag was 29 million tons.³ This is slightly higher than the 1970 level, but below the level for 1960, when the fleet flying the U.S. flag had a tonnage of around 30 million dwt. There have been absolute and relative reductions in the American flag fleet. In 1960 it represented 19.1 percent of the world fleet, but in 1985 the figure had dropped to 4.7 percent (see table). There were many reasons for this, including the registration of American ships under foreign flags, the sale of U.S. ships abroad, and the demolition of ships of military design. It must be said, however, that the reduction of the American fleet stopped in the second half of the 1970's and that this was followed by some growth. To a considerable extent, this was due to the mastery of advanced maritime transport technology by American shipowners, especially container shipping. The United States now accounts for around 15 percent of the world fleet of container carriers and automobile carriers. Here again, however, it is surpassed by Japan (over 16 percent).

The U.S. merchant fleet transports only an insignificant portion of American foreign trade cargo--around 6 percent.⁴ The figure changes radically, however, if ships of foreign registration belonging to U.S. shipowners are taken into account: around 40 percent of the dry large-tonnage cargo of American foreign trade.⁵

In 1985 a fleet "effectively controlled" by the United States, with a total tonnage of 47.7 million dwt (considerably surpassing the tonnage of the American registered fleet), was operating under the flags of 21 countries. Furthermore, Liberia, Panama, and the Bahamas--three "convenient flag" countries--accounted for 41.2 million dwt alone.⁶ The owners of this fleet include the biggest American industrial corporations and banks--Mobil Oil, Exxon, Chevron, Alcoa, Bank of California, and others. In this way, the American fleet registered abroad makes the United States one of the largest shipowning powers in the world.

The distinctive features of Reagan Administration economic policy, based on the neoconservative theories of economic regulation, have also affected shipping. Here, just as in other spheres of the national economy, attempts were made to limit government intervention and to expand private initiative in accordance with President Reagan's promise to revive the principles of "American enterprise." The administration is hoping to stimulate the concentration of capital and production in this sphere by means of changes in the system for the administrative-legal regulation of the operations of ship owners. Specifically, this means the limitation of the reservation of cargo, subsidization, and the underwriting of loans by the government on the one hand, and broader tax benefits on the other.

Reservation--that is, the guarantee of a specific percentage of cargo to national carriers--is of vital importance to American ship owners. Although reserve cargo shipments represent 1.6 percent of all U.S. maritime foreign trade, they constitute 30 percent of the cargo of ships flying the American flag; in the most profitable sphere of operations, shipments of finished manufactured goods, they account for around 25 percent of the income of American companies.⁷

The White House resisted legislative initiatives extending the practice of reservation to export shipments of coal, but was pressured by ship owners to agree to a version of the so-called "combined farm bill" rescinding the reservation of only government-subsidized commercial grain exports. The relative portion of reserved grain in "Food for Peace" shipments was simultaneously increased from 50 to 75 percent.⁸

Most of the reserve shipments, over 70 percent, are still made up of Defense Department cargo (no reduction of their reservation has been planned). Consequently, total reserved cargo has remained virtually the same.

The Reagan Administration took a more resolute position from the very beginning on credit and financial incentives for national ship owners. Its first move was the dramatic reduction and subsequent cancellation of subsidies to encourage the construction of ships by American ship owners in national shipyards. Besides this, representatives of the executive branch constantly strive for congressional reductions in operating differentials for ship owners. The figure for fiscal year 1986 was 335 million dollars, or 43 million less than the year before.⁹ At the beginning of 1981 Reagan announced that the market provided shipping companies with enough opportunities for successful operations without government subsidies.

The White House wants to institute a single tax rate of 35 percent on the profits of ship owners, instead of the progressive scale ranging from 10 to 46 percent.¹⁰ This will naturally benefit large shipping companies. Furthermore, to secure greater freedom for entrepreneurial activity, the administration convinced Congress to temporarily authorize American recipients of subsidies and tax benefits to operate and buy cheaper ships built and registered abroad. This actually gives ship owners a chance to use the funds they have accumulated in special tax-exempt bank accounts to buy foreign ships, and to charter ships flying foreign flags, which government-subsidized carriers could not do in the past. These privileges will be partial compensation for the cancellation of ship building and operating differentials and for the limitation of government-guaranteed loans from private banks.

It is only on the surface that these changes in the system of government intervention in shipping appear to be a renunciation of protectionism. Washington policy is aimed at creating the necessary conditions for the effective use of the advantages of highly concentrated production and capital by American shipping monopolies.¹¹ This is corroborated by an analysis of the new shipping act of 1984.

The law grants full antitrust immunity--that is, exemption from American antitrust legislation--to the major forms of shipping agreements.¹² Immunity was previously limited and extended to agreements only after their approval by an independent regulatory agency--the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC). Now these agreements automatically go into effect at the time of their submission to the FMC, which can disallow them at any time in the next 45 days, but only on solid grounds and with a court order.

Besides this, the law authorizes the parties to conference agreements to take independent action (without the consent of other conference members) in matters of tariff policy, facilitating the establishment of monopoly prices by the largest shipping companies.

By the terms of the new law, a carrier can negotiate contracts with shippers on the situations in which transport prices will be contracted and will not be dependent on the carrier's tariff rates. A relatively new system for the encouragement of shippers to increase shipping volume has also been legalized. This is a system of volume discounts included in carrier and conference rates, and the right of conference members to take independent action consequently extends to them. Carriers can offer the shipper discounts on a graduated scale depending on freight volume. For example, the conference for shipments from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan to the United States set the following discounts for shippers depending on freight volume: 5 percent for 1-2.5 million dollars, 7.5 percent for 2.5-5 million dollars, and 10 percent for over 5 million dollars. This allows shipping leaders to monopolize the transport service market even more by lowering maritime transport prices, and also gives corporations participating in foreign trade additional profits by lowering their freight costs.

For small shippers, on the other hand, the advantages of these innovations are quite dubious. First of all, associations of small shippers are not granted

full antitrust immunity. Second, although these associations can negotiate service contracts with conferences, it is not clear whether they represent a legal person--that is, whether they have the right to sign contracts on behalf of their members.

The 1984 act on shipping also introduced significant changes into the regulation of intermodal shipments, a combination of sea and land transport. Conferences are now authorized to establish common rates for these shipments. This reveals the pro-monopoly bias of the law. It will be of the greatest advantage to large shipping companies with the facilities for intermodal transport.

For many decades the United States ignored the interests of even its closest strategic allies, specifically by limiting participation by West European and Japanese ship owners in the transport of American foreign trade cargo. Western Europe and Japan are naturally striving to strengthen and expand the influence of their shipping companies. This is the reason for the fundamental differences in the very approach of the imperialist "centers" to the regulation of international shipping.

For example, in an attempt to protect their carriers from the competition of the stronger American shipping monopolies, the West European countries and Japan have always supported the "confidential" type of conference agreement in which questions of membership are decided in each specific case by the parties to the agreement, and withdrawal entails the observance of certain conditions. The United States, on the other hand, advocates "open" conferences, in which the free entry and withdrawal of members is secured. This requirement of conference agreements was retained in the 1984 act.

Western Europe and Japan, in contrast to the United States, have traditionally defended the exemption of conferences from antitrust laws and non-intervention by the government in their operations. In spite of the fact that the laws of several West European states and Japan, just like American legislation, envisage the control of the cartel type of agreements and sanctions against them, they have been virtually inapplicable to shipping.

The limitation of intervention by the U.S. Government in international shipping will indisputably alleviate some conflicts. The 1984 act, however, gave rise to several new reasons for conflict. Just as before, they are connected with U.S. attempts to gain unilateral advantages for national carriers in their competition with rivals. This is how people in Western Europe and Japan interpret the authorization of parties to conference agreements to take "independent action" in matters of tariff policy.

American maritime legislation envisages the possibility of enforcing its standards far beyond the boundaries of the country. The 1984 act did not extend antitrust immunity to agreements on shipments between foreign ports. This means that U.S. antitrust laws will be enforced if the operations of parties to these agreements will (or might) affect the development of American maritime trade. In addition, the new law granted the FMC the right to impose stern sanctions, to the point of suspending the rates on shipments of American

trade cargo, on parties to agreements excluding American ship owners.¹³ Actions of this kind by the governments of other states could also be used as grounds for their imposition. It was assumed from the start that the sanctions would be an instrument to counteract the protectionist policies of other states.

In an attempt to protect themselves from the negative implications of the American system for the regulation of international shipping, the West European countries and Japan have instituted stricter control over maritime shipping agreements.

For more than 5 years the Common Market has been debating the draft "Rules of Competition" defining the procedure by which the articles of the Treaty of Rome restricting anticompetitive monopoly agreements can be applied to maritime transport. Reaffirming the de facto exemption of the main forms of shipping agreements from these articles, the draft empowers the Commission of the European Communities to investigate cases of "unscrupulous" competition and to take the appropriate measures against these practices. Laws augmenting the possibilities for government intervention in maritime shipping operations have been passed in the FRG, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Spain, and France. An extensive campaign for the stronger legal protection of shipping has been launched in Japan.

At the same time, the United States has suggested agreement on a common bloc policy by the developed capitalist states with regard to some major aspects of the regulation of international shipping. Furthermore, it has urged the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral intergovernmental agreements, preferring them to universal agreements and conventions.

As a result, the dialogue between the United States and the countries of the Advisory Group on Shipping (AGS)¹⁴ became much livelier in the 1980's. The United States wanted firm guarantees of access by American ship owners to the maritime trade of West European countries and Japan with third countries, especially developing states. In turn, the AGS countries insisted on the substantial limitation of the American policy of reserving shipments, especially of government freight, for national carriers. It took more than 2 years to reach a compromise on these matters.

During the negotiations the United States agreed that its bilateral intergovernmental agreements with developing countries, stipulating the distribution of reciprocal shipments, should secure the free access of West European and Japanese ship owners to at least 60 percent of the total freight. The most difficult problem, however, was the request for the guaranteed free access of American carriers to trade with third countries. The United States demanded mutual free access in conference agreements, basing this request on its own concept of "open" conferences. The AGS countries expressed their willingness to make concessions to the Americans only with regard to guaranteed access to conference trade for "present outsiders" (ship owners not belonging to the conference) with the appropriate freight facilities.¹⁵ Disagreements over this matter caused long delays in the finalization of the agreement.

One of the important matters discussed at the negotiations was a common program of "countermeasures" against the attempts of developing states to limit the access of carriers in third countries to their foreign trade. The thesis of so-called "mutuality" serves as the main instrument for the exertion of pressure on developing countries. It is essentially the acknowledgement of the right of participation in bilateral trade by the ship owners of only the countries extending the same opportunities to carriers in third countries. The United States has stubbornly tried to insert this principle into international maritime contracts, striving for its inclusion in bilateral agreements on shipping with developing countries.

The development of relations with the United States has a significant impact on the shipping policy of its allies. Reaching a mutual understanding with the United States--the main political and trade partner--is still an important determining factor in the shipping policies of West European countries and Japan.

The agreement containing the awaited compromise on the entire group of matters was signed in Copenhagen in April 1986. The wording of the agreement is still being kept secret, but reports in the foreign press have described it in general terms. It guarantees ship owners in the United States and the AGS countries mutual access on the abovementioned terms to freight shipments in their trade with developing countries and the coordination of measures to combat the protectionist policies of developing states in shipping; it defines the volume of freight covered by future bilateral intergovernmental agreements on the distribution of shipments, and it stipulates the procedure for the settlement of claims and the arbitration of disputes.¹⁶

The first intergovernmental Soviet-American agreement on some aspects of shipping was signed on 14 October 1972 for a term of 3 years. Another agreement of this kind was then concluded on 29 December 1975 for a period of 5 years. These agreements became the international legal basis for the regulation of maritime trade.

When Washington imposed many discriminatory restrictions on trade with the USSR in the beginning of the 1980's, shipments of finished manufactured goods, which were already negligible, virtually stopped. The volume of agricultural shipments was also reduced, despite the new USSR-U.S. agreement signed in 1983 on the trade in some agricultural products.

As a result of the anti-Soviet campaign in the United States, an addition to the 1916 shipping act was passed in 1978 and then became part of the new shipping act in 1984. It was called the "Act on Government-Controlled Freight Carriers." The law stipulates special tariff rates for government-controlled shipping companies operating outside conferences. Whereas private shipping lines can lower tariff rates without special permission from the FMC, government lines do not have this right. Furthermore, government carriers must substantiate their tariff rates, which is extremely difficult in view of the vague criteria stipulated in the act. Besides this, the FMC does not require grounds for their denial. The system of exceptions is built into the law in such a way that, on the one hand, it does not apply to government

companies in developed capitalist countries and, on the other, it forces government companies in other countries to raise their rates to the level of conference rates.¹⁷

According to its initiators, the 1978 law was supposed to reduce the participation of Soviet ships in American foreign trade shipments. It is virtually impossible to estimate the full negative impact of the law, however, because in 1980 the reactionary longshoremen's union of the Atlantic Coast, one of the AFL-CIO unions, used the "events in Afghanistan" as an excuse to boycott Soviet ships, against the protests of shippers. Although the independent longshoremen's union of the Pacific Coast did not join the boycott, Soviet carriers lost the use of freight facilities here too, because shippers from other countries began to refrain from using Soviet ships in the fear that they might be boycotted at any moment. As a result, Soviet shipping lines gradually stopped carrying the freight of U.S. foreign trade with third countries. In addition, the intergovernmental agreement was not renewed, and this was the fault of the American side.

The USSR wants Soviet-American contacts in the sphere of shipping to develop on the basis of mutual benefit and wants to solve existing problems. Progress in this sphere would make a definite contribution to the normalization of relations between the two powers.

FOOTNOTES

1. MONTHLY BULLETIN OF STATISTICS, March 1984.
2. "Statistical Abstract of the United States 1985," p 622.
3. "Lloyd's Register of Shipping. Statistical Tables," London, 1985, p 5. Deadweight is a term used to describe the weight of a vessel in metric tons (DWT--deadweight tons), indicating the maximum load (commodities, fuel, foodstuffs, and crew) it can carry and remain seaworthy. Besides this, the holding capacity of the merchant vessel is measured in registered tons; a gross registered ton (GRT) is equivalent to 2.83 cubic meters.
4. "Statistical Abstract of the United States 1985," p 623.
5. LLOYD'S SHIPPING ECONOMIST, June 1982, p 28.
6. Calculated according to information in "Foreign Flag Merchant Ships Owned by U.S. Parent as of May 1, 1985." The U.S. Maritime Administration allows American ship owners to transfer the fleet under a flag of "convenience" on the condition that the fleet be put at the government's disposal in the event of an emergency. This is called the "effectively controlled" fleet. The "flag of convenience" countries offer ship owners tax and other privileges.
7. INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT JOURNAL, 1984, No 11, p 1135; No 28, p 3161.

8. THE JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, 16 May 1985; 18 June 1985.
9. LLOYD'S LIST, 16 May 1985.
10. THE JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, 28 May 1985.
11. The high concentration of production in U.S. shipping monopolies is attested to just by the fact that three American companies, Sea-Land, American President Lines, and United States Lines, rank highest in fleet container capacity in world maritime shipments between the United States and the Far East. Respectively, they should account for 10.1, 8.5, and 8.9 percent of total container capacity in 1986 along this route (LLOYD'S SHIPPING ECONOMIST, May 1983, p 13).
12. In international maritime trade the transport of high-volume freight (oil, coal, iron ore, etc.) is covered by special tramp freight contracts. The simultaneous shipment of small loads by several shippers, usually consisting of finished manufactured goods, is performed by shipping lines according to regular schedules and rates. Shipping companies (or lines) conclude agreements to regulate the main conditions of this form of transport. The most popular form of agreement, regulating primarily the shipment price (or tariff rates), is the line conference--an agreement of the cartel type. Shippers also form their own organizations for collective action in relations with carriers and their associations.
13. SEATRADE, July 1984, p 19.
14. The AGS was established 20 years ago by the West European countries and Japan, which use this intergovernmental organization to gain mutual support in counteracting American influence in world shipping.
15. OUTLOOK, November 1984, p 10.
16. SEATRADE WEEK, 2-8 May 1986, p 2.
17. MORSKOY FLOT, 1981, No 7.

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U.S. CONGRESS AND SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

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[Article by V.Yu. Vasilkov; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] At the end of last year the American Congress overrode a presidential veto on a bill on sanctions against South Africa and it became law. This was a unique case for the current administration but it can hardly be regarded as a serious blow to the racist regime.

We should recall that the President won the first round of the struggle between Congress and the White House over sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa. When the 99th Congress convened in fall 1985, the President easily circumvented the legislators with the support of the Senate Republican leadership. A bill passed in the House of Representatives was not put to a vote in the Senate. Instead, the President's executive order of 9 September 1985 imposed several symbolic restrictions on trade with South Africa for 1 year. It prohibited new loans to the South African Government by American banks, the export of nuclear technology to South Africa, as well as the computers and accessories needed by its police force, and U.S. imports of Krugerrands, the South African gold coins, and of weapons and ammunition produced in South Africa. The many stipulations accompanying each of these points and economic realities (for instance, by that time the American banks had stopped financing South Africa on their own, and the United States had never bought South African arms), however, essentially nullified their already more than modest aims.¹

Meanwhile, the situation in South Africa grew increasingly tense, and objections to apartheid became more widespread and more adamant. Suffice it to say that around 2 million black South African workers took part in the May Day strike of 1986. The retaliatory punitive actions of the authorities also acquired broader dimensions. More than 1,000 people have been killed and over 20,000 people have been arrested in South Africa since September 1984--that is, since the beginning of the mass demonstrations by the black population. As far as Pretoria's pseudo-reforms are concerned, they have not even been enforced since summer 1986.

American business groups with interests in South Africa grew increasingly anxious. By the end of 1986 the number of American companies which had left South Africa since 1984 reached 63. By that time total U.S. direct private investments in South Africa had declined to 1.4 billion dollars from their highest point of 2.6 billion in 1981. The reduced profits of most of the companies dealing with South Africa (some of them are even suffering losses) make capital investments in this country more risky. Besides this, under the influence of the movement against apartheid within the United States, 20 states, 68 cities, 118 universities, and many church, labor, and other public organizations have withdrawn their assets from corporations and banks connected with South Africa.² By the middle of 1986 these withdrawn assets totaled 5 billion dollars. All of these circumstances are compounding the crisis of the American policy of "constructive engagement."

On 19 May 1986 the racists launched an armed raid on Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Botswana. The United States responded by deporting South Africa's senior military attache and by recalling its own from Pretoria, but it also impeded the passage of a resolution in the UN Security Council on comprehensive sanctions against the aggressor. A state of emergency was declared throughout South Africa on 12 June.

Congress apparently saw this move and Ronald Reagan's official message to President P. Botha of South Africa, expressing the "wish" that the state of emergency could be lifted, as a challenge. On 18 June the House had already approved a bill proposed by R. Dellums (Democrat, California), envisaging extremely stern measures: an embargo on trade with South Africa--although, it is true, with the exception of imports of strategic materials at the President's discretion--and the withdrawal of all private American investments in the next 6 months.

We can only wonder, however, what it was that filled the congressmen with so much indignation. After all, the leader of the counterrevolutionary anti-Angolan UNITA group, J. Savimbi, visited the United States in January and February 1986 and was given the kind of reception that is usually reserved for high-level statesmen. Savimbi had meetings with R. Reagan, G. Shultz, and C. Weinberger and addressed the Congress. The main result of the visit was the U.S. promise to give UNITA military assistance, which became possible in summer 1985, after Congress repealed the Clark amendment, which had prohibited this kind of aid. In March 1986 Washington sent the first shipment of arms to UNITA, a shipment valued at 15 million dollars, including the latest Stinger missiles and antitank weapons. Holden Roberto, the leader of another antigovernment group, the FNLA, crushed by Angolan patriots in 1976, spent 5 weeks in the United States in April and May 1986. After he testified in hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, congressmen advised more extensive intervention in Angolan affairs and the augmentation of shipments of modern weapons to the counterrevolutionaries.

Therefore, U.S. ruling circles, on the one hand, are striving to use the racist government to undermine progressive regimes in southern Africa and, on the other, are urging Pretoria to give apartheid the appearance of a more respectable system "from the top down," by means of reforms, in order to

secure American interests in the region. This is precisely what the South African Government is being urged to do by the Reagan Administration and--somewhat more vigorously--by Congress. Pretoria's reluctance to follow Washington's instructions to the letter, its attempts to "select" only those of some benefit to itself, is what aroused the negative response on Capitol Hill.

The existence of certain tactical disagreements between the administration and Congress, combined with their agreement on long-range American policy goals in southern Africa, predetermined the next moves in their battle over the sanctions against South Africa.

First of all, the results of votes in the House of Representatives forced the administration to quickly plan countermeasures. The plan of action was the same as in 1985: It would try to undermine congressional approval of any kind of effective sanctions by instituting some kind of alternative, but much milder, measures. To this end, soon after the vote in the House, it was announced that the administration had begun a "bold" reassessment of its policy toward South Africa under the supervision of Secretary of State Shultz and J. Poindexter, then the President's national security adviser. One of the elements of this reassessment turned out to be broader official contacts with representatives of the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa. A future speech by the President, in which he was supposed to announce the basic premises of the new policy, also began to be advertised. He was also expected to announce the replacement of the U.S. ambassador to South Africa. The retirement of H. Nickel, who had occupied this post since 1981, and the appointment of a black diplomat to take his place were supposed to be signs of a departure from the policy of "constructive engagement."

President Reagan made his speech on 22 July and timed it to coincide with the beginning of the debates on the sanctions in the Senate. Half of the speech, however, was taken up by an "explanation" of why the administration agreed with Prime Minister M. Thatcher of Great Britain that sanctions are "morally wrong" and "utterly repugnant." He then went on to say that "there have been impressive changes in South Africa recently." The President did not forget to mention U.S. strategic interests in southern Africa or the "Soviet threat" either. All of this ended with the conclusion that "the Government of South Africa has no obligation to discuss the future of the country with any organization declaring the aim of creating a communist state and using terrorist tactics to attain this goal" (this was a reference to the ANC--V.V.).³ The speech was well received only by the South African Government, and the only prominent leader of the black South Africans to applaud the speech was tribal chief G. Buthelezi, the government's loyal stooge. Senator N. Kassebaum (Republican, Kansas), chairman of the Subcommittee on African Affairs, expressed the opinion of the majority in Congress when she said that she was "deeply disappointed." In the Capitol the President won the praise of only the extreme rightwing Republican senators, B. Goldwater (Arizona), J. Helms (North Carolina), and others like them.

The news of the appointment of an ambassador, which Reagan wanted to make the centerpiece of his speech, also backfired. The nomination of R. Brown,

a black businessman from North Carolina, had to be withdrawn at the last minute. It was learned that he was closely associated with an adviser to former Nigerian President S. Shagari, a man named U. Dikko, who has been accused of the illegal transfer of millions of dollars out of the country. The administration also made another mistake when it drafted an agreement on the restriction of the growth of imports of South African textiles to the United States. In 1985 alone the volume increased by 139 percent. The new agreement allowed an increase of 4 percent a year, and this was done at the time when Congress was discussing sanctions. By doing this, the administration made Congress even angrier.

In an attempt to correct the situation, G. Shultz informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 23 July that the administration was willing to agree with the allies on some kind of new measures against South Africa, and that he himself was willing to meet with ANC President O. Tambo. Shultz asserted that the adoption of sanctions by Congress deprived the administration of a free hand and would supposedly signify a U.S. "abandonment of responsibility." On 24 July the President himself announced the need for a "flexible" policy toward South Africa, hinting at the possibility of some kind of additional sanctions. The ones his advisers mentioned included the prohibition of landing rights for South African planes in the United States and restrictions on the issuance of visas to South African officials.

One important fact must be emphasized. Just before the administration took these measures, G. Shultz had a long talk with Senate Republican Majority Leader R. Dole (Kansas) and Republican Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee R. Lugar (Indiana) and apparently agreed on a joint strategy with them: The administration would meet Congress halfway, and the Senate leadership would water down the House bill as much as possible. This is what apparently lies behind the UPI report of 30 July that Reagan "yielded the leadership in the matter of sanctions to Lugar and Dole." The agency report went on to say that "the Republicans object to Reagan's position on sanctions but are leading a fight against the bill passed by the House last month."

On 1 August the Senate Foreign Relations Committee rejected a proposal by A. Cranston (Democrat, California) on the support of the House bill, and the milder proposal of Democrats E. Kennedy (Massachusetts) and L. Weicker (Connecticut). A proposal formulated by Lugar was passed by a vote of 15 to 2 (J. Helms and L. Pressler, Republicans from South Dakota). The bill was then passed by the full Senate by a vote of 84 to 14.

In September, however, President Reagan made a last attempt to impede the enactment of a law on sanctions. On 4 September he announced the extension of his executive order of 9 September 1985. By this time the issue of an ambassadorial appointment had also been decided. After the rejection of R. Brown and then of W. Todman, E. Perkins, former ambassador to Liberia, became the first black U.S. ambassador to South Africa. As U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT commented, "not one of the administration's gestures bore the faintest resemblance to any kind of new policy toward South Africa, and not one of them gave the critics of the old policy any satisfaction."⁴

It is unlikely that they would have pleased even the "moderate" senators, who, incidentally, did not support the House bill. Under these conditions, the House had to choose between a version of the bill acceptable to the Senate or nothing at all. Congress had to make the final decision by 3 October, when it would adjourn for the elections. The 10 days allowed for the presidential examination of the bill had to be subtracted from the month remaining, and some time had to be set aside for another vote in both houses for the purpose of overriding the anticipated presidential veto. Besides this, the presence of two-thirds of the members of both houses, required to override a presidential veto, would necessitate the consideration of the Republicans' opinions.

After weighing all of these procedural considerations, the House of Representatives passed the bill in the form in which it had been approved by the Senate by a vote of 308 to 77 on 12 September. It is indicative that a few days later the House rejected an amendment on allocations for intelligence, in accordance with which the decision to assist Angolan rebels in the future would have to be jointly approved by the Senate and House. This authorized the continuation of military assistance to UNITA and again "balanced out" the vote for sanctions against South Africa.

Ten days later the President vetoed the bill on sanctions. At the very end of the session, on 29 September, the House of Representatives rejected it 313 to 87, and the Senate voted 78 to 21 to override the veto. In this way, the 1986 comprehensive act against apartheid went into effect. It was called comprehensive because the new law includes all of the earlier restrictions on relations with South Africa, particularly the 1963 embargo on arms shipments and the presidential order of 1985. The law envisages the following measures.

FINANCIAL SANCTIONS. It bans new investment in and new loans to South Africa and the extension of credit to the South African Government or any organizations controlled by it.

The exceptions listed in the law, however, will largely nullify this measure. For example, it allows short-term credit, the refinancing of existing South African debts, and the issuance of loans and credits for education, housing construction, and "humanitarian" undertakings. The law does not prohibit the reinvestment of profits earned in South Africa. It is a well-known fact, however, that the growth of American capital investment has long been due precisely to the reinvestment of profits and not to new capital from the United States.

IMPORT RESTRICTIONS. It prohibits the import of South African uranium, coal, textiles (90 days after enactment), cast iron, steel, weapons, ammunition, military vehicles, agricultural products, foodstuffs, any of the products of South African state-controlled companies from third countries, and gold Krugerrands.

South African exports in 1985 totaled 16.5 billion dollars, including 2.17 billion to the United States. As far as the goods banned in the act are concerned,

the figures for U.S. imports in 1985 were the following: agricultural products--around 180 million dollars, uranium--140 million, cast iron and steel--70 million, coal--43 million, textiles--21 million; in other words, a total of 450 million dollars, or 15 percent of South African exports to the United States and 2 percent of its total exports. Purchases of Krugerrands stopped in October 1985, in accordance with the executive order. South Africa lost only 3 percent of its commissions, because there was no ban on imports of South African gold bullion.

After the sanctions went into effect, South Africa announced that it would retaliate by refusing to buy American grain. This was not a serious sacrifice. During 2 bad years for agriculture (1983/84 and 1984/85) South Africa had to import--mainly from the United States--more than 2 million tons of grain a year to supplement its local output of 4 million tons. During the agricultural season of 1985/86, which ended on 1 October, however, imports of corn fell to almost zero, and only 300,000 tons of wheat were imported, including 160,000 tons from the United States, 90,000 from Australia, and 55,000 from Canada. Furthermore, as South African officials announced, other Western countries have already offered to replace the United States as grain suppliers.

EXPORT RESTRICTIONS. The law bans the export of crude oil and petroleum products, military hardware, and any materials, parts, and technical documents used in nuclear power plants or other nuclear installations to South Africa and the export of computers, accessories, and services to South African military, police, and other organizations involved in the maintenance of the apartheid system.

South African imports totaled 11.5 billion dollars in 1985, including 1.26 billion from the United States. That same year it bought U.S. petroleum products worth 13.1 million dollars. The significance of these miniscule shipments is negligible. Other restrictions repeat existing limitations, which have, incidentally, been violated repeatedly.

AIR TRAVEL SANCTIONS. The U.S.-South African agreements on air travel are no longer in force. South African air lines have lost the right to land planes in the United States, and American flights to South Africa have been banned. Not one American air line, however, makes regular flights to South Africa.

OTHER SANCTIONS. The law prohibits the acquisition of South African goods and services by American government agencies, with the exception of those needed for diplomatic and consular operations, and the use of federal funds for the development of trade and tourism, including the financing of trade agencies and participation in trade fairs and exhibits. It also bans the use of government funds to subsidize trade with South Africa.

One section of the act bans U.S. cooperation with South African armed forces, with the exception of cases in which this cooperation "will facilitate the acquisition of necessary intelligence." An interesting item in THE NEW YORK TIMES said that U.S. and English intelligence services supply South Africa with information about the ANC and other national liberation movements in the

independent African countries during their regular contacts with South African intelligence services, which began in the 1960's and are still being maintained. This considerably supplements the information the racists obtain with the aid of the radio reconnaissance equipment they received in the 1970's from the United States, England, and the FRG. Intelligence data are used for punitive operations against the native population of South Africa and for subversive actions against neighboring countries.⁵ Obviously, this is an extremely significant exception to the "sanctions."

CONDITIONS FOR THE LIFTING OF ALL SANCTIONS: the release of ANC Chairman N. Mandela and other political prisoners; the cancellation of the state of emergency and the release of all "detainees"; the legalization of all political parties and organizations; the commencement of talks with the leaders of the black majority. In these cases the President will have the power to lift or modify the sanctions. He will also have this power if he decides that South Africa has made "substantial progress" in the elimination of apartheid.

According to L. McKellar, economics expert from Queens College in New York, it is possible that this will cause a slight production slump in South Africa, followed by production growth in a year or so--as soon as South African industry begins adapting to the sanctions. "Many of the prohibitions are actually much less important than they seem to be," THE NEW YORK TIMES accurately stated. "There is not the slightest possibility that the South African economy will suffer seriously from this," said F. Luebke, the president of the American Chamber of Commerce in South Africa.

It is also noteworthy that after the "comprehensive act" was passed, South Africa began considering ways of adapting to the sanctions, and not ways of eliminating apartheid. R. Parsons, the chief administrator of the South African Association of Chambers of Commerce, said that these measures would force the business community to seek ways of neutralizing the sanctions, and not of instituting racial reforms, "because their survival is at stake." President P. Botha of South Africa convened a special economics conference to plan countermeasures. They will emphasize so-called "flexible" or "non-traditional" methods of trade. What does this mean?

Long before the sanctions against South Africa became a reality, South African businessmen took advantage of Israel's favorable trade status in the EEC and United States. It opened plants in Israel, where products underwent minor finishing touches and were stamped "Made in Israel." In this way, steel, chemicals, fertilizer, concentrated feeds, and other products which were actually produced in South Africa, in the apartheid system with its cheaper labor, reached the West. Citizens of South Africa, many of them Jewish, are responsible for 35 percent of all non-American investments in Israel, and Israel's investments in South Africa have increased tenfold in the last 2 years. Most of these reciprocal investments are intended for the use of Israel as a springboard for the duty-free export of South African goods to Western Europe and the United States. After the sanctions were imposed, this circumventing mechanism became even more important to South Africa, particularly in view of the agreement concluded in 1985 by Israel on free trade with the United States. It was then that P. Botha announced the creation of an

organization to conduct "non-traditional" trade through third countries.⁷ It is also no secret that South Africa has access through Israel to the nuclear technology and weapons it is officially forbidden to buy. In this way, the sinister alliance of Zionism and apartheid prepared the soil in advance for the subversion of the already "meager" American sanctions.

The obvious preponderance of restrictions on U.S. imports from South Africa over export bans will increase the already traditionally large positive balance in U.S. trade with South Africa. It goes without saying that the import restrictions do not apply to any of the numerous strategic minerals purchased from South Africa. The products of its mining industry, however, account for 85 percent of its annual export revenues. Therefore, the refusal to buy crude minerals would have been the most effective measure. It is no wonder that most American experts agree that Pretoria's curtailment of shipments of strategic minerals to the United States as a response to the sanctions would be virtually impossible, because "the South African economy would suffer at least as much as the United States." It is more probable that South Africa will suspend payments on its foreign debt of 21 billion dollars, including 3.2 billion owed to American banks, as a countermeasure against the sanctions if they should be enforced more rigorously.⁸

A comparison of the American sanctions imposed in 1986 to the executive order of 1985 indicates gradually sterner measures, although they still do not affect vitally important spheres of economic relations between the United States and South Africa. The precise choice and sequence of these measures are striking because they will give the government in Pretoria time to adapt to increasing international isolation, now that world public opinion has made it inevitable. According to reports from South Africa, there has been almost no reaction to the sanctions in Johannesburg financial markets because businessmen have known that their imposition was an inevitability for months. The South African rand has also remained strong.

A report in *NEWSDAY*, a New York newspaper, about a secret American-Anglo-West German agreement of September 1986 is interesting. It envisages the obstruction of any sanction that would seriously hurt the South African economy. Besides this, the paper cites a remark by "an influential member of Great Britain's Conservative Party." In his words, although the agreement "is not recorded on paper," it will be perceptible each time the issue of sanctions is raised in international organizations.⁹ There have been no official denials of this report, and this is indicative in itself. But the existence or non-existence of the agreement is not that important. After all, ever since the beginning of the 1960's, when the issue of sanctions against South Africa was first discussed in the United Nations, the Western powers have invariably displayed complete class solidarity with the racists and have blocked all effective measures.

The sanctions imposed on 17 September 1986 by the EEC provide further evidence of this. They apply to new investments and the import of steel, cast iron, and gold coins. In 1985 South African exports of steel and cast iron to Western Europe were estimated at around 500 million dollars. In combination with the American measures, this will cause South Africa to lose around a

billion dollars a year in exports. And the Western sanctions in general will affect less than 6 percent of its exports. There is no question that neither the United States nor any other Western country will reinforce the sanctions after they have reached a certain point. It is just as indisputable that the alleged "ineffectiveness" of earlier sanctions will be used as the excuse, although they were not comprehensive, as the world community wants them to be, but were selective.

As Senator E. Kennedy said in Congress in connection with the passage of the "comprehensive act," U.S. policy "puts America on the side of racism in South Africa," and the United States "is the apartheid system's last loyal friend." This is an accurate description of the "constructive engagement" policy of the Reagan Administration, which has verbally renounced this concept but is actually continuing its vigorous defense of white supremacy in South Africa.

FOOTNOTES

1. For more detail, see SSHA: EPI, 1986, No 5, pp 74-80--Ed.
2. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 20 October 1986, pp 45-46.
3. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, 15 July 1986, p 4264.
4. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 13 October 1986, p 36.
5. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 23 July 1986.
6. Ibid., 3 October 1986.
7. MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, 11 July 1986, p 26.
8. NEWSWEEK, 13 October 1986, p 51.
9. NEWSDAY, 19 September 1986.

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ECONOMY AND POLITICS OF COMPUTERIZATION

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 87
(signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 94-98

[Article by O.M. Mirimskaya]

[Text] The computerization of the acquisition, storage, processing, and distribution of information has become one of the most common trends in the development of economic and social affairs in the United States, Japan, and other developed capitalist countries. The millions of mini- and micro-computers and the tens of thousands of local computer networks which made their appearance in the 1980's have changed the informational structure of society considerably, influencing the economy, politics, and even the ideology of the capitalist world.

The material base for the production of computers and other computerization equipment consists of the computer industry and the software industry. In combination with maintenance and programming services, they made up a new and huge industry in the 1980's--the information and computer engineering industry. In the United States this industry already ranked third in gross sales volume (after the oil and automobile industries) in 1984, when its sales volume reached 150 billion dollars. Since then, it has been rising at a rate of 15-17 percent a year.

The many economic and political consequences, contradictions, and "mysteries" of this growth, described by Western economists as phenomenal, have been discussed in a veritable flood of books and articles. They include analyses of the achievements of leading companies in the industry and the development of the main computer production centers, like California's famous Silicon Valley.

"Silicon Valley Fever,"¹ a book by two authors--Stanford University economist Everett Rogers and Silicon Valley firm engineer Judith Larsen--gives readers an inside look at the largest U.S. center of the information and computer engineering industry.

The authors speculate on the reasons for the extremely rapid growth of most of the firms established in Silicon Valley in the last 3-7 years. The young companies producing microprocessors, software, and other high technology

products here began their operations with limited capital, but growth rates reaching as high as 150-200 percent a year gave many of them a gross income of hundreds of millions of dollars by 1984-1985 and allowed the Compac Computer and Seagate Technology firms to even enter the group of the 50 largest companies in the industry.

The authors of "Silicon Valley Fever" believe that three main factors are at work here: the extensive use of venture capital, the flexibility of management structures in new companies, and the enterprising nature of their founders. There is no question that venture capital investments, which increased almost 40-fold from 1970 to 1983 (p 65), did aid in the establishment of hundreds of new firms in such high technology branches as semiconductor, computer, and software production. In combination with the penetration of Silicon Valley by financial firms from Japan and Western Europe, this growth even led to a slight surplus of capital in the centers of the "new technology."

The flexibility of management structures also plays a positive role in the progress of high technology industries, the authors conclude. In this term, Rogers and Larsen include the possibility of the rapid reorganization of production, the minimum number of managerial personnel, and a "mutual understanding" between managers and engineering and technical personnel, stemming from the fact that most managers came from the ranks of engineers. An indicative example of this flexible management can be seen in the operations of the fairly large Chromemco computer firm, which has never purchased a single building or piece of equipment in all the 7 years of its existence, preferring to lease everything for the sake of keeping production mobile (p 182).

The authors assign "American enterprise" and the inclination of many talented engineers to establish their own firms a colossal role in the success of the production of "new technology." They cite the history of the Fairchild semiconductor corporation as an example. Its former employees became the founders of almost 80 medium-sized and large electronics firms in Silicon Valley (p 44).

The rapid development of production and science, combined with the atmosphere of commercial enterprise, served, in the authors' opinion, as the basis for the development of new spiritual values. They call them the "high technology culture." In the term "culture," Larsen and Rogers include the ability of the population of Silicon Valley to produce great technological and economic achievements, and the unique way of life of most of the center's inhabitants. Scientists and engineering and technical personnel (they constitute more than half of the personnel of Silicon Valley firms) not only work 10 or 11 hours a day, but also continue working on the design of processors and computers and the development of programs after they come home. These people have no time for church or entertainment. They are always working, both in the office and at home, and they work voluntarily. A characteristic indicator of this lifestyle, the authors write, is the fact that the percentage of contributions made by private firms in Silicon Valley to cultural organizations is just over half as high as the national average (p 164).

The percentage of children in Silicon Valley schools with a high IQ by U.S. standards is almost 40 times as high as the national average. The authors

see this as another distinctive feature of the "new culture" (p 164). The constant interaction of students with computers, which are present in abundance in the local schools, and the overall creative atmosphere have already produced an entire generation of "computer kids"--the people who are supposed to carry on the valley's present progress.

In the authors' opinion, this progress has displayed a tendency toward acceleration, and this is specifically reflected in the Silicon Valley inhabitants' lack of desire to save money. They are spending all of their money today because they know that they will make more money tomorrow. In any case, it is true that the desire for high and extremely high profits is an invariable feature of the "new spiritual values of the high technology culture," and there is nothing new in this. The motto of the tens of thousands of employees of Silicon Valley firms is "Slower growth is tantamount to death."

The authors are afraid that when hard times come to Silicon Valley, it "will resemble Pittsburgh, Cleveland, or Detroit today." What will happen to computerization, to the industry, and to the "new culture"? (p 250).

The question is answered in part by Stephen McClellan, the president of a Wall Street group of computer industry analysts. In his book "The Coming Computer Industry Shakeout,"² he sets forth the theory of the "constant shakeout" (p 326). This is what he calls the periodic restructuring of the industry.

The dramatic reduction of the dimensions and cost of semiconductor components led to the first major upheaval--the beginning of the mass production of micro-computers and the slower growth of the demand for large, medium, and mini-computers. This raised some computer firms to unprecedented heights and caused the collapse of others, which had not had time to revise their production structure in accordance with the needs of computerization. The companies whose position was dramatically eroded in the first half of the 1980's included some fairly firms--Storage Technology, Texas Instruments, and even Honeywell. The winners, Apple Computer and Wang Laboratories, joined the group of the top 10 companies in the industry.

As soon as the industry recovered from this crisis, economists began predicting the next upheaval. The present restructuring of computer production is increasing the percentage accounted for by software in the gross income of the industry. According to S. McClellan, the total cost of programming industry products in the United States and of the programs included in the basic accessories of computers for sale represent 50 percent of the gross income of the information and computer engineering industry. Beginning in the middle of the 1980's, the new shakeup will increase, according to the author's estimates, the proportion accounted for by software to 80 percent of the gross income of the industry (p 238).

In his analysis of the reasons for these developments, however, McClellan reveals the degree to which his views are limited by the laws of the capitalist economy: He blames everything on the excessive enterprise of

engineers and businessmen and on the unrestricted growth of new independent firms. It is true that events in the software industry today resemble what happened 5 or 6 years ago in the production of micro-computers, when several hundred firms producing personal computers ceased to exist. In 1985 there were already more than 4,000 programming firms in the United States, and more than a thousand were developing applied programs for personal computers (p 242).

At the same time, the author points to several significant differences between the computer and programming businesses, differences which became quite apparent with the growth of the program market. The fact is that the mass production of programs makes it difficult to reduce overhead costs by reducing the scales of production, and for this reason, the author believes, small programming firms are more independent and stable. In his opinion, the constant shakeups in the industry in the future will be secured by the need to produce new types of programs and, consequently, new types of computers, the production of which will expand by virtue of the enterprise of American engineers and managers.

In reality, however, no small, medium, or even large companies in the information and computer engineering industry are really independent. The need for the program compatibility of computers forces thousands of firms to conform to the standards of industry leaders--IBM, DEC, and AT&T. For example, in 1984 Syncom Systems had to stop producing its popular database management systems, which were compatible with the computers of 40 different firms, and begin manufacturing products compatible only with the equipment of IBM and DEC.

The plans of the largest U.S. and Japanese computer corporations to begin the mass production of fifth-generation computers with elements of artificial intelligence in the 1990's pose a real threat to the present independence of software firms. In this case, the industry shakeup will not be a result of the enterprise of the founders of independent firms, but of objective advances in scientific and technical progress and the policy of giant monopolies. Eloquent testimony can be found in a book by Hofstra University Professor R. Sobel, "IBM vs. Japan: The Struggle for the Future,"³ and in a work by Tokyo University Professor G. Gregory on the Japanese electronics industry.

Sobel's study notes that IBM, which ranks sixth among the leading U.S. industrial corporations, is the largest producer of computers in the capitalist world. Its income doubles every 5 years and, according to the predictions of American experts, will exceed 100 billion dollars in 1990. In a discussion of IBM's success in world computer markets, the author stresses that the company was able to do this "by virtue of its financial strength, competent intraorganizational management, and correct choice of competitive strategy" (p 11).

Each year, however, it becomes more difficult to retain the position of the main supplier of equipment for computerization. Competition from Japan, which has almost caught up with the United States in total radioelectronics output, was clearly apparent in the computer industry in the 1980's. In an analysis

of the aggressive advancement of Japanese firms, Sobel remarks that until the middle of the 1980's they had mainly used the traditional methods of competition in combination with compliance with American standards (the production of computers compatible with IBM equipment). This policy was quite successful in the Japanese domestic market. In the last 20 years, IBM's share of total computer sales in Japan decreased from 60 to 20 percent (p 98). At the same time, the Japanese branch of IBM is still the third largest producer of computers in this country and is vigorously striving to regain its lost positions. There have been more frequent appeals, however, by Japanese economists, businessmen, and politicians for stronger unity in the struggle against IBM.

This is also the position taken by G. Gregory, a Belgian who has lived in Japan for 30 years and has studied the Japanese electronics industry. Discussing the prospects for the development of this industry in his book,⁴ he notes that labor productivity in the Japanese electronics industry increased 2.5-fold in the second half of the 1970's, and he estimates that the same rate of growth will be maintained throughout the 1980's (p 39). He believes that this will allow Japan to retain its leading position in the industries in which it has been dominant in the last 7 or 8 years and to become the biggest producer of very large integrated circuits (VLIC), super-computers, robots, home personal computers, accessories, and telecommunications equipment.

Gregory lists inter-firm cooperation, the "human factor," and the active regulation of industry management by the government as the most important factors contributing to the success of Japan's computer industry. These factors, he says, indicate the existence of a unique predisposition in all Japanese industry to the vigorous use of innovations, the rapid renewal of product assortment, the establishment of high technology production, and the augmentation of labor productivity.

The VLIC project is an example of successful cooperation by Japanese electronics corporations, which were able to foresee the future promise of developments in this field and to begin working on them under the auspices of a government strategic program 2 or 3 years before their rivals overseas. Furthermore, the Japanese project was from 20 to 25 percent cheaper than the American one because there were no duplicate assignments (p 50). The same thing is going on now in the work on the fifth-generation computer, which the Japanese began 2 years before the Americans and English, suggesting to many that Japan has a certain advantage in this key area of scientific and technical progress. It must be said, however, that in response to the Japanese "challenge" the United States launched the program of the so-called "strategic computer initiative,"⁵ presupposing not only the federal coordination of research in the field of new highly productive computers, but also the financing of these projects, and in amounts representing from double to triple the financing provided in Japan.

Citing the "human factor" as another reason for the success of Japanese electronics, Gregory backs up his statement with data on the system of higher education in the country. Japan is far ahead of all the other capitalist countries in terms of the number of specialists in electronics and electrical

engineering. But the assertions of many Japanese economists that the improvement of the skills of millions of workers and the growth of foreign trade revenues will raise the standard of living appreciably are not consistent with the facts. The use of computers, which augments labor productivity substantially, is reducing the number of personnel in private firms and government establishments. For this reason, one of the serious social effects of the computerization of the economy in capitalist countries is rising unemployment, especially among unskilled workers, and this is contributing to the further erosion of their standard of living. The use of computers simultaneously simplifies the work of some categories of workers (for example, clerks and traffic controllers) and complicates the work of others (engineers and designers). Wages in low-paying jobs display almost no increase, and this leads to the further polarization of incomes and exacerbation of social inequality. The huge superprofits of Fujitsu, Hitachi, and other monopolies are not used to increase wages, but are distributed among the owners of the firms.

Government regulation of the Japanese computer industry is another major factor in its rapid development. As G. Gregory points out, it is accomplished with the aid of a diversified system of governmental administrative levers.

Arguing that IBM and other U.S. firms have significant advantages over their Japanese rivals, R. Sobel repeatedly analyzes the state of affairs in international computer markets. One of the main points in his discussion is the existence of IBM's large overseas branches in Western Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. The author believes that the governments of West European states will always give preference to IBM, because its branches provide more than 100,000 people in England, France, the FRG, and other countries with jobs, whereas Fujitsu, Hitachi, and NEC sell items manufactured in Japan and thereby undermine the economy of Western Europe. But R. Sobel does not see the main threat these "advantages" pose to IBM and the entire U.S. economy: When high technology production moves to other countries, the centers for the development of the new technology also move there.

Whereas the United States is now selling IBM personal computers built in plants in South Korea and Hong Kong out of Japanese components, tomorrow these states could begin developing their own new computers, using American-trained local personnel. IBM will gradually be crowded out of these countries by local firms in the same way that it has been ousted from first place in the Japanese market. This is precisely what is happening in Europe. The European countries, which have benefited, in Sobel's opinion, from the presence of IBM plants, have been waging a struggle against this company for a long time and are even resorting to economic and technological cooperation with Japan for this purpose.

The desire of many capitalist states to reduce their economic and political dependence on the United States is being reflected more and more clearly in the struggle for independence in the processing of information and for scientific and technical leadership in computer engineering. In this way, computerization is intensifying inter-imperialist conflicts in today's world. The authors of these books, however, do not take a close look at these conflicts.

FOOTNOTES

1. E. Rogers and J. Larsen, "Silicon Valley Fever: The Growth of the High Technology Culture," N.Y., 1984.
2. S. McClellan, "The Coming Computer Industry Shakeout: Winners, Losers and Survivors," N.Y., 1984.
3. R. Sobel, "IBM vs. Japan: The Struggle for the Future," N.Y., 1986.
4. G. Gregory, "Japanese Electronics Technology: Enterprise and Innovation," Tokyo, 1985.
5. See SSHA: EPI, 1986, No 9, pp 112-117--Ed.

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REVIEW OF U.S. BOOK ON SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 87
(signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 99-101

[Review by A.V. Bursov of book "Shared Destiny: Fifty Years of Soviet-American Relations," edited by M. Garrison and A. Gleasson, Boston, Beacon Press, 1985, XXXII + 167 pages]

[Text] This is a book of collected articles analyzing the past, present, and future of Soviet-American relations, which were 50 years old in 1983. The foundation of the work consists of four lectures by prominent American historians on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. In addition, the work contains two specially prepared articles by University of California history professors R. Dallek and G. Roger. The compilers of the anthology and the authors of the foreword and afterword are Director M. Garrison of the Brown University Center of Foreign Policy Development and history Professor A. Gleasson from the same university.

The center was established in 1981 largely through the efforts of prominent businessman and former U.S. ambassador to Moscow T. Watson and former attache in the American embassy in our country M. Garrison. They both believe that one of the main factors of international security is the normal development of U.S.-USSR relations and cooperation in the consolidation of peace and disarmament.

The problems in the development of Soviet-American relations are interpreted in different ways by the authors. Some of them concentrate on the positive aspects and lessons of these relations, while others focus on the negative. This approach is largely due to the differing political views of the authors. The work contains articles by renowned liberal politicians, public spokesmen, and academics who do not approve of the current American administration's hard line and who are aware of the new international balance of power and new political realities. They were instrumental in the shift in favor of detente in American political thinking in the 1970's. They include G. Kennan, J. Gaddis, and M. Garrison.

The book also contains articles by other, equally renowned Sovietologists who specialize in Soviet history and politics: These are Stanford University political scientist A. Dallin and Director A. Ulam of the Harvard University Center for Russian Studies.

An interesting analysis of the establishment of Soviet-American relations is presented in the article by G. Kennan, who could be called the patriarch of American Sovietologists. The author's views have undergone a complex evolution. As we know, he was the author of the notorious theory of the "containment of communism," which became a popular concept in American political thinking and practice after World War II. Kennan was one of the first U.S. politicians, however, to realize the pernicious effects of the cold war on the world and on the United States' own national interests and he now regularly advocates the reinforcement of the bases of peaceful coexistence by the USSR and United States and all-round cooperation by the two countries in economics and in arms limitation and reduction.

In his article Kennan admits with regret that he "helped to arouse emotional and hypocritical anti-Sovietism" (p 11). He makes the accurate statement that American ruling circles were unable to assess the lessons of history soberly and that they should have taken a different view of relations with the Soviet Union, "turning with others away from the road leading to the end of all hope" (p 17).

In his article, A. Ulam discusses the methods of improving mutual understanding between the great powers. He directs attention to the need for the more thorough analysis of the motives of each side's foreign policy actions and then concludes, on the basis of past experience, that the most important thing for U.S. leaders and the American public is a clearer understanding of the real fears and hopes of the Soviet Union (p 57).

In his article "The First 50 Years," J. Gaddis, renowned historian from Ohio State University, focuses attention on the issue of national security. He correctly says that in spite of the USSR's military strength, it has several reasons--including some rooted in the country's history--to be particularly sensitive with regard to its security. But from this correct postulate, Gaddis draws the completely false and, what is most important, unfounded conclusion that the USSR supposedly believes it can safeguard its own security by "expanding its influence at the expense of the national security of other countries." Assigning equal blame to the United States and the USSR for the failure to normalize their relations, the author nevertheless has to admit that it has been the United States that has repeatedly initiated the escalation of the cold war throughout postwar history. Some examples of this are the Marshall Plan, the creation of NATO, the rearming of West Germany, the Kennedy Administration's quantitative buildup of strategic arms, the American Government's decision to install independently targetable warheads on its strategic missiles, the "human rights" campaign at the end of the 1970's, and the rhetoric of the Reagan Administration, which has proclaimed the USSR the "evil empire" (p 25).

Gaddis seems to be straddling the fence. This is a quite uncomfortable position, but for some reason it is preferred by many Sovietologists in the United States. On the one hand, they admit that the United States is acting unwisely in maintaining the arms race and escalating the cold war; on the other, they insist on the use of military strength to pressure the Soviet Union and on a "balance of terror" as a "stabilizing factor." "Those who advocate the elimination or reduction of nuclear arms and the renunciation of deterrence should

propose some other stabilizing factor," he writes (p 32). Gaddis himself does not suggest any alternative to "deterrence through mutual intimidation." He, like many other American historians and politicians, absolutizes the "intimidation factor." But after all, the Soviet Union proved in its latest thoroughly substantiated proposals and initiatives on nuclear arms reduction and elimination that there is a real alternative to the "balance of terror" and that it can be achieved in the next 10 or 15 years in the presence of goodwill on both sides.

In A. Dallin's article on the lessons of history, the American approach to the development of Soviet-American relations is criticized. The author makes note of the aggressive and intractable nature of the U.S. policy line in relations with Soviet Russia, which became apparent immediately after the October Revolution, when the United States tried to "overthrow the Leninist government" and, after these attempts failed, refused to acknowledge the "Bolshevik regime" in Russia for a long time, right up until F. Roosevelt's arrival in the White House (p 60). The author says that the main reason for this approach is the tendency of American leaders to make foreign policy decisions "with a view to the wishes of certain interest groups and a specific segment of the voting public." This is attested to, in his opinion, by such actions as the 1974 Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which made the development of Soviet-American trade and economic relations wholly dependent on the U.S. "human rights" campaign, which essentially represented interference in the USSR's internal affairs. The author believes that although the relations between the great powers are distinguished by ideological confrontations, this should not impede the negotiation and conclusion of effective agreements. The "over-ideologization" of relations with the Soviet Union (which the author tends to blame on the "Americans' irrational fear of the Soviet Union's power") always, he writes, leads to the misjudgment and oversimplification of Soviet motives and behavior in international affairs (p 66). Although Dallin refutes the incorrect American ideas about the Soviet system and the foreign policy goals of the USSR, he also falls into this trap when he says that "the chief danger is Soviet military strength" (pp 74-75). The academic cannot (or will not) admit that the American leadership systematically uses the myth of the "Soviet military threat" to convince voters of the need for the arms race, with the aim of military superiority to the USSR.

Nevertheless, Dallin admits that the American policy line in relations with the Soviet Union has been inconsistent. He blames the failures of this line on the American system of government. His conclusions are quite realistic. "Whether we want to or not," he writes at the end of the article, "we must accept the fact that the Soviet Union exists.... We have no other alternative but to live together on the same planet" (p 79).

In his article, R. Dallek analyzes the American view of Soviet life. The author believes that the "average American" is prejudiced against the Soviet Union by continuous anticommunist propaganda. He suggests that "Reagan's anti-Sovietism is more a result of his strong negative feelings about government economic regulation and social change in general than of a realistic assessment of Soviet goals" (p 100). The author is certain that the outside world for Ronald Reagan is no more than a projection of life in America, and

that his struggle "in defense of liberty and morality" abroad is no more than a response to the exacerbation of the internal political struggle in his own country.

In the afterword one of the editors of the work, M. Garrison, makes a statement which is essentially present in all of the articles, regardless of their authors' views: The USSR and the United States shared a common destiny at the end of the first 50 years of Soviet-American relations. It is essential that both powers, he stresses, realize that there is nothing more important than the prevention of war, which could destroy both systems and all human civilization (p 159).

Therefore, the book testifies that in spite of the diverging views of the authors and their far from pro-Soviet leanings, their conclusions suggest one thing: We must earnestly seek ways and means of averting nuclear conflict. This will necessitate constructive and realistic political dialogue at various levels between Moscow and Washington.

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REVIEW OF POLISH BOOK ON VOA PROPAGANDA

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(signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 101-103

[Review by S.I. Bolshakov of book "Panorama dywersji czyli obraz Polski w propagandzie 'Glosu Ameryki' w latach 1982-1984" [Panorama of Diversion, or the Image of Poland in "Voice of America" Propaganda in 1982-1984], Warsaw, Polska Agencja Interpress, 1985, 121 pages]

[Text] A "white paper" published in 1984 by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and entitled "The Policy of the United States of America Toward Poland in Light of Facts and Documents (1980-1983)" cogently demonstrated the incendiary U.S. role in the fueling of antisocialist feelings in the Polish People's Republic before and during the exacerbation of the internal political situation there in the early 1980's. Radio broadcasts played a special role in Washington's anticommunist campaign.

This new Polish publication analyzing the "Voice of America" broadcasts to Poland in 1982-1984 is of indisputable interest in this connection.

The book consists of three parts. The first reveals the "link" between U.S. propaganda and foreign policy. The second analyzes the fundamentals of "psychological warfare" and the methods and means used by the U.S. propaganda machine. The third part of the book contains an analysis of specific "Voice of America" activities.

The book begins with a brief survey of the history of this radio station, which began its international broadcasts in February 1942 with a promise to tell its listeners throughout the world "only the truth." For more than 40 years it, in conjunction with several large radio subversion centers in the West, has been broadcasting concentrated ideological propaganda to the socialist countries and imposing its own interpretation of events on them.

When the Reagan Administration began pursuing "public diplomacy" and carrying out "Project Truth" and its subsequent replacement, "Project Democracy" (1982), it paid special attention to Poland in connection with the signs of crisis there. Its interest in this socialist country was supposedly motivated by the need to "assist the opponents of socialism and internal opposition groups" (p 10). President Carter's National Security Adviser Z. Brzezinski made a

"great contribution" to the organization and direction of a massive ideological propaganda assault on Poland. He had prepared a secret memorandum as early as 17 March 1978. Copies were distributed only to Secretary of State C. Vance, Secretary of Defense H. Brown, and CIA Director S. Turner. In it, Brzezinski recommended that "the United States and its allies concentrate on Poland" (p 11).

"Project Democracy" followed all of Z. Brzezinski's instructions: more intense radio propaganda in the socialist countries (just under a billion dollars was allocated for this purpose); the support of any organization advocating the "liberalization" and "democratization" of Warsaw Pact countries; U.S. Government actions against "violations of human rights" and propaganda of the American concept of "human rights" in international forums.

The authors of this book underscore the continuity of U.S. propaganda policy toward Poland in 1982-1984: Ideas were taken not only from Brzezinski--the theoretical basis of "psychological warfare" consisted of the theories of W. Daugherty, M. Yanowitch, P. Linebarger, and other American experts in this field, theories they had elaborated back in the 1950's.

In January 1983 a "special planning group" was set up by order of the National Security Council and began promoting "psychological warfare" against Poland. Its members were the secretary of state, secretary of defense, and the directors of the USIA and AID. The authors of this book cogently expose the real purpose of the U.S. program of ideological subversive activity against Poland, in which the "Voice of America" was assigned a prominent role. Each of the authors' theses analyzing the methods of American radio propaganda is illustrated with excerpts from actual radio programs, with the dates and times of the broadcasts cited in all cases. The authors point up the specific ways in which American radio propaganda speculates on the Polish people's feelings of national pride in broadcasted appeals for rebellion and insubordination (p 41).

One of the methods the VOA used in broadcasts to Poland during the period of crisis was the propaganda of stronger Polish contacts with the West as an alternative to the development of relations with socialist countries. "Contrary to obvious facts," the book stresses, "it was asserted that Poland's best friend was the United States" (broadcast of 26 December 1982, aired at 23:30) (p 47).

Taking advantage of the traditional importance of the Catholic Church in Polish life, "Voice of America" constantly discussed the relationship between church and state. The position taken by the radio station, reflecting the general official approach of Washington to this matter, was provocative and incendiary. Broadcasts in 1984, for example, constantly dealt with the following subjects: the "conflicts between the Roman Catholic Church and the communist authorities," the "historic role of the Roman Catholic Church in the development of Polish culture and civilization," the conflict between the "totalitarian system" and Polish cultural traditions, etc.

The authors reveal the direct connection between the instructions of American experts in "psychological warfare" and their implementation in the programs

the station broadcast to Poland. In accordance with these instructions, VOA broadcasts to Poland in 1982-1984 concentrated on the propaganda of subversive activity within the country in an attempt to maintain and stimulate feelings of uncertainty, pessimism, and mistrust of the PZPR in Polish society.

Even today, U.S. policy toward Poland is hostile. Washington's propaganda sounding-board, the VOA, is still distorting the facts about positive changes in the country and its advancement toward the complete normalization of the domestic economic and political situation. Western, including American, propaganda is still telling lies about the achievements of socialism in Poland and is trying to compound the difficulties arising during the efforts to improve its sociopolitical development. This is why the publication in Warsaw of this exposure of modern U.S. methods of "psychological warfare" against socialist Poland is so relevant.

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BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH OF FRANK CARLUCCI

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 87
(signed to press 21 Jan 87) p 106

[Article by V.V.: "Frank C. Carlucci--New Assistant to the U.S. President for National Security Affairs"]

[Text] For the fifth time in the 6 years of R. Reagan's presidency, he has replaced one of the key figures in the White House--the national security adviser. This time the reason was the mounting political scandal in Washington, christened "Irangate" by journalists. The President's choice this time was F. Carlucci, a man with a great variety of experience, although in number two positions, in the diplomatic service, the intelligence community, and the Pentagon.

Frank Charles Carlucci was born in Scranton, Pennsylvania, in 1930. His Italian father was a successful insurance broker. After graduating from Princeton University in 1952, he served in the navy and then worked in corporations. In 1956 he graduated from the Harvard University School of Business.

He worked in the diplomatic service from 1956 to 1969, first in Johannesburg (South Africa), then in the Congo and Tanzania, and then as a political adviser in Rio de Janeiro from 1966 to 1969.

Even then he was already being called a "CIA man" and an expert in covert operations. For example, he was accused of complicity in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba when he worked in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa); he was deported from Tanzania after he was charged with subversive activity; and in Brazil he was involved in a rightwing coup. American commentators also believe that Carlucci was involved in the conspiracy of the "black colonels" in Greece and in covert operations against the Government of South Yemen, not to mention his support of an antigovernment demonstration by reactionary forces in Portugal in 1975, when he was the U.S. ambassador to this country. As we can see, his record of covert operations goes back a long way....

Carlucci spent 6 years in Washington official circles (1969-1975). He was aided in his advancement by his Princeton friendship with D. Rumsfeld, who was appointed director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, an organization

to "combat poverty," by R. Nixon in 1969 and who appointed Carlucci his assistant. A year later Carlucci became the director of this agency. It is quite probable that his career was also advanced at times by another Princeton classmate, current Secretary of the Treasury J. Baker.

The years of his work and close friendship with current Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger followed. When Weinberger became deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget, he appointed Carlucci his assistant, and when Weinberger became director of the OMB, he made Carlucci his deputy; after moving into the office of secretary of health, education and welfare, Weinberger invited Carlucci to be his under secretary. It is also significant that the director of the OMB in 1971, when Carlucci was the assistant deputy director, was current Secretary of State G. Shultz.

His successful career in Washington and his past experience in international affairs paved the way to the post of ambassador to Portugal (1975-1978). When he returned, he was appointed deputy director of the CIA and occupied this office until the end of President Carter's term.

In 1981 Weinberger again made Carlucci his deputy--this time in the Pentagon. When he left this position in 1983, Carlucci received his next appointment from Shultz, who made him the head of a task force studying American aid to foreign states.

From 1983 to 1986 he worked in business, as the president and chairman of the board of Sears World Trade--the foreign trade subsidiary of the powerful Sears, Roebuck merchandising monopoly. In this sphere, however, he was much less successful: The branch suffered losses of 60 million dollars, as a result of which plans were made to merge it with other corporate divisions.

Last but not least, Carlucci received his White House appointment.

American correspondents have underscored Carlucci's close association with the intelligence community and the Pentagon and his close friendship with Weinberger and current CIA Director W. Casey (there is good reason why the new adviser is called "Casey and Weinberger's man") and with foreign policy establishment chief Shultz. This nomination seems to have pleased all of the leading members of the Reagan Administration.

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DEVELOPMENT OF ASAT SYSTEM DISCUSSED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 87
(signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 107-112

[Article by V.G. Glebovich: "The ASAT System: The Antisatellite Weapon"]

[Text] The ASAT (antisatellite) system came into being as a result of the development of long-term tendencies in the American politico-military leadership's endeavors to militarize space and to turn it into a new sphere of the arms race and the arena of the Pentagon's planned "Star Wars."

Back in 1963-1964 the U.S. Army and Air Force were deploying antisatellite complexes based on Nike Zeus missiles, the experimental Nike-X BMD system, and Thor missiles on Kwajalein atoll and Johnston Island in the Pacific Ocean.¹ At the beginning of the 1960's U.S. military agencies were also working hard on other antisatellite weapons projects, which were not carried out because of substantial financial and technical difficulties.²

A U.S. Defense Department analysis of possible improvements in existing anti-satellite systems using missiles in the middle of the 1960's revealed their limited capabilities due to their attachment to permanent launch sites and their insufficient ability to destroy satellites quickly. Later efforts in this field concentrated on the improvement of homing systems and the creation of non-nuclear means of interception, which would, according to the Pentagon, have the following advantages: reduced risk for the United States' own objects in space; a greater savings in series production; the possibility of avoiding the use of complex firing devices and special radar equipment.

With a view to this, the Air Force command drew up "Program 922" for an anti-satellite system for the interception of satellites in the ascent phase of the trajectory with an infrared homing system and a non-nuclear charge. By the middle of the 1960's Hughes Aircraft, Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV), and Northrop were contracted by the Air Force to consider the possibility of creating this kind of antisatellite weapon, equipped, for example, with variable-thrust engines.

A contract for the continuation of the work on "Program 922" was signed with the Aerospace firm (a branch of LTV). The tests of this system in 1971 and 1972 were unsuccessful.

At the beginning of the 1970's the Air Force began designing small anti-satellite weapons with a long-wave infrared targeting system, without a propelling charge, designed to be launched from the surface of the earth or from an airplane. They were supposed to put satellites out of commission by mechanical contact with them. Other varieties of antisatellites with various basing modes, equipped with an active radar homing device and a high-explosive charge, or intended to put a satellite out of commission by the force of a collision, were also considered.

For example, the Pentagon returned to the idea of using aircraft to carry antisatellite weapons, an idea dating back to 1959, when the Air Force was working on the "Bold Orion" program and began testing an antisatellite missile of the same name, launched from a B-47. The possibility of this kind of interception was then demonstrated with a simulated interception of the American Explorer VI satellite over Cape Canaveral. As a result of defects in targeting equipment, only four such tests were conducted, and priority was then assigned to antisatellite complexes using nuclear weapons.³

By the middle of the 1970's these and other ideas about antisatellite weapons, the experience in the development of homing ABM missiles with non-nuclear warheads, developed by the Vought firm as part of the HIT program, and the preparations made by the Army and the Honeywell firm in 1977 for the experimental interception of an ICBM re-entry vehicle in the mid-course phase by non-nuclear means as part of the HOE program,⁴ lay at the basis of the plans to develop the ASAT system.

On 8 September 1977 the Air Force signed a contract for 58.7 million dollars with the Vought firm for work on a new system, which was to be completed by 15 April 1980 and tested in 1981. The work on this program was expected to occupy one-fourth of the firm's employees, and the total cost of designing the system was estimated at 600 million dollars.⁵ The program the Vought firm worked on was designated "2134," and the weapons system was called the MALS.⁶

The Vought firm took a warhead from the HIT program as the basis for its anti-satellite weapon. It was a unit with an optical targeting system and a miniature built-in digital computer, surrounded by cylindrical rocket engines to control the movement of the warhead and of its kill components. In March 1979 the warhead of the projected antisatellite was demonstrated at a meeting of the Senate Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations. It was 45 centimeters long, 30 centimeters in diameter, and weighed around 15 kilograms. The antisatellite, designed to destroy targets on contact, was to be equipped with sustainers and microtrackers.⁷

At this time the final decision was made in favor of an ASAT system launched from an F-15 fighter, rather than with the aid of a modified Minuteman 3 ICBM, because, as its supporters insisted, of the greater flexibility of this system and the possibility of changing the trajectory of the antisatellite depending on the orbit of the target satellite. A return to the ground-launch option was envisaged in the event that a satellite in a stationary orbit would have to be intercepted or that technical defects would be encountered in air launching.

Tests in 1980 confirmed the ability of the ASAT system to put satellites out of commission in high-speed collisions.

As the work progressed, estimates of the cost changed. The Vought firm estimated the preliminary expenses of developing and testing the antisatellite at around 197 million dollars. According to some calculations, the creation of the entire system could cost around 700 million, deployment could cost 675 million, and operation for 10 years could cost 500 million. There are also other figures: According to the estimates of the Department of the Air Force, the cost of creating a system based on antisatellites of this type could reach 4 billion dollars, depending on the scales of deployment, and experts from the congressional General Accounting Office put this figure at over 10 billion dollars. The United States planned to spend over a billion dollars on it from 1983 to 1986.⁸

The work on the system was performed by two firms--Vought and Boeing. The first adapted the Altair missile for use as a second-stage booster and developed its own interceptor (antisatellite), which was called the MHV,⁹ and its separation mechanism. The firm enlisted the services of other companies to develop certain subsystems: Hughes Aircraft (infrared sensors for the targeting subsystem); Singer (targeting subsystem); Harris (built-in computers).

The Boeing firm modified a SRAM missile for use as the first-stage booster and designed the equipment for the carrier plane and for the PMOC experimental flight control center,¹⁰ which is part of the NORAD system.

McDonnell Douglas modified the F-15 plane.

In October 1980 the Defense Department approved a program for the further development of the antisatellite and scheduled tests with the interception of a specially designed dummy satellite before 1983.

In the type of ASAT system chosen,¹¹ a two-stage rocket is launched from an F-15. An interceptor measuring 30.5 x 33 centimeters is installed in the front end of the second stage, above an inertial targeting system. The rocket and antisatellite combined are 6 meters long, their maximum diameter is around 0.45 meters, and they weigh 1.5 tons (according to other sources, the respective figures are 5.4 meters, around 0.5 meters, and 1,180 kilograms). The rocket takes the antisatellite to a specific point in space, where it is revved up to 20 revolutions per second and is pointed at the target.

The test flights are to proceed in three stages:

The launching of a rocket with a dummy antisatellite (to gauge the compatibility of the rocket and plane and to perfect launching to a specific point in space);

The launching of a rocket with an antisatellite, without interception, and an MHV at a specific star (to gauge the effectiveness of the infrared targeting system and the ability to put the MHV in a particular point in space);

The interception of inflatable target satellites.¹²

Before the ASAT system is deemed operable, at least five target satellites (or three in a row) must be shot down in test flights.

According to reports in the American press, 17 flight tests of ASAT system components without the separation of the rocket from the plane were conducted in the United States between the end of 1982 and November 1984. The first of the 12 tests planned for 1984-1986 was conducted on 21 January 1984 to evaluate the performance of the power unit of the rocket launched from the F-15. Infrared telescopes and trackers were tested on 13 November 1984.

On 13 September 1985 the United States conducted the first of the series of projected tests with a real target in space. A two-stage rocket launched from a high-altitude F-15 delivered its front end to the target (an American Soulwind satellite was used as the target), and the satellite was destroyed at a distance of 450 kilometers from earth. Further tests on targets in space, however, were blocked by Congress. In 1986 the Pentagon conducted two tests: one directly connected with the ASAT program, with the system homing in on the heat emitted by a star; and the other to perfect the track and approach system.

Several defects were discovered during the tests of the ASAT system and the creation of target satellites. The elimination of these, according to some estimates, could delay the initial and complete operational readiness of the system for at least a year and cause a commensurate increase in its cost.

Plans for the use of the system in battle envisage the following: The plane carrying the rocket on a special ventral pylon, where auxiliary control and launch equipment will be located, will be informed of the target designation by ground services while it is on an airfield or in the air and will then be guided to the launch area. Here the pilot will turn the plane to the correct angle for interception with precise data from the ground. The rocket can be launched while the plane is flying horizontally or is pitching up (an abrupt increase in altitude) to give the rocket additional speed, and at subsonic or supersonic speeds at altitudes of up to 30 kilometers. The time frame for the launch can be no less than 10 seconds, which is more time than is needed for the launching of conventional "air-to-air" missiles of the Sparrow type. The rocket delivers the interceptor to the rendezvous site. The interceptor is released, and then the sensors of its homing system detect the target and close in on it. The kill is the result of the interceptor's collision with the target, and can be accomplished with a relative speed of convergence of up to 13.7 k/sec.¹³ The U.S. Air Force is also considering an interceptor which explodes when it approaches the target as an alternative option.

The kill capabilities of the ASAT system are assessed on the basis of the properties of all its elements, including the F-15. The airborne ASAT complex in the ammunition bay of the F-15 is a self-contained unit and includes a built-in computer with algorithms of aircraft maneuvers and launch operations, which means that any F-15 could be re-equipped to carry the system within 6 hours and virtually excludes the need for the special

training of pilots. Its use in battle will require relatively few deployment sites, because this fighter plane has a range of 2,500 km (or 7,500 with in-flight refueling), sufficient to cover the zones of projected interception. Basing the ASAT on a fighter plane increased the operational flexibility and survivability of this weapon by making it possible to deploy it on various permanent bases, but it also compounded the problem of verifying any possible agreements connected with it.

According to the estimates of MIT researchers, the rocket of the ASAT system can take the MHV to an altitude of 450 miles (around 720 km) in 140 seconds, guaranteeing its initial speed of around 9 km/sec (with consideration for gravity and without consideration for the initial speed and flight altitude of the F-15). According to SIPRI researchers, the ASAT system can destroy the majority of satellites in orbit at an altitude of up to 450 km. The specialists from MIT feel that it could be used against satellites orbiting at an altitude of up to 1,000 km.¹⁴

The Air Force planned to put the ASAT system in a state of initial combat readiness in 1987. Complete combat readiness was scheduled for 1988.¹⁵ These dates were made unattainable, however, when Congress cut off the funds for testing the system on a real target in space.

If the ASAT system had been developed and deployed, it would have been under the organizational jurisdiction of the Air Force Space Command, which was established on 1 September 1982 and which has transferred many of its functions to the combined space command under the direct jurisdiction of the secretary of defense and JCS and accountable to the President for all space systems and operations in space through the Defense Department.

Most of the battle management of the ASAT aerospace complexes is to be conducted from the administrative center of the NORAD command (on Mount Cheyenne, near Colorado Springs, Colorado), through command points near the basing sites of F-15 fighters or directly from these points. No plans have been made to secure the F-15 bases as organizational elements, because this will allow the tactical air command to use the bases for conventional missions. In the future the functions of the Prototype Missions Operations Center could be transferred to the combined missions operations center, which the Air Force is establishing near Patterson Air Force Base (in Colorado) and which will be linked with the NORAD battle management center.

In the future the ASAT program will entail continuous work to perfect it and the equipment securing its operation. A few years ago the basing of F-15 planes in the southern hemisphere was considered--for example, in New Zealand or on the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. Current R & D projects are investigating the possibility of equipping the ASAT booster with more powerful propulsion plants. The additional cost of perfecting the entire system has been estimated at 1 or 2 billion dollars. According to some estimates, the creation of a system to launch MHV's to higher orbits (even stationary ones) with Trident or Minuteman missiles would require from 3.5 billion to 7.5 billion dollars (depending on the number of missiles purchased).¹⁶

The properties described above put the ASAT in the category of second-generation antisatellite weapons systems. It could become the basis for some elements of a space-based ABM system (with subsequent reworking). In terms of its technological level and the level of its subsystems and support systems, it is related in several ways to the weapons envisaged in the SDI program. The absence of treaty restrictions on antisatellite weapons is regarded by militarist circles in the United States as an opportunity to test the components of Star Wars weapons in circumvention of the 1972 ABM Treaty. Officially, ASAT is intended to destroy Soviet satellites, which, according to Western sources, could be used for antiship weapon targeting. In fact, however, the antisatellite weapon can be used to destroy national technical means of verification and "blind" the USSR's early warning systems in order to secure a first nuclear strike and protect American strategic defensive systems for the repulsion of the impending retaliatory strike.¹⁷ In the opinion of L. Aspin, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in the 99th Congress, the deployment of these systems could "result in the most unstable situation ever since the creation of the first atom bomb."

The realization of the threat posed by the ASAT system to international security and to the United States' own security gave rise to widespread opposition in Congress and the American public. The congressmen opposed to antisatellite weapons are striving to prevent the final testing of the system because they believe that these last tests would complicate the conclusion of any agreements in this sphere with the Soviet Union, and they feel that these agreements should be concluded.

For fiscal year 1984 Congress approved the amendment of Senator P. Tsongas (Democrat, Massachusetts) banning the testing of weapons against objects in space. During the discussion of legislation for the next fiscal year, 1985, the administration exerted maximum pressure on the Capitol, and Congress made concessions and authorized no more than three ASAT tests against targets in space, although it is true that this authorization was made conditional upon the observance of several conditions by the administration. After the first such test in September 1985, however, a ban was again included in the bill approved by both houses on military appropriations for FY 1986. The President had to sign it and it became law. When the budget for FY 1987 was being discussed, the House of Representatives again voted to ban appropriations for tests of antisatellite weapons in August 1986. At that same time, a large group of congressmen advocated the complete cessation of the financing of the system in general. This began a new round of the battle. As a result, the Senate followed the example of the House and voted for this restriction. One indicator of the mood on Capitol Hill is the fact that in the "package" of amendments proposed by the House and later nullified by a conference committee, this initiative was the only one that was not subjected to any changes for the sake of compromise.

According to many Western experts and analysts, the Soviet unilateral moratorium on the emplacement of antisatellite weapons in space of 18 August 1983 and the Soviet Union's subsequent show of restraint after the first test of the American ASAT system against a real target in space played an important part in the struggle of opinions on this matter in recent years in the U.S.

political arena. The USSR is known to have repeatedly expressed its willingness to reach agreements with the United States on the mutual renunciation of tests of any antisatellite weapons systems, on the prohibition of the creation of new systems, and on the elimination of existing ones.

FOOTNOTES

1. By the middle of the 1970's these systems were removed from operational status, and the Air Force system was scrapped. American experts believe, and this belief has been corroborated by several experiments, that the use of a nuclear charge would create the risk of "blinding" American satellites (see SSHA: EPI, 1984, No 5, pp 113, 114; MEMO, 1984, No 1, p 37).
2. They include the Air Force's "Saint" program for the creation of an inspector-antisatellite, capable of destroying the inspected satellite if necessary; the Navy's "Early Spring" program, in which a ballistic missile was to be launched from a submarine and fire shrapnel at a satellite; the Navy's "Skipper" program, in which satellites were to be put out of commission by shooting them with small steel projectiles.
3. B. Jasani and C. Lee, "Countdown to Space War," London and Philadelphia, 1984, p 64.
4. HIT--homing intercept technology; HOE--homing overlay experiment.
5. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 1977, vol 107, No 6, p 71; FLIGHT, 1977, vol 112, No 3575, p 815; AEROSPACE DAILY, 1977, vol 88, No 4, pp 26, 27.
6. MALS--miniature air launched system.
7. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 1979, vol 110, No 26, p 23.
8. AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA, 1985, No 8, pp 46, 47; SSHA: EPI, 1984, No 5, p 116.
9. MHV--miniature homing vehicle.
10. PMOC--prototype missions operations center.
11. The description is based on data in AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 1978-1980.
12. These are being created by the Avco firm. Targets are launched before the interception test, from the NASA range on Wallops Island or from Vandenberg Air Force Base by Scout boosters. The target satellite is equipped with an autonomous power pack to simulate the heat properties of various targets and with monitoring instruments to assess the results of unsuccessful tests (or failures). At least 10 such satellites are to be built.

13. For a more detailed discussion, see AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA, 1985, No 8, pp 46, 47.
14. "Studies in Science and Technology for International Security," Report No 10, Cambridge (Mass), March 1984, pp 34-38, 43.
15. SSHA: EPI, 1984, No 5, pp 116, 117.
16. DEFENSE DAILY, 1983, vol 130, No 28, p 219.
17. SSHA: EPI, 1985, No 2, pp 3-14.

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